本論文利用契約理論為研究途徑基礎, 研究近年台灣房仲業「精英招募方案」之薪資結構。試圖從「機制設計」(mechanism design) 的觀點建立理論模型以解釋台灣房仲業者提供此一方案背後的原因。本研究從台灣房仲業產業特性為前提出發, 解釋「精英招募專案」以下三點特色: 1.願意招募無房仲相關工作經驗之「新手」進行培訓。2. 雇主培訓期最適薪資不採取誘因薪資而為固定薪資。3.培訓期最適薪資高於保留工資。

Based on the contract theorem, the thesis studies the wage structure of 「The project of elite recruitment」in the industry of real estate in Taiwan.Try to build the model from the view of mechanism design explains why the industry of real estate in Taiwan have 「The project of elite recruitment」.In the thesis, begins from the characteristics of Taiwan’s real estate industry to explain the followings about the 「The project of elite recruitment」. 1. The employers are willing to recruit and have trainings to those who have no related work experience in the industry of real estate. 2. In the training period, the employers pay the fixed compensation and do not take the incentive compensation as the optimal compensation. 3. The optimal compensation
is higher than the reservation compensation in the training period.

1 緒論3
1.1 研究動機與目的. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 台灣房仲市場概述. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.1 台灣房仲業發展歷史. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.2 在職教育訓練之培訓過程. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3 文獻回顧. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2 「精英招募專案」培訓與雇用薪資之探討19
2.1 基本模型. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2 雇用期薪資的決定. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3 培訓期薪資的決定. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4 結論. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3 房仲業薪資策略之比較研究33
3.1 心力投入對產出的創造不需人力資本支持. . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.1.1 雇用期薪資的決定. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.1.2 培訓期薪資的決定. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.1.3 結論. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2 在職教育訓練由雇主負擔. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2.1 結論. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4 結論43
參考文獻46
A 台灣房仲業大事記51
A.1 八大仲介品牌區域店數. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
A.2 台灣房仲業歷年重大事項. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
A.3 民國一百年台灣各家房仲業者徵才計畫. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

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