本篇論文建構雙占市場中具有產品垂直差異的廠商和欺騙性廣告策略的模型。異質的消費者對不同品質的產品偏好有所差異，低品質廠商可以從事欺騙廣告活動使消費者認為其為高品質，且消費者是輕信的，會完全相信廣告資訊。在此設定下討論當廠商可能做出欺騙廣告時，監管機構應如何訂定最適懲罰。研究結果顯示監管機構對廠商做出欺騙廣告的行為應採取足夠重的懲罰才對消費者最有利，而消費者在競爭性較高的雙占市場下福利較獨佔市場為高。

Two firms that produce products with different quality compete for heterogeneous consumers with two strategies: pricing and advertising. The consumers have different preferences for different quality products, and they are naive in the sense that they never doubt the advertising information. Hence, the low quality product firm can engage in deceptive advertising to make consumers believe its products are high quality. Under this setting, we discuss what the optimal deterrence rule against deceptive advertising a regulatory agency should adopt regarding consumers' welfare. We find that imposing a severe enough penalty on the firm which makes fraudulent advertising is best for consumers. Moreover, the consumers’ welfare is higher under a more competitive, duopolistic competition than that under monopoly.

口試委員會審定書. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
摘要. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
第1 章緒論. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
第2 章文獻回顧. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
第3 章基礎模型及均衡分析. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
第4 章消費者剩餘和監管機構的作用. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
第5 章獨佔. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
第6 章結論. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
參考文獻. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
附錄. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

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