隨著學術的發展，針對行為經濟學的研究如雨後春筍般冒出，Kahneman所著《快思慢想》( Thinking, Fast and Slow )更是享譽國際，Kahneman以心理學的角度切入人類的行為並為其構築出行為模式，使得行為經濟逐漸走入大眾視野。而在行為經濟學的研究中，有一個最經典的案例，即為Ultimatum game。本研究旨在探討當受測者Ultimatum game中擔任回應者時，其行為模式以及其背後動機。
本研究以線上問卷調查蒐集樣本資料，回收整理後，最終取得202份有效問卷，將問卷資料並利用SPSS統計軟體分析各因素對於決策的影響程度。進行分析後得到以下研究結果：
1. 回應者會做出違反經濟學理性預期的行為，即拒絕優勢提議。
2. 回應者之行為遵循著模式。
3. 研究結果顯示社會關注、互惠迴避及覺得提議可能性不大，這三個因素為
顯著影響受測者決策的動機。
4. 本研究發現與過往文獻研究相反的結論，即有些動機不顯著，也發現了不同
的實驗設計以及不同的環境都可能影響受測者的決策判斷。也間接說明人類心理活動的複雜程度。

With the advancement of academia, research in behavioral economics has proliferated like mushrooms after rain. Daniel Kahneman’s renowned book, ‘Thinking, Fast and Slow,’ has significantly contributed to bringing behavioral economics into the public eye. Kahneman approaches human behavior from a psychological perspective and constructs behavioral models, which can be considered groundbreaking.
Within the realm of behavioral economics research, one of the most classic cases is the Ultimatum Game. Therefore, this study collected sample data through online surveys, resulting in 202 valid responses after data compilation. The questionnaire data were analyzed using SPSS statistical software to assess the impact of various factors on decision-making.
The following research findings emerged: (1) Responders exhibit behavior that deviates from the rational expectations of economics, specifically rejecting advantageous proposals. (2) Responder behavior adheres to discernible patterns. (3) The study results highlight the significant influence of social concern, reciprocity aversion, and perceived unlikelihood of proposal acceptance as motivators for decision-making among participants. (4) Contrary to previous literature, this study discovered that some motivations are not significant. Additionally, different experimental designs and environmental contexts influence participants’ decision judgments, indirectly reflecting the complexity of human psychological processes.

論文審定書 i
摘要 ii
Abstract iii
目錄 iv
表次 v
圖次 vi
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究流程 3
第二章 文獻回顧 5
第一節 UG實驗爭論 5
第二節 回應者行為模式之探討 6
第三節 回應者行為動機之探討 7
第四節 信念或認知之影響 9
第五節 跨領域研究 11
第六節 研究架構與假設 11
第三章 研究方法 16
第一節 研究方法 16
第二節 資料分析方法 18
第四章 資料分析結果 19
第一節 敘述性統計 19
第二節 內部一致性分析 23
第三節 羅吉斯回歸分析 24
第四節 Hosmer-Lemeshow檢定 27
第五節 研究結果與比較 28
第五章 結論與建議 30
參考文獻 33
附錄 問卷 38

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