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姓名 陳玉芬(Yu-Fen Chen) 電子郵件信箱 E-mail 資料不公開
畢業系所 企業管理學系研究所(Business Management)
畢業學位 博士(Ph.D.) 畢業時期 96學年第1學期
論文名稱(中) 聲譽對公司理財之影響
論文名稱(英) Reputation Effects on Corporate Finance
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    摘要(中) 公司理財的理論在過去半世紀裡持續地發展。其中，公司的財務決策吸引許多外部投資人的關注。當公司的價值決定於外部投資人對公司經營品質的認知，且公司經理人亦在乎外部投資人對公司的看法時，該經理人作任何財務決策，將試圖強化其公司的聲譽，形成了聲譽影響公司價值的推論。然而，迄今聲譽模型仍鮮少應用於公司的財務決策。
    本文將聲譽模型應用於三項公司理財之決策，以界定聲譽對公司理財之影響：(1)可轉換公司債之贖回政策，(2)初次公開上市之決策與(3)企業融資政策。首先建構兩期聲譽模型，應用於第一項議題：聲譽對可轉換公司債贖回政策之影響，並獲致下列之結論：經營品質不佳的公司，會選擇贖回可轉換公司債；而經營品質佳的公司，則藉由不贖回可轉換公司債建立其聲譽。本文之結論與Harris和Raviv在1985年的論文結果一致，然而，聲譽模型強調除發放信號的效果外，不贖回可轉債可視為公司建立聲譽與信任的機制。
    在初次公開上市的決策議題中，本文亦建構另一聲譽模型，以分析公司聲譽對公司初次公開上市決策之影響。其結果顯示公司聲譽確實影響上市與否之決策。經營品質佳且擁有好聲譽的公司，期盼透過掛牌上市強化其聲譽；經營品質佳但過去聲譽不佳的公司，期盼透過上市建立其聲譽。經營品質不佳但過去擁有好聲譽的公司，期盼藉由上市維持其聲譽。然而，研究中亦發現經營品質佳的公司有過度投資於聲譽的現象，而經營品質不佳的公司則藉其盛名上市。這些現象導致了公司的過度上市及IPO的定價偏誤，也解釋了初次公開上市公司長期股價表現不佳及存活率大幅下降的原因。
    第三個議題為企業融資政策，本文考量財務危機風險與公司聲譽等兩大因素，建構一個聲譽模型。其結果顯示經營體質佳且擁有好聲譽的公司，可享有負債或業主權益融資上之彈性。經營品質不佳但擁有好聲譽的公司，亦可藉其盛名取得權益資金。但經營品質佳的公司，一旦聲譽不佳，則可能喪失融資管道而錯失投資良機。經營品質與聲譽均不佳的公司，將在資金市場上被淘汰。
    本文發現聲譽確實影響上述三項公司理財之決策，並建議在後續研究中進一步探討聲譽對其他公司財務決策之影響。
    摘要(英) For the past half a century, there has been progressive development in corporate finance theories, and among these, corporate financial decisions have been attracting the attention of outsiders. As the outsiders’ learning process of the firm’s private information determines the firm’s value, managers who are concerned with outsiders’ perceptions of their firms try to enhance their firms’ short-term reputation through their financial decisions. However, up to this date, few reputation models have been applied to predict these financial decisions.
    Three corporate finance issues are involved to identify the reputation effects on corporate finance: (1) convertible bond call policies, (2) IPO decisions and activities, and (3) corporate financing policies. As for the first issue, this study constructs a two-period reputation model of a convertible bond call policy. This model concludes that in equilibrium, a firm with bad management quality and a bad reputation chooses to call, while a firm with good management quality or of a good reputation builds up it reputation by not calling the convertible bonds. This is consistent with the signaling theory proposed by Harris and Raviv (1985). However, the reputation model here identifies the call policy as a reputation-building mechanism rather than being only a signaling role, and suggests that the reputation rents resolve the discrepancies of the stock’s post-call price performance.
    As for the IPO decisions and activities, this study performs another reputation model to analyze a firm’s reputation effects on IPO activities, especially on the decision to go public. The results yield that a firm’s reputation does affect its decision to go public. By listing equities publicly, firms with good management quality and a solid past would anticipate enhancing their reputations, and those with a poor past would anticipate building up good names. Furthermore, good reputation firms with bad management quality would anticipate maintaining their reputations by going public. On the other hand, it is found that good firms over-invest in building up their reputations and bad firms take advantage of their reputations to go public. Both result in firms’ over-going public and IPO mispricing. This constitutes an alternative interpretation on IPOs’ long-run underperformance and the sharp decline of the survival rate.
    As for the corporate financing policies, the other reputation model is constructed by taking both determinants, the costs of financial distress as well as the firm’s reputation into consideration. The results show that good management quality firms with good reputations enjoy their financial flexibility between debt and equity. Bad management quality firms take advantage of their good names to issue equities, which leads to over investment. Good management firms lose their financial accesses due to bad reputations, which lead to under investment. Reputations would screen the bad management quality firms with bad reputations off the market.
    This dissertation concludes that reputations indeed affect the three selected corporate financial decisions and suggests further plow on more corporate finance issues.
    關鍵字(中)
  • 企業融資策略
  • 公司理財
  • 可轉換公司債贖回政策
  • IPO長期績效不佳
  • IPO定價偏誤
  • 初次公開上市
  • 資本結構
  • 聲譽
    		• 關鍵字(英)
  • corporate financing policies
  • corporate finance
  • convertible bond call
  • going-public decision
  • IPO mispricing
  • IPO long-run underperformance
  • capital structure
  • reputation
    • 論文目次 Contents                                   Pages
    1. Introduction                   1
    2. Literature Review
    2.1 Reputation      5
    2.2 Convertible Bond Call Policies    9
    2.3 IPO                       10
    2.4 Corporate Financing Policies              12
    3. Reputation Effects on Convertible Bond Call Policies
    3.1 The Model             17
    3.2 Equilibria of the Convertible Bond Calling Game   23
    3.3 Main Reputation Effects and Empirical Evidence   28
    3.4 Conclusion of Chapter 3              31
    4. Reputation Effects on IPO Activities 
    4.1 The Model             32
    4.2 Equilibria of the Going-Public Decision   36
    4.3 Main Reputation Effects and Empirical Evidence   41
    4.4 Over-Going Public, IPO Mispricing, and Long-Run Underperformance   43
    4.5 Conclusion of Chapter 4   47
    5. Reputation Effects on Corporate Financing Policies
    5.1 The Model  49
    5.2 Equilibria of the Corporate Financing Policies   54
    5.3 Main Reputation Effects and Empirical Evidence   57
    5.4 Conclusion of Chapter 5   60
    6. Conclusion
    6.1 Contribution to the Literature   62
    6.2 Extensions   65
    Reference   67

    Figures
    Figure 1.1 Diagram of the research structure   4
    Figure 3.1 Time line of the call-conversion game   17
    Figure 3.2 The call-conversion game   19
    Figure 4.1 Time line of the IPO model   33
    Figure 5.1 Time line of the Corporate Financing Model   49
    Tables
    Table 3.1 Notation of the Calling-Conversion Model   22
    Table 4.1 Notation of the IPO Model   36
    Table 4.2 Probability Matrix of Going Public as a Function of a Firm’s Quality and Its Reputation             40
    Table 5.1 Notation of the Corporate Financing Model   53
    Table 5.2 Decision Matrix of Financing and Investing   57
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