本研究的主旨為檢視審計委員會對公司創新的影響。我們使用專利和引用數量相關的追蹤資料，加上美國上市公司審計委員會的五個特徵，來代表審計委員會和公司創新的效率。結果證實，審計委員會強而有力的監控能力可能會破壞創新生產力。此外，我們將樣本依據產業競爭力、機構投資人持股即被併購的機率分別探討，結果顯示低競爭產業、高機構投資人持股和被併購機率較低的公司更可能破壞創新，也說明審計委員會的嚴格監督可能會阻止有風險性的創新行為，造成對公司創新的負面影響。

The main purpose of this paper is to inspect the impact of audit committees on corporate innovation. We use panel data associated with the patents and citations number and five characteristics of audit committees of U.S. public companies to proxy the efficiency of audit committee and innovation, and find that the strong monitoring from audit committees may undermine innovation. In addition, separating our sample on the basis of industry competitiveness, institutional investor holding, and the probability of merger and acquisition, there results reveals that companies in less competitive industries, with high institutional investor holding and lower probability of M&A are more likely to disrupt innovation, further elaborate that the strict oversight from audit committees may deter risky innovation activities and thus has a negative impact on corporate innovation.

論文審定書……………………………………………….i
誌謝辭…………………………………………………….ii
中文摘要…………………………………………………iii
Abstract…………………………………………………..iv
1. Introduction……………………………………………1
2. Literature Review and hypothesis ……………….…..7
2.1 Audit committee independence…………………….8
2.2 Financial expertise…………………………..……...10
2.3 Age…………………………..………………………..11
2.4 Tenure ……………………………………………….12
2.5 Size…………………………………………………...13
3. Data and measures ……………….. ………………...14
3.1 Data………………………………………………….14
3.2 Empirical Specification…………………………….15
3.2.1 Corporate Innovation…………………………..16
3.2.2 Audit Committee Characteristics ……………..17
3.2.3 Control Variables……………………………….18
4. Empirical results….….….….….….….….….….….....19
4.1 Descriptive analysis………………………………..19
4.2 Multiple regression.................................................20
5. Other tests for the Audit Committee………………..25
5.1 Industry Competitiveness………………………....25
5.2 Institutional Investors Holding……………………27
5.3 Probability of being merged and acquired………29
6. Conclusion…………………………………………….31
Reference………………………………………………...33
Appendix…………………………………………………62

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