2022 年 2 月 24 日，俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭，全面爆發戰爭。歐洲多國皆對其展開前所未見的嚴厲的經濟制裁，包括對於能源的進口禁令。然歐洲一直以來對俄羅斯的能源依賴相當高，針對俄羅斯所進行的制裁對歐洲各國產生了巨大的影響，進而造成部份外交策略較和緩之國家國內發起放棄制裁的抗議活動，如德國。綜覽過去制裁相關研究，制裁的有效性與對民主的影響為重要的研究課題，然學者多數著墨於對目標國的研究。少數深入制裁國影響者，也多為對其經濟成本對國內的影響，較少探討制裁國國內因素影響經濟制裁政策。
故本研究採用個案研究法，並以最相似比較法，選擇波蘭與匈牙利作為分析對象。以案例國之政府新聞稿、議員歐洲議會之會議記錄作為制裁政策變遷之資料與民意調查結合進行分析，欲延伸學者對於人民在衝突外交政策支持因素的討論，探討人民預期之執政黨特於與制裁政策之一致性是否影響人民對制裁政策的支持。
研究結果顯示，當執政黨之制裁策略與其給予人民之預期特質具有一致性時，人民將支持其制裁策略，並使該政府的制裁政策偏向穩定；反之，當兩者產生落差時，即使制裁原本受民眾支持，也可能因民意而制裁政策不穩，甚至執政黨民意下滑而失去政權。

On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, triggering a full-scale war. Multiple European countries imposed unprecedented severe economic sanctions on Russia, including import bans on energy. However, Europe has long been highly dependent on Russian energy, and these sanctions imposed on Russia have had enormous impacts on European countries, subsequently leading to anti-sanctions protests in some countries with more moderate foreign policy approaches, such as Germany. Reviewing past sanctions-related research, the effectiveness of sanctions and their impact on democracy have been important research topics, yet scholars have predominantly focused on studying target countries. The few who have examined impacts on sanctioning countries have mostly addressed the economic costs and their domestic effects, with less exploration of how domestic factors in sanctioning countries influence economic sanctions policy.
Therefore, this study employs a case study approach combined with the Most Similar Systems Design, selecting Poland and Hungary as analytical subjects. By integrating government press releases, parliamentary records of representatives in the European Parliament, and public opinion surveys as data sources, the study aims to extend scholarly discussion on factors affecting public support for contentious foreign policies, exploring whether consistency between the public's expected ruling party characteristics and actual sanctions policy affects public support for sanctions.
The findings indicate that when a ruling party's sanctions strategy is consistent with the characteristics the public expects of it, public support for the sanctions policy is maintained and the policy tends to remain stable. Conversely, when a gap emerges between the two, even a sanctions policy that was originally supported by the public may become unstable, and the ruling party may experience declining public support or even lose power.

學位論文審定書 I
摘要 II
ABSTRACT III
目錄 V
圖次 VII
表次 VIII
第一章、緒論 1
第一節、 研究背景與動機 1
第二節、 研究問題與目的 2
第二章、文獻回顧 4
第一節、 制裁定義 4
第二節、 探討制裁目標國之文獻 4
第三節、 探討制裁雙方及第三國之文獻 7
第四節、 探討制裁國角度之文獻 8
第三章、理論框架 11
第一節、 政府特質 11
第二節、 外交政策支持 12
第三節、 小結 14
第四章、研究方法 15
第一節、 研究假設與架構 15
第二節、 研究方法與設計 15
一、 民眾對經濟制裁政策之態度 16
二、 政府特質 17
第三節、 個案選擇依據 19
一、 地理與地緣政治 19
二、 國內政治制度 20
三、 經濟依賴 21
四、 能源依賴 21
第四節、 波蘭 23
第五節、 匈牙利 24
第五章、研究結果 26
第一節、 波蘭 26
一、 第一階段（2022年2月24日至2023年4月）：積極倡議且態度嚴厲 26
二、 關鍵轉折事件：2023年4月農民抗議事件 30
三、 第二階段（2023年4月至2023年10月）：轉移制裁政策矛盾期 32
第二節、 匈牙利 33
第一階段（2022年2月24日至2022年5月）：有條件的支持 34
四、 第二階段（2022年5月至2024年）：反對歐盟擴大制裁 35
五、 第三階段（2024年至2025年） 37
第三節、 比較分析：波蘭與匈牙利制裁政策與政黨特質之一致性 38
第六章、結論與研究限制 41
第一節、 結論 41
第二節、 研究限制及未來研究方向 43
參考資料 45
壹、 中文文獻 45
貳、 外文文獻 48
附錄一、波蘭對重要外交夥伴涉及「制裁」新聞稿摘錄 73
附錄二、歐洲議會第九屆集第十屆匈牙利議員涉及「制裁」議題會議發言摘錄 82

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楊三億（2025）。複雜式避險策略研究：立陶宛、匈牙利與土耳其的安全策略選擇。問題與研究，64(3)，1-50。https://doi.org/10.30390/ISC.202509_64(3).0001
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2. 網路資料
Az ülések szó szerinti jegyzőkönyve (2022) A REPowerEU terv: Európai szolidaritás és energiabiztonság Ukrajna orosz inváziója nyomán, többek között Lengyelország és Bulgária gázellátásának közelmúltbeli beszüntetése . 19 May. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2022-05-19-INT-2-138-7500_HU.html (November 4, 2025)
Az ülések szó szerinti jegyzőkönyve (2022) Az Európai Tanács 2022. December 15-i ülésének következtetései (a vita folytatása)—Wednesday, January 18, 2023. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2023-01-18-INT-3-060-0000_HU.html (November 24, 2025)
Az ülések szó szerinti jegyzőkönyve (2022) Az Ukrajna elleni orosz támadás (a vita folytatása) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2022-03-01-INT-1-094-9375_HU.html (November 25, 2025)
Az ülések szó szerinti jegyzőkönyve (2022) Oroszország eszkalálja Ukrajna ellen folytatott agresszív háborúját https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2022-10-05-INT-3-049-0000_HU.html (November 24, 2025)
Az ülések szó szerinti jegyzőkönyve (2022) Tartsuk alacsonyan a számlákat: Az Ukrajnában zajló háború társadalmi és gazdasági hatásai, és egy extraprofitadó bevezetése - 2022. október 18., Kedd. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2022-10-18-INT-2-041-0000_HU.html (November 4, 2025)
Az ülések szó szerinti jegyzőkönyve (2023) Az Oroszországra vonatkozó uniós szankciók hatékonysága https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2023-10-17-INT-2-073-0000_HU.html (December 24, 2025)
Az ülések szó szerinti jegyzőkönyve (2023) Az Oroszországra vonatkozó uniós szankciók hatékonysága https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2023-10-17-INT-2-034-0000_HU.html (November 24, 2025)
Az ülések szó szerinti jegyzőkönyve (2023)Az Oroszországra vonatkozó uniós szankciók hatékonysága https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2023-10-17-INT-2-073-5000_HU.html (December 24, 2025)
Az ülések szó szerinti jegyzőkönyve (2024) Az Oroszország agresszív háborújával, valamint az Észak-Korea és Oroszország közötti erősödő katonai együttműködéssel szemben Ukrajnának nyújtott megingathatatlan uniós támogatás megerősítése https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-10-2024-11-26-INT-2017006432437_HU.html (November 24, 2025)
Az ülések szó szerinti jegyzőkönyve (2024) Uniós intézkedések az orosz árnyékflotta ellen és az Oroszország elleni szankciók teljes végrehajtásának biztosítása https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-10-2024-10-23-INT-2017003530138_HU.html (November 24, 2025)
Az ülések szó szerinti jegyzőkönyve (2025) Az Európai Tanács 2025. December 18–19-i ülésének előkészítése, különösen az Ukrajnának nyújtandó támogatás szükségessége, a transzatlanti kapcsolatok és az EU stratégiai autonómiája —Wednesday, December 17, 2025. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-10-2025-12-17-INT-2017052281747_HU.html (December 24, 2025)
Az ülések szó szerinti jegyzőkönyve (2025) Az orosz földgáz behozatalának fokozatos megszüntetése és az esetleges energiafüggőségek hatékonyabb nyomon követése https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-10-2025-12-16-INT-2017051634276_HU.html (December 24, 2025)
Az ülések szó szerinti jegyzőkönyve (2025) Az orosz földgáz behozatalának fokozatos megszüntetése és az esetleges energiafüggőségek hatékonyabb nyomon követése https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-10-2025-12-16-INT-2017051634300_HU.html (December 24, 2025)
Az ülések szó szerinti jegyzőkönyve (2025) Az Oroszországból az EU-ba irányuló energiabehozatal megszüntetése és a harmadik országokon keresztüli kiskapuk megszüntetése https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-10-2025-10-22-INT-2017044788303_HU.html (December 24, 2025)
Bernd Debusmann Jr. (2023) “Ukraine aid from US in doubt after failed Senate vote”. BBC News. December 6. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-67637679. (December 21, 2023)
Brüsszel háborúpárti (2024) https://kormany.hu. https://kormany.hu/hirek/brusszel-haboruparti (December 10, 2025)
Chief of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland: We must help Ukraine together but we must also do so in a coordinated way - The Chancellery of the Prime Minister (2022) Gov.pl website. The Chancellery of the Prime Minister. https://www.gov.pl/web/primeminister/chief-of-the-chancellery-of-the-prime-minister-of-poland-we-must-help-ukraine-together-but-we-must-also-do-so-in-a-coordinated-way (December 10, 2025)
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Magyarország nem csatlakozhat az orosz gázra, olajra kivetett szankciókhoz (2022) https://kormany.hu. https://kormany.hu/hirek/magyarorszag-nem-csatlakozhat-az-orosz-gazra-olajra-kivetett-szankciokhoz (December 12, 2025)
Nem fogjuk engedni, hogy Magyarországot bárki belesodorja ebbe a háborúba! (2022) https://kormany.hu. https://kormany.hu/hirek/nem-fogjuk-engedni-hogy-magyarorszagot-barki-belesodorja-ebbe-a-haboruba (December 10, 2025)
Orbán Viktor elutasította az ukrán elnök követeléseit fegyverek küldéséről és az orosz energiahordozók betiltásáról (2022) https://kormany.hu. https://kormany.hu/hirek/orban-viktor-elutasitotta-az-ukran-elnok-koveteleseit-fegyverek-kuldeserol-es-az-orosz-energiahordozok-betiltasarol (December 10, 2025)
Poland—Adopts national sanctions list affecting Russian entities in gas, coal, IT, and manufacturing sectors | Investment Policy Monitor | UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub (2022) https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policy-monitor/measures/3932/adopts-national-sanctions-list-affecting-russian-entities-in-gas-coal-it-and-manufacturing-sectors (December 10, 2025)
Premier Mateusz Morawiecki: nie ma polskiej gospodarki, bez silnego polskiego rolnictwa (2022) Portal Gov.pl. https://www.gov.pl/web/premier/premier-mateusz-morawiecki-nie-ma-polskiej-gospodarki-bez-silnego-polskiego-rolnictwa (December 10, 2025)
Prime Minister Morawiecki holds phone call with Vice President Kamala Harris—The Chancellery of the Prime Minister (2022) Gov.pl website. The Chancellery of the Prime Minister. https://www.gov.pl/web/primeminister/prime-minister-morawiecki-holds-phone-call-with-vice-president-kamala-harris (December 10, 2025)
Prime Minister Morawiecki holds phone call with Vice President Kamala Harris—The Chancellery of the Prime Minister (2022) Gov.pl website. The Chancellery of the Prime Minister. https://www.gov.pl/web/primeminister/prime-minister-morawiecki-holds-phone-call-with-vice-president-kamala-harris (December 10, 2025)
Prime Minister: Germany must not sink into unyielding egoism - The Chancellery of the Prime Minister - Gov.pl website (2022) The Chancellery of the Prime Minister. https://www.gov.pl/web/primeminister/prime-minister-germany-must-not-sink-into-unyielding-egoism (December 10, 2025)
Rikard Jozwiak. EU Sanctions Deadlock? Hungary And Slovakia Pressure Brussels Over Russia Blacklist. (March 12, 2025). https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-russia-sanctions-hungary-slovakia-blacklist-deadlock/33344214.html. (November 12, 2025)
Szijjártó Péter: A szankciók nem veszélyeztethetik Magyarország energiaellátását. (2022a). https://kormany.hu. https://kormany.hu/hirek/szijjarto-peter-a-szankciok-nem-veszelyeztethetik-magyarorszag-energiaellatasat (November 22, 2025)
Szijjártó Péter: Magyarország része és részese a közös európai álláspontnak. (2022b). https://kormany.hu. https://kormany.hu/hirek/szijjarto-peter-magyarorszag-resze-es-reszese-a-kozos-europai-allaspontnak (November 22, 2025)
Szijjártó Péter: Nem engedhetjük meg, hogy a magyar emberek fizessék meg a háború árát (2022c) https://kormany.hu. https://kormany.hu/hirek/szijjarto-peter-nem-engedhetjuk-meg-hogy-a-magyar-emberek-fizessek-meg-a-haboru-arat (November 22, 2025)
The Deputy Head of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration: This act is Poland’s voice in the European discussion on sanctions - Ministry of the Interior and Administration - Gov.pl website. (2022a). Ministry of the Interior and Administration. https://www.gov.pl/web/mswia-en/the-deputy-head-of-the-ministry-of-the-interior-and-administration-this-act-is-polands-voice-in-the-european-discussion-on-sanctions (November 30, 2025)
The Sanctions Act signed by the President—Ministry of the Interior and Administration—Gov.pl website. (2022a). Ministry of the Interior and Administration. https://www.gov.pl/web/mswia-en/the-sanctions-act-signed-by-the-president (November 30, 2025)
The sanctions list announced – a conference with Minister Mariusz Kaminski and Deputy Minister Maciej Wąsik—Ministry of the Interior and Administration—Gov.pl website. . Ministry of the Interior and Administration.(2022). https://www.gov.pl/web/mswia-en/the-sanctions-list-announced--a-conference-with-minister-mariusz-kaminski-and-deputy-minister-maciej-wasik (November 30, 2025)
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3. 資料庫
Döring, Holger, Quaas A., Hesse M., and Manow P. (2023). Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in established democracies. Development version
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