本文旨在探討台灣上市櫃公司中，家族企業的公司治理對現金持有的影響，並依據代理問題的觀點提出三點假說。實證結果發現，家族企業的現金持有較非家族企業現金持有低，此現象符合支出假說。本文另發現台灣家族企業中，現金持有隨著家族控制股東持股增加而下降，可見所有權集中加劇了支出的行為。此外，家族企業其董事會獨立性愈高，傾向持有愈多的現金。

This study explores the influence of corporate governance on cash holdings in Taiwan-listed family firms. I developed three hypotheses based on the agency problem. The empirical results are : First, cash holdings are significantly lower in family firms than in non-family firms, and this finding is consistent with the spending hypothesis. Second, when family firms have higher control rights, the cash holdings will be lower. Last, the family firms with higher board independence tend to hold more cash.

論文審定書 i
摘要 ii
Abstract iii
第一章 緒論 1
第二章 文獻回顧與假說 3
2.1. 權衡理論與現金持有 3
2.2. 代理問題與現金持有 4
2.3. 家族企業特性與現金持有 5
第三章 研究資料與方法 8
3.1 資料來源與樣本選取 8
3.2 研究變數定義 8
3.2.1 家族企業 8
3.2.2 公司治理 9
3.2.3 控制變數 10
3.2.4 應變數 11
3.3 研究方法及模型設定 11
第四章 實證結果 13
4.1 敘述統計 13
4.2 迴歸結果分析 20
4.3 穩健性測試 24
4.3.1 替換所有權與董事會結構變數 24
4.3.2 替換現金持有之期數 26
4.3.3 加入生命週期 27
第五章 結論與建議 33
參考文獻 35
附錄 38

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