摘要
本研究以2008年至2020台灣股票市場為樣本，研究公司治理對於三大法人持股的影響。公司治理變數分為三面向探討，分別為股權結構、資訊透明度及人事穩定度。研究結果顯示外資對於公司治理變數較為顯著，其中值得注意的是獨立董事比例與外資持股率顯著負相關，並進一步檢驗發現存在非線性關係，外資對於董事長兼任總經理則是顯著的正相關。投信與自營商對於股權結構面向則多與外資持相反意見，但對於交叉持股三者則統一顯著負相關。同時，透過穩健性檢驗以報酬率高低分群及傾向配對評分法，其結果支持原本論述。最後對於法人持股、公司治理與報酬率三者的關聯性進行探討，研究顯示法人持股對公司治理變數並不存在替代效果，公司治理與法人持股皆會對報酬率產生影響。

Abstract
In this paper, we use the data from 2008 to 2020 in Taiwan stock market as a sample. We inspect the impact of corporate governance on the different institutional holding. The variables of corporate governance are divided into three aspects, which are the ownership structure, information transparency and personnel stability. The research results show that foreign shareholding ratio is more significant for corporate governance variables. It is worth noting that the proportion of independent directors is significantly negatively correlated with foreign shareholding ratio. Further testing finds that there is a non-linear relationship, and foreign shareholding ratio has a significant positive correlation for the chairman who hold a concurrent post on general manager. domestic institutions and dealers tend to hold opposite opinions to foreign shareholding ratio in terms of ownership structure, but they have a unified and significant negative correlation with cross-shareholding. At the same time, through the robustness test, the return rate is divided into groups and propensity paired scores, and the results support the original discussion. Finally, we discuss the relationship among institutional holding, corporate governance and rate of return. The study shows that institutional holding has no substitution effect on corporate governance variables, and both corporate governance and institutional holding do have an impact on the rate of return.

論文審定書 i
中文摘要 ii
Abstract iii
圖目錄 v
表目錄 vi
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 主要發現 3
第二章 文獻回顧 4
第一節 股權結構 4
第二節 資訊透明度 6
第三節 人事穩定度 8
第三章 資料與研究方法 9
第一節 樣本與變數定義 9
第二節 敘述統計 9
第三節 實證模型 10
第四章 實證結果與分析 15
第一節 公司治理與機構投資人持股的關聯性 15
第二節 非線性檢定 16
第三節 其他穩健性檢驗 17
第四節 報酬率與公司治理的關聯性 18
第五章 結論與建議 19
參考文獻 20
附錄一 23
附錄二 24

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