本研究從城市規劃者視角出發，建構一個線性城市模型，以探討在新興城市規劃中，政府如何依據其對消費者福利與環境影響的政策偏好，調整市區規模與工業區選址。模型納入市區、工廠與零售商三者之間的空間互動，並以政府對消費者剩餘的重視程度、消費者願付最高價格與最大負外部性成本作為影響決策的核心變數。
分析結果顯示，當市區較小且政府對消費者剩餘重視程度較低時，工廠傾向設於城市中央；隨著政府對消費者剩餘的偏好提高，工廠將逐漸移往邊界以減少污染影響。此外，在僅考慮消費者剩餘為目標函數的前提下，若外部性為線性成本結構，則隨著消費者願付價格和最大負外部性成本的差距增加，政府才會擴大市區並容許工廠靠近中心；相對地，在二次外部性成本結構下，政府普遍傾向將工廠設於中央，惟所對應之市區規模相對較小。
綜合上述，政府對福利的政策偏好強度、消費者效益與汙染損害之間的權衡關係，以及負外部性成本的結構形式，皆對城市空間結構的最適配置產生關鍵影響，有助於理解新興城市土地利用與產業分佈的機制。

This study adopts the perspective of urban planners to construct a linear city model that explores how governments, in planning emerging cities, adjust the size of urban area and the location of industrial zones based on their policy preferences regarding consumer welfare and environmental impact. The model incorporates spatial interactions among urban area, factories, and retailers, and considers the government's emphasis on consumer surplus, consumers’ maximum willingness to pay, and the maximum cost of negative externalities as the key variables influencing policy decisions.
The analysis reveals that when the urban area is relatively small and the government places less emphasis on consumer surplus, the factory tends to be located at the center of the city. As the government's preference for consumer surplus increases, the factory gradually relocates toward the boundary to reduce pollution impact. Moreover, under the assumption that the government aims solely to maximize consumer surplus, the results show that with a linear external cost structure, the government only expands the urban area and allows the factory to move closer to the center when the gap between consumers’ willingness to pay and the maximum external cost increases. In contrast, under a quadratic external cost structure, the government generally prefers to locate the factory at the city center, but the corresponding size of the urban area tends to be smaller.
In summary, the strength of the government’s policy preference for welfare, the trade-off between consumer benefits and pollution damage, and the structural form of negative externalities all play critical roles in determining the optimal spatial configuration of a city. These findings contribute to a better understanding of land use and industrial distribution mechanisms in emerging urban developments.

論文審定書i
摘要ii
Abstractiii
目錄iv
圖次v
第一章 緒論1
第二章 模型設定6
第三章 區域規劃賽局的時序與初步分析8
第四章 線性負外部成本12
第五章 負外部成本為二次函數24
第六章 結論27
參考文獻29
附錄31

Anderson, S.P. & Neven, D.J. (1991). Cournot competition yields spatial agglomeration. International Economic Review 32(4), 793-808.
Barcena-Ruiz, J.C. and Casado-Izaga, F.J. (2014). Zoning under spatial price discrimination. Economic Inquiry 52(2), 659-665.
Bárcena-Ruiz, J.C. and Casado-Izaga, F. J. and Hamoudi, H. and Rodriguez, I. (2016). Optimal zoning in the unconstrained Hotelling game. Papers in Regional Science 95(2), 427-435.
Bárcena-Ruiz, J.C. and Casado-Izaga, F.J. (2017). Zoning a cross-border city. Journal of Regional Science 57(1), 173-189.
Bárcena‐Ruiz, J.C. and Casado‐Izaga, F.J. (2018a). Zoning a metropolitan area. Papers in Regional Science 97(S1), 123-137.
Bárcena-Ruiz, J.C. and Casado-Izaga, F.J. (2018b). Optimal size of a residential area within a municipality. Journal of Economics 124(1), 75-92.
Bárcena-Ruiz, J.C. and Casado-Izaga, F.J. (2020). Partial ownership of local firms and zoning of neighboring towns. The Annals of Regional Science 65(1), 27-43.
Cao, H. and Wang, L.F.S. (2023). Optimal zoning of managerial duopoly. Managerial and Decision Economics 44(1), 58-67.
Chen, C.S. and Lai, F.C. (2008). Location choice and optimal zoning under Cournot competition. Regional Science and Urban Economics 38(2), 119-126.
d’Aspremont, C., Gabszewicz, J.J. and Thisse, J.F. (1979). On Hotelling’s “stability in competition”. Econometrica 47(5), 1145-1150.
Guo, W.C. and Lai, F.C. (2024). Urban/rural spatial price discrimination with online competition. The Annals of Regional Science 73(1), 323-361.
Hamoudi, H. and Risueño, M. (2012). The effects of zoning in spatial competition. Journal of Regional Science 52(2), 361-374.
Hotelling, H. (1929). Stability in Competition. The Economic Journal 39(153), 41-57.
Hurter, A. and Lederer, P. (1985). Spatial duopoly with discriminatory pricing. Regional Science and Urban Economics 15(4), 541-553.
Lai, F.C. and Tsai, J.F. (2004). Duopoly locations and optimal zoning in a small open city. Journal of Urban Economics 55(3), 614-626.
Lederer, P. and Hurter, A. (1986). Competition of firms: discriminatory pricing and location. Econometrica 54(3), 623-640.
Li, Y. and Shuai, S. (2018). A welfare analysis of location space constraints with vertically separated sellers. Review of Industrial Organization 52(1), 161-177.
Ozdenerol, E., Huang,Y., Javadnejad, F. and Antipova, A. (2015). The Impact of Traffic Noise on Housing Values. Journal of Real Estate Practice and Education 18(1), 35-53.