臺灣金融主管機關規定，自2019年起所有上市及上櫃公司須強制投保董監事責任保險(Directors and Officers Liability Insurance, D&O保險)，本文採用差異中的差異法(Difference-in-Differences, DID)模型，探討強制投保政策對企業價值的整體影響。實證結果顯示，D&O保險與公司價值呈顯著正相關，企業在強制投保政策實施後整體公司價值提升，且保險金額愈高，對公司價值的正向影響愈顯著，支持監督效果假說。此外，D&O保險與研發支出及資本支出亦呈現正相關，顯示該保險制度有助於提高管理階層對短期失敗風險的容忍度，進而促進企業投入創新與擴張性投資。尤其在高額投保企業中，研發創新投入更加顯著，反映出企業在強制投保制度下，對公司治理、風險管理與長期策略之重視。

Taiwan's financial regulatory authority has mandated that since 2019, all listed and over-the-counter companies must purchase Directors and Officers Liability Insurance (D&O insurance) as a requirement. This article employs the Difference-in-Differences (DID) model to examine the overall impact of this mandatory insurance policy on corporate value. The empirical results indicate a significant positive correlation between D&O insurance and company value, demonstrating that overall company value increases following the implementation of the mandatory insurance policy. Furthermore, the greater the insurance coverage, the more pronounced the positive effect on company value, supporting the monitoring effect hypothesis. Additionally, D&O insurance is positively correlated with research and development (R&D) expenditures and capital expenditures, suggesting that this insurance system enhances management's capacity to tolerate short-term failure risks, thereby promoting corporate investment in innovation and expansion. Notably, in companies with high insurance coverage, investments in R&D and innovation are even more substantial, reflecting a strong emphasis on corporate governance, risk management, and long-term strategy under the mandatory insurance system.

論文審定書 i
致謝 ii
摘要 iii
Abstract iv
目錄 v
圖次 vii
表次 viii
第一章 緒論 1
第二章 文獻回顧 6
第一節 董監事責任保險的起源與發展情況 6
第二節 董監事責任保險需求 10
第三節 董監事責任保險與公司價值 11
第四節 董監事責任保險與研發創新和資本支出 12
第三章 假說發展 14
第四章 研究資料與方法 16
第一節 資料來源 16
第二節 變數定義 16
第三節 實證模型 20
第五章 實證結果及分析 26
第一節 敘述統計量與相關係數分析 26
第二節 回歸估計結果 31
第三節 穩健性測試 35
第六章 結論與建議 38
附錄 41
參考文獻 42
中文參考文獻： 42
英文參考文獻： 44

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