近年來對於專利的價值逐年提高，專利競爭的策略應用已經屬於市場競爭的一環，而專利戰爭與訴訟的目的不外乎：﹝一﹞捍衛研發成果﹝二﹞迫使對手無法競爭進而退出市場﹝三﹞對侵權廠商進行專利攻擊，可嚇阻對手並宣揚自己的專利，藉此賺取權利金或賺取高於「所失利益」的賠償金。
本文在侵權資訊完全與不完全下的情況下，以預期的角度推導在專利廠商應用其改良、訴訟、和解等策略下，兩廠商在專利到期日前後利潤的變化，並加以分析雙方廠商在這些策略交互影響下所產生出的均衡結果。
研究結果顯示，當侵權行為在完全訊息的情況下擁有專利的廠商不會受到侵權廠商的牽制；在訊息不完全下兩期利潤會受到侵權機率的影響。和解金方面在完全訊息的情況下不論改良與否都不會影響和解金額；在訊息不完全下則存在不同的和解金額。但所有的策略還是要以成本為考量，成本高於獲利時，企業應衡量是否進行專利訴訟。

In recent years, the value of patents increased year by year, The application of the strategy of patent competition already belongs to the market competition. The purpose of the patent wars and litigation is (1) to protect their R&D products (2) to force the opponent out of the market (3) promote their patents in order to earn royalties or earn more than " lucrum cessans " compensation.
This article in right infringement information completely and incompletely below situation, by anticipated angle inferential reasoning, in the patent manufacturer applies its under improvement, lawsuit, reconciliation and other strategies, two manufacturers the change of profit around the patent due date, and analyze the bilateral manufacturers in the equilibrium result that under these strategy interactions has.
The results show that patent holder will not be affected by the infringement
Manufacturer in the complete information and patent holder profit will be affected by the profitability of the infringement in the Incomplete Information. In the case of the settlement gold, no matter whether the improvement or not, the settlement will not be affected in the case of perfect information . Different amounts of settlement gold if the information is imperfect. However, all the strategies for the patent must depand on cost, When the cost is higher than the profit ,the company must consider whether to conduct the patent litigation.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究背景 2
第三節 研究方法 4
第二章 文獻回顧 5
第三章 理論模型 7
第一節 完全訊息模型架構與分析 7
第二節 不完全訊息模型架構與分析 12
第四章 延伸討論 18
第五章 結論與建議 19
第一節 研究結論 19
第二節 研究建議 19
參考文獻 21

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英文部分
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