破產法是一國借貸市場的主要制度，亦是對於債務人違約的懲罰機制之一，借貸市場中的資訊不對稱問題，始終是借貸市場的核心問題。銀行與債務人之間的資訊不對稱問題的存在，可能誘使債務人在投資成功時選擇違約（亦即戰略違約），導致道德危險問題。本文透過賽局分析，檢視破產法的強硬程度如何影響到債務人的策略選擇。
當銀行容許協商時，較嚴格的破產法會降低清算成本，進而降低戰略違約機率。當銀行容許債務展延時，則會降低第一階段失敗之債務人選擇違約的機率，同時提高再博一次的機率。
無論銀行選擇協商或債務展延，擔保品之價值對違約機率之影響皆為負。當銀行選擇協商時，擔保品價值與成功廠商選擇戰略違約之機率之間呈現反向關係。當銀行選擇債務展延時，擔保品價值與第一階段失敗廠商選擇違約的機率之間亦呈現反向關係。原因是當被清算的成本降低時，失敗廠商有較高的誘因做出停損，亦即選擇違約，而非再博一次。
本文的結果顯示，破產法的強硬程度會對銀行的選擇有直接的影響。衍伸性意涵則為，如果一國的破產法對於中小企業的重整機制較不完善，或將使中小企業，相較於上市企業而言，更可能會受到清算。

Bankruptcy law is the main institution of a country's loan market. The problem of information asymmetry in credit market is always the core problem of credit market. The existence of information asymmetry between the bank and the debtor may induce the debtor to choose to default when the investment is successful (i.e. strategic default), resulting in the moral hazard problem. In view of this, the severity of the bankruptcy law is bound to affect the debtor's choice of strategy.

When banks allow negotiation, tougher bankruptcy laws reduce the cost of resolution, and thus the chance of strategic default. When a bank allows a debt to be extended over time, it reduces the chance that a borrower who failed in the first stage will choose to default and increases the chance that it will be extended again.

Whether the bank chooses to negotiate or extend the debt, the value of the collateral has a negative impact on the probability of default. When the bank chooses to negotiate, there is an inverse relationship between the value of collateral and the probability of the successful firm choosing strategic default. There is also an inverse relationship between the value of the collateral and the probability that the first-stage failed firm will choose to default when the bank chooses to extend the debt. The reason is that when the cost of being liquidated falls, failing firms have a higher incentive to make stop-loss-that is, to default rather than try again.

目錄
論文審定書 i
致謝 ii
摘要 iii
Abstract iv
第一章、緒論 1
第一節、研究動機與目的 1
第二節、研究架構 3
第二章、文獻回顧 4
第一節、破產法的實證研究 4
第二節、擔保品相關文獻 5
第三章、模型設定 6
第一節、破產法 6
第二節、模型假設-債務協商 6
第三節、模型假設-債務展延 9
第四節、最適合約-債務協商 11
第五節、最適合約-債務展延 15
第四章、結論與未來研究方向 18
第一節、總結 18
第二節、未來研究方向 20
參考文獻 20

一、中文文獻
1. 黃虹霞(2002)，公司重整制度之檢討，《月旦法學雜誌》，第85卷，193-210。
2. 楊蓁海(2007)，「我國銀行存放款利差減少原因剖析與因應對策」，《中央銀行季刊》，第29卷第2期，45-82。
二、英文文獻
1. Aghion, P., Hart, O., and Moore, J. (1992).The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform (No. w4097). National Bureau of Economic Research.
2. Araujo, A. P., Ferreira, R. V., and Funchal, B. (2012). The Brazilian bankruptcy law experience. Journal of Corporate Finance, 18(4), 994-1004.
3. Armour, J., and Cumming, D. (2008). Bankruptcy law and entrepreneurship. American Law and Economics Review,10(2), 303-350.
4. Ayotte, K. (2007). Bankruptcy and entrepreneurship: The value of a fresh start. The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 23(1), 161-185.
5. Berger, A. N., and Udell, G. F. (1990). Collateral, loan quality and bank risk. Journal of Monetary Economics,25(1), 21-42.
6. Berglöf, E., and Roland, G. (1997). Soft budget constraints and credit crunches in financial transition. European Economic Review,41(3-5), 807-817.
7. Besanko, D., and Thakor, A. V. (1987). Collateral and rationing: sorting equilibria in monopolistic and competitive credit markets. International Economic Review, 671-689.
8. Bester, H. (1985). Screening vs. rationing in credit markets with imperfect information. The American Economic Review, 75(4), 850-855.
9. Bester, H. (1994). The role of collateral in a model of debt renegotiation. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 26(1), 72-86.
10. Biais, B., and Mariotti, T. (2003). Credit, wages and bankruptcy laws.
11. Chan, Y. S., and Kanatas, G. (1985). Asymmetric valuations and the role of collateral in loan agreements. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 17(1), 84-95.
12. Chang, C. Y., Cheng, J. C., and Chen, C. Y. (2016). Can Incentive Compensation Prevent the CEOs to Exploit the Benefit of Debt Holders?. Journal of Business Administration, (110), 1-25.
13. Claessens, S., and Klapper, L. F. (2005). Bankruptcy around the world: Explanations of its relative use. American Law and Economics Review,7(1), 253-283.
14. Cummings, S. R., Black, D. M., Thompson, D. E., Applegate, W. B., Barrett-Connor, E., Mattey, J. P., and Wallace, N. (1998). Housing prices and the (in) stability of mortgage prepayment models: Evidence from California. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
15. Dewatripont, M., and Maskin, E. (1995). Credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies. The Review of Economic Studies, 62(4), 541-555.
16. Djankov, S., Glaeser, E., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. (2003). The new comparative economics. Journal of Comparative Economics,31(4), 595-619.
17. Duffie, D., Scheicher, M., and Vuillemey, G. (2015). Central clearing and collateral demand. Journal of Financial Economics, 116(2), 237-256.
18. Janda, K. (2004). Bankruptcy procedures with ex post moral hazard. The Development of the Czech Society in the European Union, Matfyzpress, Praha, 199-217.
19. La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (1997). Legal determinants of external finance. The Journal of Finance, 52(3), 1131-1150.
20. Leeth, J. D., and Scott, J. A. (1989). The incidence of secured debt: evidence from the small business community. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 379-394.
21. Lucas Jr, R. E. (1978). Asset prices in an exchange economy. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1429-1445.
22. Peng, M. W., Yamakawa, Y., and Lee, S. H. (2010). Bankruptcy laws and entrepreneur–friendliness Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,34(3), 517-530.
23. Rampini, A. A., and Viswanathan, S. (2010). Collateral, risk management, and the distribution of debt capacity. The Journal of Finance, 65(6), 2293-2322.
24. Sachs, J. D. (1990). A strategy for efficient debt reduction. Journal of Economic Perspectives,4(1), 19-29.
25. Sachs, J., and Williamson, J. (1986). Managing the LDC debt crisis. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,1986(2), 397-440.
26. Sautner, Z., and Vladimirov, V. (2018). Indirect costs of financial distress and bankruptcy law: Evidence from trade credit and sales. Review of Finance, 22(5), 1667-1704.
27. Taft, J. (2007). The latest attempt to regulate subprime mortgage lending: the federal banking agencies issue the subprime mortgage lending guidance. Real Estate Finance,24(3), 10.