在資源豐富的國家中，豐富的資源不一定能有效地促使國家擁有更好的經濟發展。因此，我們嘗試建立一個包含一個政府與一個納稅人群體的模型，其中政府會選擇不同的形態及是否投入公共建設做出選擇，而人民則依據政府的反應做出是否守法納稅的決定。而這些都會影響政府在負責任或是貪腐型態之間的選擇。
我們發現自然資源詛咒的存在與否建立於負責任政府的治理能力，也就是完成公共建設獲得報酬的可能性。若貪腐政府完成公共建設獲得報酬的可能性不低，一個貪腐政府在人民逃稅的情況下仍願意進行公共建設投資的均衡會浮現。若負責任的政府的獲得報酬的可能性偏低，會使政府選擇負責任的誘因下降，選擇不投資公共建設，進而促使人民逃稅，使國家掉入公共建設投資回報低落的貧困陷阱。
相反的，負責任且獲得報酬的可能性高的政府可以在不徵稅的情況下有效的投資公共建設。當稅收與自然資源收益不足以融資公共建設時，需外部援助或投資提升基礎設施。獲得報酬的可能性高的負責任政府能通過稅收談判讓人民納稅以監督政府，若貪腐政府獲得報酬的可能性高，人民也可能納稅予貪腐政府進行公共投資，形成貪腐的稅收談判均衡。而當負責任和貪污腐敗兩種型態的政府獲得報酬的可能性均偏低時，國家會陷入貪腐陷阱，也就是即使人民納稅，政府仍然選擇貪腐。

In resource-rich countries, abundant resources do not necessarily lead to better economic development. Therefore, we attempt to establish a model that includes a government and a group of taxpayers. In this model, the government will choose its type and decide whether to invest in public infrastructure, while the people will decide whether to comply with tax laws based on the government's actions. And these factors will influence the government's choice between being responsible or corrupt.
We found that the presence of the resource curse depends on the governance capacity of a responsible government, specifically its ability to complete public infrastructure projects and receive rewards. If a corrupt government has a significant chance of completing public infrastructure projects and receiving rewards, an equilibrium will emerge where the corrupt government is willing to invest in public infrastructure even when citizens evade taxes. Conversely, if the likelihood of a responsible government receiving rewards is low, the incentives for the government to act responsibly diminish. This leads to the government choosing not to invest in public infrastructure, prompting tax evasion among citizens and causing the country to fall into a poverty trap with low returns on public infrastructure investments.
Conversely, a responsible government with a high probability of receiving rewards can effectively invest in public infrastructure without relying on taxes. When tax revenues and natural resource incomes are insufficient to finance public infrastructure, external aid or investment is necessary to enhance infrastructure. A responsible government with a high likelihood of receiving rewards can engage in tax negotiations, encouraging citizens to pay taxes to monitor the government. If a corrupt government also has a high probability of receiving rewards, citizens might still choose to pay taxes to such a government for public investment, leading to a corrupt tax negotiation equilibrium. However, when both responsible and corrupt governments have a low probability of receiving rewards, the country falls into a corruption trap, where the government chooses corruption even if citizens pay taxes.

論文審定書 i
誌謝 ii
中文摘要 iii
Abstract iv
第一章 緒論 1
第二章 文獻回顧 3
第三章 基本模型及分析 5
第四章 不同型態政府對剩餘資金分配的異質性 22
第五章 結論 50
參考文獻 51

1. Arezki, R. and Bruckner, M. (2011) Oil rents, corruption, and state stability: evidence from panel data regression. European Economic Review 55(7): 955-963.
2. Auty, R. (1993) Sustaining development in mineral economics: the resource curse thesis. Routledge, London.
3. Besley, T., Jensen, A., and Persson, T. (2019) Norms, enforcement, and tax evasion. NBER WP 25575.
4. Besley, T. (2020) State capacity, reciprocity, and the social contract. Econometrica 88: 1307-1335.
5. Bornhorst, F., Gupta, S., and Thornton, J. (2009) Natural resource endowment and the domestic revenue effort. European Journal of Political Economy 25(4): 439-446.
6. Devarajan, S. and Do, Q.-T. (2023) Taxation, accountability, and cash transfers: breaking the resource curse. Journal of Public Economics 218: 104816.
7. Gelb, A. (1988) Oil windfalls: blessing or curse? Oxford University Press for the World Bank.
8. Thomas, A.H. and Trevino, J.P. (2013) Resource dependence and fiscal effort in Sub-Saharan Africa. IMF Working Paper 2013/188.