由於企業資本額、組織規模大，需集合眾人之資金並委由經營團隊管理營運，但可能雙方目標不同，而使企業所有權與經營權可能分離，且在股東與經營層資訊不對等即時的背景下，經營層使用公司資源可能以最大化個人利益為優先，卻未必使得股東利潤最大最佳化，進而衍生經營層代理職責問題，如何落實公司治理問題解決代理問題?過去有許多相關文獻針對公司治理議題之探討，公司治理與營運績效有某種意涵的相關性。本文藉由A、B兩家公司在公司治理評鑑項目有關之股權結構、董事會運作、高階經理人異動與營運損益績效之問題探討其密切性及影響。本文透過對個案A、B公司的產業分析，及公開資訊觀測站之有關公司治理評鑑項目：董監持股及質押比；近幾年財報營運損益；公司虧損但董監事報酬增加的資料，參考相關文獻，分析及相關性並提出研究建議。 公司治理的強化；內稽內控的制度健全性；控制股東的股權及經理人的結構；董監持股比例；董、總是否合一等，都連帶影響營運績效的好壞。建議落實董事會的功能發揮，公司治理制度從嚴審評，建立高連結性的經理人績效與盈餘分配權，可期待降低股權與經營權之間的代理成本，避免少數股權控制公司經營衍生的相關問題。以全體利益關係人、所有股東、公司利益最大化為決策重點指標。因此也可讓經理人穩定職務，專注於本業的績效，時時保有企業的競爭力，創造企業最大利益。

Corporations operate with large capital bases and organizational structures often require investments from various individuals and engage the services of professional management teams. However, separation of ownership and control against the backdrop of information asymmetry between shareholders and management could potentially result in management utilizing company resources to maximize personal interests instead of shareholders’ welfare, leading to agency problems at management level. How to solve agency issues with corporate governance? Many literatures have studied the topic of corporate governance and identified certain correlations between corporate governance and operation performance. The paper looked at Company A and Company B in terms of ownership structure, board operation, and top executive turnover which are corporate governance evaluation categories and discussed their relationships and impacts on operational performance.
Through industry analysis of Company A and Company B as well as their information available on the Market Observation Post System by corporate governance evaluation categories, including shareholding and equity pledge ratios of directors and supervisors, financial performance in recent years, and the relationship between operational performance and remunerations to directors and supervisors, and with references to relevant literatures, this paper analyzed the correlations and proposed recommendations.
Operational performance is affected by improvement of corporate governance, the soundness of internal audit and internal control system, shareholdings of controlling shareholders and management structure, shareholding percentages of directors and supervisors, as well as whether the positions of chairman and president are served by the same person.
This paper recommended to operate an effective board, keep tight evaluation of corporate governance systems, and establish high correlations between management performance and rights to profits for a reduction in agency costs between owners and management, while at the same time avoid issues stemming from management by minority shares. The key indicator for decision-making shall be to optimize the interests of all stakeholders, shareholders and the company. Management can then ensure job security, focus on performance of core business, and maintain corporate competitiveness to create maximum benefits for the company.

論文審定書 i
誌 謝 ii
摘 要 iii
Abstract iv
目錄 vi
圖目錄 vii
表目錄 viii
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究架構 4
第四節 研究流程 5
第二章 文獻探討 7
第一節 公司治理 7
第二節 代理理論 21
第三節 股權結構、董事會與公司價值 25
第四節 公司治理與營運績效相關文獻 29
第三章 研究設計及方法 31
第一節 五力分析 31
第二節 公司治理評鑑指標 32
第三節 個案A公司產業 34
第四節 個案B公司產業 37
第四章 研究結果與分析 40
第一節 個案A、B公司現況 40
第二節 個案A、B公司產業五力分析 45
第三節 實證結果與分析 47
第五章 結論與建議 54
參考文獻 55

 

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