本文探討單一平台使用情境下消費者及電視平台之間的競爭和策略互動。不論消費者收視水平差異成本是線性或者是二次遞增的狀態下，站在專門內容（非中立）電視台的角度，當其與一般性（中立）電視台競爭時，專門內容（非中立）之付費電視台與專門內容（非中立）之免費電視台相比，其利潤較高。這也解釋了為何付費觀賞電視節目成為當今趨勢的原因之一。然而，隨著電視台收視戶對頻道之忠誠度增加，一般性（中立）電視台可以增加廣告量，專門內容（非中立）之付費電視可以提高觀眾的訂閱費。至於專門內容（非中立）之免費電視台的策略則在收視戶對頻道之忠誠度偏低時，忠誠度的微幅增加卻會減少此專門內容（非中立）之免費電視台的廣告量。另外，當消費者收視水平差異成本為線性下，一般性（中立）電視台廣告會較消費者收視水平差異成本為二次遞增時為多。而專門內容（非中立）之免費電視則在內容夠極端專業且收視戶對頻道之忠誠度夠高時，廣告會在消費者收視水平差異成本為二次遞增時較多。最後，若是一般性（中立）電視台與專門內容（非中立）之付費電視台在競爭時，一般性（中立）電視台的廣告量會在消費者收視水平差異成本為線性時較多。而專門內容（非中立）之付費電視的訂閱費會在消費者收視水平差異成本為線性時較多。

This paper explores the competition and strategic interactions among consumers and television platforms in the context of single-homing environment. In a duopoly market, regardless of whether the consumers’ viewing costs derived from horizontal preference difference are linear or quadratic, a free television platform with specialized contents (non-neutral) that generates profits through advertising is always less profitable than a similar TV platform that operates on a subscription-based system if a free TV platform with general contents (neutral) is the competitor. This finding helps explain why a non-neutral, pay TV has become a prevailing trend in recent years. As the viewer’s loyalty toward TV platforms increases, a neutral, free TV increases its advertising volume, and a non-neutral, pay TV raises subscription fees. However, a non-neutral, free TV instead lowers the advertising volume when the viewer’s loyalty increases given that the viewer’s loyalty is sufficiently low originally. Furthermore, when the consumers’ viewing costs are linear, the advertising volume in the neutral, free TV is larger than that with quadratic costs. However, the advertising volume from a non-neutral, free TV is larger when the consumers’ viewing costs are quadratic instead of linear if the TV is specific enough on the content and the viewer’s loyalty is high enough. Finally, if a non-neutral, pay TV competes with a neutral, free TV, advertising volume for the neutral TV and the subscription fee charged by the non-neutral, pay TV are both higher under linear consumers’ viewing costs.

論文審定書 i
致謝 ii
摘要 iii
Abstract iv
目錄 v
圖次 vi
第一章 緒論 1
第二章 文獻回顧 3
第三章 模型與分析（一） 6
第四章 模型與分析（二） 17
第五章 跨情境比較 35
第六章 結論 41
參考文獻 43

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