嫉妒是人類的一種負面情緒，折磨自己的同時也有可能傷害他人。本文以賽局理論分析人們在帶有嫉妒心時，與人合作的決策。本文設計靜態賽局與不完全信息動態賽局，在不完全信息動態賽局中對手的支付有不完全信息。研究結果發現，己方和對方的嫉妒心確實影響雙方合作的機率，玩家也因為嫉妒心，會根據對方能拿到的支付大小來決定是否選擇合作。本文還探討了過去最後通牒賽局實驗與理論不符可能的理由：嫉妒。並且設計重複的最後通牒賽局，觀察玩家如何試探對方的嫉妒程度。

Envy is a kind of negative human emotions which might not only bring sufferings to oneself, but bring harms to others. This thesis uses the Game Theory to analyze if envy would affect how people make their decisions while cooperating with others. This thesis uses Simultaneous games and Sequential games with imperfect information to analyze. In Sequential games with imperfect information, players might have no knowledge about the payment of earlier players. The results show that envy on both players will indeed affect the probability of cooperation. Because of envy, the players will also depend on how much the other players might get paid to decide whether they’re cooperating. This thesis also explores the possible reason of why the Ultimatum Game experiments in the past failed to meet with the theory: Envy. In addition, this thesis designs repeated Ultimatum Game experiments to observe how players test out the degree of envy other players have.

論文審定書........................................................i
謝辭..............................................................ii
摘要 .............................................................iii
Abstract .........................................................iv
目錄 .............................................................v
圖目錄 ...........................................................vi
表目錄 ...........................................................vii
第一章 緒論 ......................................................1
第一節 研究動機與目的 ........................................1
第二節 研究架構 ..............................................2
第二章 文獻回顧 ..................................................3
第一節 嫉妒存在的統計證據 ....................................3
第二節 嫉妒的經濟學模型 ......................................4
第三節 最後通牒賽局實驗 ......................................5
第三章 理論模型 ..................................................6
第一節 靜態賽局 ..............................................6
第二節 不完全信息動態賽局 ....................................17
第三節 重複的最後通牒賽局 ....................................25
第四章 結論與建議 ................................................35
參考文獻 .........................................................37

中文部分
1. 陳怡伶 (2010)，嫉妒與演化，國立中山大學經濟學研究所碩士論文。
英文部分
1. Cabrales, Antonio, Calvó-Armengol, Antoni, & Pavoni, Nicola (2008). Social Preferences,Skill Segregation,and Wage Dynamics. Review of Economic Studies, 75(1), 65-98.
2. Chen, Y. H., Chen, Y. C., Kuo, W. J., Kan, K. H., Yang, C. C., & Yen, N. S. (2017). Strategic concern drives proposers to offer fairly in ultimatum games: An fMRI study. Scientific Reports, 7, 527.
3. Frank, Robert H. (1984). Are Workers Paid their Marginal Products? The American Economic Review,74(4),549-571.
4. Güth, Werner, Schmittberger, Rolf, & Schwarze, Bernd (1982). An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,3(4), 367-388.
5. Manna, Ester (2016). Envy in the workplace. Economics Letters, 142(5), 18-21.
6. Menon, Tanya and Thompson, Leigh (2010). Envy at Work. Harvard Business Review, 88(4), 74-79.
7. Sanfey, A.G., Rilling, J.K., Aronson, J.A., Nystrom, L.E., & Cohen, J.D. (2003). The neural basis of economic decision making in the Ultimatum Game. Science, 300, 1755-1758.