本文以信任商品及企業的信用為啟發，其中牽涉了企業在形象經營上的策略，企業可能會為了節省成本而說謊欺騙消費者，造成社會福利的減損。

本文主要著重於透過賽局模型呈現企業與消費者之間的策略互動關係。為了獲取更大的利益，企業可能會透過欺騙消費者，使消費者認為企業形象更為正面。文章分為兩部分討論：第一部分探討企業是否聲稱自己善盡企業社會責任、是否謊報，以及其與消費者群體啟動調查決策的機率之間的關係。除此之外，本文進一步探討企業在不同市場結構之下的選擇，特別是非自然獨占之在位者如何在有CSR參數的情況下經由限制訂價維持自身優勢；第二部分則探討透過政府處罰和增加資訊透明度等方式，如何降低企業說謊的可能性，並討論在各個決策點下的均衡情況。

This article takes inspiration from trust in products and the credit of companies. It involves strategies related to corporate image management, where companies may lie and deceive consumers to save costs, resulting in a reduction of social welfare.

This article primarily focuses on illustrating the strategic interactions between businesses and consumers through a game theory model. To gain greater profits, businesses may deceive consumers into believing that the company's image is more positive. The article is divided into two parts for discussion: the first part examines the relationship between whether businesses claim to fulfill corporate social responsibility (CSR), whether they lie about it, and the probability of the consumer group initiating an investigation. Additionally, this section further explores business choices under different market structures, particularly how incumbents in non-natural monopoly situations maintain their advantages through limit pricing when CSR parameters are involved. The second part discusses how to reduce the likelihood of businesses lying through government penalties and increased information transparency, and it examines the equilibrium conditions at various decision points.

目錄
論文審定書 i
摘要 ii
Abstract iii
目錄 iv
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機及目的 1
第二節 研究流程 5
第二章 文獻回顧 6
第一節 信任商品文獻回顧 6
第二節 聲譽效果文獻回顧 6
第三節 CSR效果文獻回顧 7
第四節 限制定價文獻回顧 10
第三章 理論模型 11
第一節 模型假設 11
第二節 模型分析 14
第三節 市場分析 18
第四節 討論 20
第四章 結論 22
參考文獻 25

圖次
圖1 研究流程圖 5
圖2 企業與消費者互動關係之賽局樹 14

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