在政治個人化與媒介化的趨勢下，領袖情感極化（LAP）已成為當代民主系統性裂痕的核心指標。本研究利用 2022 年 TIGCR 資料，針對 1,257 名黨派認同者進行實證分析，探討媒體組合（Media Repertoires）如何調節政黨認同對領袖評價的影響。實證結果顯示，台灣傳統媒體環境仍是引發極化的「極化峰值（Legacy Peak）」。然而，研究發現了顯著的「對象特異性效果」：在評價繼任者（賴清德）時，「全媒體攝取者（Omnivores）」透過「情感緩衝（Affective Buffering）」展現出強健的極化緩解效應，證實資訊異質性能稀釋敵意而非引發反擊效應。相較之下，僅攝取新媒體者受限於政黨認同的「錨定效應」，而現任領袖（蔡英文）則因形象高度「情感結晶化」，導致媒體的調節效果在此類對象上受到結構性制約。本研究結論指出，資訊環境的去極化潛力，取決於媒體多樣性與政治目標物形象穩定性之間的交互作用。

This study investigates how media repertoires moderate the impact of partisan identity on Leader Affective Polarization (LAP) in Taiwan. Analyzing 1,257 partisan identifiers from the 2022 TIGCR survey, the results identify legacy media as the "Legacy Peak" of affective extremity. However, a significant "Target-Specific Effect" emerges for the successor (Lai Ching-te), "Omnivores" exhibit a robust "Affective Buffering" effect, suggesting that information heterogeneity dilutes animosity rather than triggering a backfire effect. Conversely, this mitigation is absent for "New Media-Only" users due to the "Anchoring Effect" of partisan identity and is structurally constrained for the incumbent (Tsai Ing-wen) by "Affective Crystallization." This research underscores that the depolarizing potential of media depends on the interplay between repertoire diversity and the image stability of the political target.

論文審定書 i
謝 誌 ii
摘要 iv
Abstract v
Table of Contents vi
List of Figures ix
List of Tables x
Chapter 1 : Introduction 1
1.1 Research Background 1
1.2 Research Motivation: The Interplay of Structural Partisanship and Media Effects 4
1.3 Research Questions and Objectives 6
1.4 Significance of the Study 7
Chapter 2 : Literature Review 9
2.1 Theoretical Foundations of Affective Polarization 9
2.2 The Rise of Leader Affective Polarization (LAP) 10
2.3 Media Environment in Taiwan: Structural Divergence and Polarized Fields 12
2.3.1 The Legacy Media: Political Parallelism and External Constraints 13
2.3.2 New Media in Taiwan: Networked Fluidity and Incidental Exposure 14
2.3.3 The Interactive Logic: From Media Diversity to Party Ambivalence 15
2.4 Conditional Factors and Competing Explanations of Media Effects 16
2.4.1 Selective Exposure and Conditional Echo Chambers 16
2.4.2 The Structural Anchor: Constraints of Negative Partisanship 18
2.4.3 The Interactive Logic: From Media Diversity to Party Ambivalence 18
2.4.4 Political Engagement and the Reinforcement of Extremity 19
2.4.5 The Nature of the Electorate: The Myth of Polarization 20
2.5 Theoretical Integration and Research Hypotheses 21
2.6 Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Synthesis 24
Chapter 3 : Research Design 26
3.1 Data Source and Research Sample 26
3.2 Variable Operationalization and Measurement 28
3.2.1 Core Dependent Variable: Operational Measurement of Leader Affective Polarization (LAP) 28
3.2.2 Specific Operational Indicators: 32
3.2.3 Analytical Rationale for LAP Dyads 33
3.2.4 Independent Variables: Media Repertoire Typology 34
3.2.5 Control Variables 36
3.2.6 OLS Model Dependent and Independent Variable Adjustments 40
3.3 Data Processing and Analysis Strategy 41
Chapter 4 : Empirical Results and Findings 44
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Data Foundation 44
4.1.1 Leader Feeling Thermometer Scores (0-10 Scale) 44
4.1.2 Visualizing Affective Extremity 45
4.1.3 Pearson Correlation Matrix of Core Variables 48
4.2 Baseline Analysis: Media Repertoires and the Intensity of LAP 50
4.2.1 Media Consumption Patterns and LAP Scores 51
4.3 Multivariate Analysis: The Mediating Role of Media Repertoires 53
4.3.1 Model Fit and Structural Dominance 54
4.3.2 Target-Specific Effects: The Role of Media Repertoires 55
4.3.3 The Dominance of Behavioral over Demographic Factors 56
4.4 : Summary of Hypothesis Testing 57
4.4.1 Discussion of Results: The Persistence of Structural Factors 57
Chapter 5 : Conclusion and Discussion 60
5.1 Summary of Empirical Findings 60
5.2 General Discussion: Crystallization, Interactive Logic, and Structural Anchors 62
5.2.1 The Limits of Media Effects: Affective Crystallization 63
5.2.2 The Success of Omnivores: Validating the "Interactive Logic" 63
5.2.3 The Constraints on New Media: The Structural Anchor 64
5.3 Media Literacy & Intervention: Practical Implications 65
5.3.1 Shifting the Focus: From "Digital Echo Chambers" to the "Legacy Peak" 65
5.4 Strategic Intervention: Leveraging the Interactive Logic of Omnivorousness 66
5.4.1 The "Window of Opportunity": Time-Sensitive Depolarization 67
5.5 Research Limitations and Future Directions 68
References 71
 

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