本文考慮授權廠商內生決定其品質提升技術水準，進而分析在產業內授權中，固定費用與單位權利金兩種授權方式的最適性，並比較其對均衡技術水準與市場結果的影響。分析結果顯示，面對產品替代性的增加，技術創新水準、授權費用、授權方的利潤、消費者剩餘以及社會福利皆會下降。此外，當產品替代性較低時，授權廠商採用固定費用授權之技術創新水準與其利潤皆高於單位權利金的授權方式。因此，最適授權契約為固定費用方式。反之，當產品替代性較高時，採用單位權利金授權下之技術創新水準與利潤皆較高，最適授權契約則為單位權利金形式。值得強調的是，無論產品替代性高低，固定費用授權下社會福利始終優於單位權利金授權。

This paper analyzes an insider licensor that endogenously chooses its quality-enhancing technology level and compares the optimality of fixed-fee and per-unit royalty contracts in terms of their effects on equilibrium technology and market outcomes. The results show that as product substitutability increases, technological innovation, licensing fee, licensor’s profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare all decline. When substitutability is low, the fixed-fee contract yields higher technological innovation and licensor profit, making it the optimal contract. In contrast, when substitutability is high, the per-unit royalty contract leads to greater innovation and profit, thus becoming the optimal choice. Notably, regardless of substitutability, the fixed-fee contract always delivers higher social welfare than the per-unit royalty contract.

論文審定書…………………………………………………………….……………….i
中文摘要………………………………………………………….………………….…ii
英文摘要………………………………………..………………………………….….iii
目錄………………………………………..……………………………………………iv
圖次………………………………………..……………………………………………vi
第 一 章 前言………………………………………………………………………1
第 二 章 文獻回顧…………………………………………………………5
第 三 章 模型設定…………………………………………………………10
第 四 章 均衡狀態分析……………………………………………………….12
4.1廠商1未進行技術授權的均衡分析………………………………......... 12
4.2廠商1採用固定費用進行技術授權的均衡分析……………………......15
4.3廠商1採用單位權利金進行技術授權的均衡分析…………………......19
第 五 章 均衡狀態比較……………………………………………………….23
5.1授權方式的均衡比較分析——最適授權契約………………….....……..24
第 六 章 結論…………………………………………………………………….30
參考文獻……………………………………………………….……………………..32
附錄1………………………………………………………………………………….33
附錄2………………………………………………………………………………….34
附錄3………………………………………………………………………………….35
附錄4………………………………………………………………………………….36
附錄5………………………………………………………………………………….37

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