本文運用Levin (2003) 關係契約與自我執行機制的概念, 建立模型探討雇主與雇員雙方於公司逃稅過程中, 分享不法利益的合作談判空間, 並且分析政府管制政策對於公司逃稅決策的影響。

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1 緒論..........................................................................................3
2 公司逃稅之外部操弄與內部控制的抵換關係:
Chen and Chu (2005) 模型的再檢視....................................6
2.1 公司不逃稅時之誘因工資. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . . . 7
2.2 公司企圖逃稅時的誘因工資. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . . . . . . 8
2.2.1 雇員無須承擔逃稅責任時之誘因工資. . . . . . .. . . . . . . 8
2.2.2 雇員須承擔逃稅責任時之誘因工資. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Chen and Chu (2005) 模型的再檢討. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3 公司企圖逃稅時關係契約工資之談判.................................15
3.1 勞雇雙方合作逃稅之關係契約. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1.1 長期關係契約. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . .... . . . 19
3.1.2 恆定關係契約. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................. 20
3.2 恆定關係契約的自我執行條件. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.3 恆定關係契約均衡之比較靜態分析. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.3.1 政策參數與逃稅利得分享率對於最適心力投入水準的影響. . .25
3.3.2 政府政策對於合作逃稅之「談判空間」的影響. . . . . 25
3.3.3 逃稅利得分享率對於「談判空間」的影響. . . . . .. . . . 29
4 結論31
參考文獻32

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