廠商間面臨單位成本資訊不對稱訊息時,會為了顯現本身成本類型與所擁有的成本優勢,而透過選擇明確訊號以達到目的。本文就廠商採取單位成本降低R&D策略時分析,國外廠商可以藉選擇增加產量來傳遞成本訊號,甚至有造成傾銷之可能。另外,在考慮有成本的R&D投入下,R&D訊號較產出訊號欠缺實用性。然而當進口國採取反傾銷措施保護國內產業,且國外廠商採取積極態度避免傾銷懲罰,傾銷訊號會失去作用,但R&D支出可作為取代之成本訊號。

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1 緒論………………………………………………………………1
1.1 研究動機與目的………………………………………………1
2 文獻回顧…………………………………………………………3
2.1 傾銷與反傾銷…………………………………………………3
2.2 R&D……………………………………………………………4
2.3 訊息傳遞賽局…………………………………………………5
2.4 .不對稱訊息下傾銷分析………………………………………7
2.5 研究方法與架構………………………………………………7
3 模型架構…………………………………………………………9
3.1 基本假設………………………………………………………9
3.2 第二期模型分析………………………………………………10
3.3 第一期模型分析………………………………………………14
3.3.1 第一期,國外廠商為高單位成本廠商時分析………………15
3.3.2 第一期,國外廠商為低單位成本廠商時分析………………17
3.4 無成本R&D模型傾銷情況討論………………………………22
3.5 有成本R&D信號分析…………………………………………25
4 反傾銷保護下, R&D信號分析…………………………………30
4.1 反傾銷法律保護與產量調整…………………………………30
4.1.1 受AD保護,產生混同均衡,最適產量,市場均衡價格和預期
利潤…………………………………………………………………36
4.2 在AD保護下,R&D信號分析…………………………………37
4.2.1 低單位成本廠商採取R&D策略分析………………………37
4.2.2 高單位成本廠商採取R&D策略分析………………………38
5 結論與建議………………………………………………………41

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