博碩士論文 etd-0512116-230934 詳細資訊


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姓名 詹育儒(Yu-ju Chan) 電子郵件信箱 E-mail 資料不公開
畢業系所 財務管理學系研究所(Finance)
畢業學位 碩士(Master) 畢業時期 104學年第2學期
論文名稱(中) 高階經理人的跳槽與薪酬研究
論文名稱(英) Executive Job-hopping and Compensation
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    紙本論文:1 年後公開 (2017-06-14 公開)

    電子論文:使用者自訂權限:校內 1 年後、校外 1 年後公開

    論文語文/頁數 英文/58
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    摘要(中) 本文研究高階經理人跳槽之原因。我們發現:總薪酬大幅增加是高階經理人跳槽的主因,高階經理人並不因公司風險及董事會之關係連結影響其跳槽意願。高階經理人跳槽後,其薪酬中的股票報酬比例顯著上升,低風險報酬的比例顯著下降。跳槽後公司不會參考高階經理人管理能力來調整其薪酬。
    摘要(英) This research analyzes the incentives that induce the executives to hop to the other firms and serve as the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). We find that the most critical incentives come from the increase in total pay after job-hopping, instead of firm risk or the connections to the board members of the firm the executive hops to. Job-hopping leads to an increase in the proportion of stock pay and a decrease in the proportion of less-risky pay. We do not find evidence that the increase in total pay is related to managerial ability.
    關鍵字(中)
  • 動機
  • 管理能力
  • 高階經理人
  • 跳槽
  • 薪酬
  • 關鍵字(英)
  • Executive
  • Compensation
  • Job-hopping
  • Managerial ability
  • Incentives
  • 論文目次 國立中山大學研究生學位論文審定書………………………………………………………………………....................i
    摘要…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………ii
    Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………iii
    1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………….......1
    2. Selection of sample firms…………………………………………………………………………………..........4
    3. Job-hopping and executives compensation………………………………………………………..................6
    3.1. Descriptive statistics………………………………………………………………………………………….......6
    3.2. Comparison of the compensation between post-hopping and pre-hopping firms …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………......8
    3.3. Comparison of the compensation between predecessors and successors………...............................10
    3.4. Difference-in-difference analysis of executive compensation…………………………...........................11
    3.5. Impacts of stock price, risk, and board connections…………………………………………...................13
    3.6. Regression analysis…………………………………………………………………………………………......16
    4. Managerial ability and compensation after job-hopping…………………………………..........................19
    4.1. Measurement of managerial ability…………………………………………………………………...............19
    4.2. Regression analysis…………………………………………………………………………………………......21
    5. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………………...23
    References……………………………………………………………………………………………………………....25
    參考文獻 Albuquerque, A., De Franco, G., Verdi, R., 2013. Peer choice in CEO compensation. Journal of Financial Economics 108, 160-181.
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    Campbell, T.C., Gallmeyer, M., Johnson, S.A., Rutherford, J., Stanley, B.W., 2011. CEO optimism and forced turnover. Journal of Financial Economics 101, 695–712.
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    Gao, H., Harford, J., Li, K., 2012. CEO pay cuts and forced turnover: Their causes and consequences. Journal of Corporate Finance 18, 291-310.
    Gao, H., Luo, J.; Tang, T., 2015. Effects of managerial labor market on executive compensation: Evidence from job-hopping. Journal of Accounting and Economics 59, 203-220.
    Jenter, D., Kanaan, F., 2015. CEO turnover and relative performance evaluation. Journal of Finance 70, 2155-2184.

    Malmendier, U., Tate, G., 2009. Superstar CEOs. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 124, 1593-1638.
    Shen, W., Cannella, A. A., 2002. Revisiting the performance consequences of CEO succession: The impacts of successor type, post-succession senior executive turnover, and departing CEO tenure. Academy of Management Journal 45, 717-733.
    口試委員
  • 陳安琳 - 召集委員
  • 蔡佳芬 - 委員
  • 唐俊華 - 指導教授
  • 口試日期 2016-06-02 繳交日期 2016-06-14

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