本文以CES效用函數(constant elasticity of substitution utility function)為基礎，探討單身及夫妻之家務時間配置問題，以及工資的變化將對該決策造成何種影響。本文發現，單身時，對家務的時間投入會隨工資而遞減，同時私人消費則會增加。其次，對於一個沒有傳統父權制的雙薪家庭而言，當夫妻雙方之相對工資變化時，雙方的家務付出時間將會呈現替代關係。第三，與沒有傳統父權制的雙薪家庭相比較，女性在有傳統父權制的雙薪家庭中的家務付出時間會增加，而男性的家務付出時間則減少。最後，本文針對家庭價值與單身價值進行比較，檢視個人脫離單身俱樂部與女性選擇回復單身的經濟條件。

Building upon the CES (constant elasticity of substitution) utility function, this thesis explores the time allocation of housework for singles and couples, and how changes in wages will affect the decision. I find that when single, the time investment in housework will decrease with wages, while private consumption will increase. Secondly, for a double-wage family without traditional patriarchy , when the relative wages of both couples change, how the time spent on housework of both parties will be a substitution relationship. Third, compared with double-wage families without traditional patriarchy, women in double-wage families with traditional patriarchy will increase the amount of time they spend on housework, while men decrease the amount of time they spend on housework. Finally, this thesis compares family value with singles value and examines the economic conditions for individuals to leave the singles club and women choose to return to singles.

目錄
論文審定書 i
誌謝 ii
摘要 iii
Abstract iv
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究流程與架構 3
第二章 相關文獻 4
第三章 模型 8
第一節 模型假設 8
第二節 單身時的最適決策分析 8
第三節 雙薪家庭的最適決策分析 10
第四節 比較與討論 17
第四章 結論與建議 21
第一節 總結 21
第二節 未來研究建議 22
參考文獻 23

圖目錄
圖 一之一 民國72年到民國108年台灣歷年的女性勞動力參與 2
圖 一之二 研究流程圖 3
 
圖目錄
圖 一之一 民國72年到民國108年台灣歷年的女性勞動力參與 2
圖 一之二 研究流程圖 3

一、中文部分
1. 洪慧心 (2020) ，「夫妻相對收入與家務分配的世代差異：兩岸趨勢比較」，國立中山大學經濟學研究所碩士論文。
2. 蕭美玲 (2005) ，「台灣的家務分工：經濟依賴及性別的影響」，臺灣社會學刊，第三十四期，115-145頁

二、英文部分
1. Blood, R. O. (1960). Husbands and Wives: The Dynamics of Married Living. Social Forces, 40(1), 90–91.
2. Brines, J. (1994). Economic Dependency, Gender, and the Division of Labor at Home. American Journal of sociology, 100(3), 652-688 .
3. Coverman, S. (1985). Explaining Husband's Participation in Domestic Labor. The Sociological Quarterly ,26(1) ,81-97.
4. Greenstein, T. N. (2000). Economic Dependence, Gender, and the Division of Labor in the Home: A Replication and Extension. Journal of Marriage and Family, 62(2), 322-335.
5. Heer, D. M. (1963). The Measurement and Basis of Family Power: An Overview. Marriage and Family Living ,25(2),133-139.
6. Jafarey, S. and Maiti, D. (2015). Glass Slippers and Glass Ceilings: An Analysis of Marital Anticipation and Female Education. Journal of Development Economics,115 , 45-61.
7. Ng, W. L. and Wang, Y. C. (2020). Waiting as A Signal: Why Women are Delaying Fertility? . Economic Modelling ,87, 471–479.
8. Rainer, H. (2008). Gender Discrimination and Efficiency in Marriage: The Bargaining Family under Scrutiny. Journal of Population Economics,21(2),305-329.
9. Rexroat, C. and Shehan, C. (1987). The Family Life Cycle and Spouses' Time in Housework. Journal of Marriage and Family ,49(4),737-750.
10. Rodman, H. (1967). Marital Power in France, Greece, Yugoslavia, and the United States: A Cross-National Discussion. Journal of Marriage and Family ,29(2),320-324.