本研究以台灣上市櫃公司作為研究對象，回測期間為2014年至2023年，共計十年。以公司治理與經營績效構面的各項衡量變數，根據其與公司績效的正負向關係，進行升冪或降冪排序，並將其排名當作分數，以建構成不同構面與不同成分股數量的投資組合。本研究發現，若將公司治理構面中的盈餘席次偏離比與盈餘股份偏離比的排序設定成與文獻定義的相反，即此兩種變數改成設定為該比率的值愈小，分數愈高，則投資組合（研究發現組）的績效在等權重與市值加權皆明顯大幅提高，尤以市值加權更為明顯。實證結果顯示，研究發現組在等權重情況下，公司治理構面中以董事會功能取前50名的年化報酬率16.31%為最高，而以股權結構取前50名的夏普比率73.34%為最佳；在市值加權情況下，以董事會功能取前30名的年化報酬率20.99%為最高，而以股權結構取前30名的夏普比率109.53%為最佳，表明此兩個指標對於投資績效具有一定的影響能力。此外，公司治理在加入經營績效後，先治理後績效的表現大部分優於先績效後治理，尤其以研究發現組合中表現更為顯著。更進一步發現，研究發現組的年化報酬率與夏普比率大幅優於過往研究組合，且在公司治理加入經營績效後，較單一構面組合的績效表現有更顯著的提升幅度；在等權重情況下，以取股權結構前50名再取經營績效前10名的組合年化報酬率21.91%、夏普比率91.68%為最高；在市值加權情況下，以取股權結構前30名再取經營績效前10名的組合年化報酬率23.04%、夏普比率113.36%為最高。

This study focuses on publicly listed companies in Taiwan, with a back-testing period spanning from 2014 to 2023, totaling ten years. The study employs various metrics from the dimensions of corporate governance and operational performance. These metrics are sorted in ascending or descending order based on their positive or negative relationships with company performance, and their rankings are used as scores to construct investment portfolios with different dimensions and numbers of constituent stocks.

The study finds that if the ranking of the deviation ratios of board seats and shareholding from earnings in the corporate governance dimension is set opposite to the definitions in the literature, i.e., the smaller the ratio, the higher the score, the performance of the investment portfolios (referred to as the "Research Findings Group") significantly improves in both equal-weight and market-cap-weighted scenarios, with the improvement being more pronounced in the market-cap-weighted scenario.

Empirical results indicate that in the equal-weight scenario, the highest annualized return rate of 16.31% is achieved by selecting the top 50 stocks based on the board functionality within the corporate governance dimension, while the best Sharpe ratio of 73.34% is achieved by selecting the top 50 stocks based on equity structure. In the market-cap-weighted scenario, the highest annualized return rate of 20.99% is achieved by selecting the top 30 stocks based on board functionality, while the best Sharpe ratio of 109.53% is achieved by selecting the top 30 stocks based on equity structure, indicating that these two indicators have a significant impact on investment performance.

Furthermore, when corporate governance is combined with operational performance, the performance of the portfolios that prioritize governance before performance generally surpasses those that prioritize performance before governance. This is particularly evident in the Research Findings Group. It is also discovered that the annualized return rate and Sharpe ratio of the Research Findings Group are significantly superior to those of previous research portfolios. When corporate governance is combined with operational performance, the performance improvement is more substantial compared to single-dimension portfolios. In the equal-weight scenario, the highest annualized return rate of 21.91% and Sharpe ratio of 91.68% are achieved by first selecting the top 50 stocks based on equity structure and then the top 10 based on operational performance. In the market-cap-weighted scenario, the highest annualized return rate of 23.04% and Sharpe ratio of 113.36% are achieved using the same selection criteria.

論文審定書…………………………………………………………………………......i
誌謝…………………………………………………………………………………….ii
中文摘要………………………………………………………………………………iii
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………...iv
目錄…………………………………………………………………………………....vi
圖次…………………………………………………………………………………...viii
表次…………………………………………………………………………………….ix
第一章 緒論 ……………………………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究背景…………………………………………………………………….1
第二節 研究目的與動機…………………………………………………………….3
第三節 研究流程………………………………………………………………….…3
第二章 文獻探討…………………………………………………………………….....5
第一節 公司治理文獻………………………………………………………………5
第二節 經營績效文獻……………………………………………………………...10
第三章 研究設計………………………………………………………………………12
第一節 資料來源與研究期間……………………………………………………....12
第二節 公司治理變數………………………………………………………………12
第三節 經營績效變數………………………………………………………………16
第四節 投資組合建構與說明………………………………………………………19
第五節 投資組合績效評估方法…………………………………………………....26
第四章 實證結果………………………………………………………………………28
第一節 公司治理與經營績效指標敘述統計分析………………………………....28
第二節 公司治理評分機制建構投資組合之績效分析……………………………32
第三節 經營績效評分機制建構投資組合之績效分析……………………………39
第四節 公司治理與經營績效評分機制建構投資組合之績效分析………………40
第五節 總結………………………………………………………………………....55
第五章 結論與建議……………………………………………………………………59
第一節 研究結論……………………………………………………………………59
第二節 研究限制與建議…………………………………………………………....60
參考文獻……………………………………………………………………………….61

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