本研究主要採用 Arya et al. (2008)對垂直整合廠商 (VIP)的設計架構，延伸至下游廠商 競爭對手可選擇向其他完全競爭上游市場外包中間財貨，亦或是向垂直整合廠商購買，同時探討數量競爭、價格競爭以及其他競爭模式 下廠商的策略行為，檢測 Arya et al. (2008)一文的穩健性 (Robustness)是否成立 。我們發現過去在垂直整合相關市場的文獻中，並未將移轉價格納入討論，故我們將移轉價格的設定加入本研究，分析廠商在四種競爭模式選擇下，產量、移轉價格、市場價格、廠商利潤、消費者剩餘及總社會福利的情形，最後分析雙方廠商的均衡策略。

This paper mainly adopts the design framework of Arya et al. (2008) for a vertically integrated producer (VIP), and extends to competitors who outsource intermediate goods from other perfectly competitive upstream markets or purchase from the vertically integrated producer. Simultaneously, we proceed to discuss the strategic behavior of manufacturers under quantity competition, price competition, and other competitive modes. We also check whether the robustness of Arya et al. (2008) is valid. In addition, we found that in the past literature on vertically-related markets, the authors seldom touch the issue of transfer price, thus we include the transfer price in the analytical to investigate its impacts on the output, market prices, manufacturer’s profits, consumer surplus, and total social welfare associated with alternative competitive modes. Finally, we also analyze the equilibrium strategy of both manufacturers.

目錄
論文審定書……………………………………………i
摘要……………………………………………………ii
Abstract……………………………………………….iii
目錄……………………………………………………iv
圖目錄 ....………...……………………………………v
表目錄…………….……………………………………vi
第一章、 前言…………..……………………………1
第二章、 模型設定………..…………………………4
2.1. Counrnot競爭 ………………..……………………5
2.2. Bertrand競爭 ………………………………...……7
2.3. 數量競爭與價格競爭之比較 ………….......….…9
2.4. 內生選擇競爭模式(P-Q) ……………………….…10
2.5. 內生選擇競爭模式(Q-P) ……………………….…12
2.6. 廠商的均衡策略……………………………….…..14
第三章、模型延伸 ……………………………….....…17
3.1. Counrnot競爭 ……………………………….….....18
3.2. Bertrand競爭 …………………………...…………20
3.3. 數量競爭與價格競爭之比較 …….......…....……22
3.4. 內生選擇競爭模式(P-Q) ……………...…………23
3.5. 內生選擇競爭模式(Q-P) ………………………...24
3.6. 廠商的均衡策略……………...……………………26
第四章、結論 ………...……………………………… 29
參考文獻 ………….............……………………………30
附錄 ……..........………………………………………....32

參考文獻
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