有鑑於簽賭與假球在運動界中橫行，我們欲從球隊、明星選手、組頭、賭徒的觀點來研究分析此情形。首先根據四位參與者各自的特性，建立各自的效用函數探討參與者之間的相關性，再利用賽局理論為分析的方法去找尋發生的條件，及能從什麼地方著手減少明星選手接受賄賂的誘因，和防範組頭的賄賂。本文發現，在參與者分別符合四種條件之下，會造成明星球員打假球與簽賭的均衡發生。之後在加入裁判的外在因素時，球隊、組頭、明星都多了不確定性，其機率要視裁判的哨音與明星天賦相抗衡的程度。為了達到至少讓明星盡力比賽的目的，獨立的官方須從提高抓假球的機率與提高對明星的懲罰程度著手；明星選手贏球得到的剩餘滿足感需大於賄賂金扣除懲罰程度；官方需加強對裁判的保安措施等…。當組頭遊說裁判與裁判賭球並存下，此時組頭會浮現占優策略為不賄賂，明星選手也會盡力比賽，成功有效的抑制打假球情形的發生，但如果遊說與賭球影響的機率不同時，結果還有待商討。

In view of the rampant spread betting and match-fixing in the sports world , we want from a team , a star player , a bookie , a gambler point of view to analyze this case study . First, according to the characteristics of each of four participants to establish their own utility function to explore the relationship between the participants , then use game theory as a method of analysis to find conditions occur , and what started reducing from star player to accept a bribe incentives, and prevention a bride of the bookie. We find that , under the participants were in line with the four conditions will cause the star player match-fixing and gambling equilibrium occur. After adding external factors , the referee , then the team , the bookie , the stars are more uncertain , depending on the degree of its probability referee's whistle with star talent to compete . In order to achieve at least try to make the star to do his/her best of the purpose of the game , the official shall be independent from the improved catch and raise the probability of fixing the degree of punishment star proceed ; remainder satisfaction need to get star players to win more than bribery deducting punitive ; official need to strengthen referee security measures and so on. When the bookie lobbying referee and the referee gambling situations exist , the bookie at this time will emerge as the dominant strategy is “no bribe” , star players will try to do his/her best , suppress the occurrence of match-fixing cases effectively . However, if the probability of influence of lobbying and gambling is not the same, the results still need to discuss.

摘要 i
Abstract ii
目錄 iii
表目錄 iv
圖目錄 v
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究流程與架構 2
第二章 文獻回顧 3
第三章 理論模型 5
第一節 模型假設 5
第二節 條件下的納許均衡 10
第三節 遊說裁判 18
第四節 裁判賭球 24
第四章 結論與建議 28
第一節 結論 28
第二節 未來研究建議 29
參考文獻 31

一、中文部分
1. 張維迎著，劉楚俊編校(2000)，「賽局理論與信息經濟學」，台北市茂昌圖書有限公司。
2. 郭俊成(2008)，教室裡的犯罪-老師和學生之間的賽局，國立中山大學經濟研究所碩士論文。
3. 謝紹群(2011)，中華職棒假球案原因初探，國立台灣大學管理學院商學研究所碩士論文。

二、英文部分
1. Bag,P.K. and B.Saha,2011. “Match-fixing under competitive odds.” Games and Economic Behavior,Vol.73,pp.318–344.
2. Becker,G.S.,1968. “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” Journal of Political Economy,Vol.76,No.2,pp.169-217.
3. Eber,N.,2002, “Credibility and Independence of the World Anti-Doping Agency: A Barro-Gordon-Type Approach to Antidoping Policy.” Journal of Sports Economics,Vol.3,No.1,pp. 90-96.
4. Haugen,K.K.,2004, “The Performance-Enhancing Drug Game.” Journal of Sports Economics,Vol.5,No.1,pp.67-86.
5. Hill,D.,2010, “A critical mass of corruption: why some football leagues have more match-fixing than others.” International Journal of Sports Marketing & Sponsorship,Vol.11,Issue 3,p221-235.
6. Wolfers,J.,2006, “Point Shaving: Corruption in NCAA Basketball.” The American Economic Review,Vol.96,No.2,pp.279-283.