近年來醫療矛盾糾紛引發的醫患衝突頻發，本應相依相敬的醫患之間形同敵人互相警戒防衛。而嚴重的資訊不對稱加之各類新聞報導，讓人們對於本應有著白衣天使美好形象的的醫生產生了另外一層負面的看法。如何制定更完善的醫療服務系統，構建友善的醫療體制，維護好醫患雙方的利益顯得尤為重要。
本研究通過搭建醫生醫療服務定價與治療心力投入為主體的誘因相容契約模型，探討所設計契約在資訊不對稱的環境下，面對獨佔與完全競爭兩種市場下均衡的最適契約解，再探討不同最適契約解的影響因素。
研究結果顯示醫生在不同市場環境下存在不同的均衡，獨佔市場當中醫生所設計契約在特定條件下能夠完美的完成了醫生的設計初衷：不同類型的患者通過不同的治療方案選擇各自獲得了滿意的治療效用回報，同時令醫生產生超額利潤；在競爭市場中，則需要外生變數滿足合適的取值時，方可產生合理均衡。

Conflicts between doctors and patients caused by medical conflicts in recent years have occurred frequently. Doctors and patients who should have respected each other become alert to one another as enemies. Serious information asymmetry and various news reports have caused people to have another negative view of the doctors who should have a good image of the White Angel. It is particularly important to develop a more complete medical service system, build a friendly medical system and safeguard the interests of doctors and patients.
This paper builds an incentive-constrained contract model based on doctors' medical service pricing and effort. Discusses the optimal contractual solution of the designed contract under the circumstance of information asymmetry and the market of monopoly and perfect competition, and then discusses the influencing factors of different optimal contractual solutions.
The results show that doctors have different equilibrium in different market environments. In the monopoly market, doctors designed the contract to perfectly complete the doctor’s original intention, different types of patients received satisfactory therapeutic returns through different treatment options; it also generates excess profits for doctors. In a competitive market, only when exogenous variables meet the appropriate value range can reasonable equilibrium be generated.

論文審定書.................................................. i
謝辭.............................................................. ii
摘要............................................................. iii
Abstract.......................................................... iv
第一章 緒論...................................................... 1
第一節 研究背景............................................... 1
第二節 研究動機與目的......................................... 3
第三節 研究方法與架構......................................... 4
第二章 文獻回顧................................................... 5
第三章 理論模型................................................... 9
第一節 模型的構建與假設....................................... 9
第二節 獨佔市場下的均衡契約.................................. 10
患者個人理性約束線、誘因相容限制線與醫生等效用線... 13
第三節 競爭市場下的均衡契約.................................. 16
患者的等效用線與醫生的零利潤線.................... 16
混同均衡......................................... 18
區隔均衡......................................... 18
第四章 結論與建議............................................... 22
第一節 研究結論.......................................... 22
第二節 研究建議........................................... 24
參考文獻.......................................................... 25
附錄.............................................................. 27

圖一 最大化醫生利潤........................................... 13
圖二 不同類型患者的等效用線.................................... 16
圖三 混同均衡.................................................. 18
圖四 區隔均衡.................................................. 18

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