本文以不知情選民為主，透過逆推得到子賽局的完美Nash均衡，探討當利益團體提供政治捐獻給候選人時，會如何影響候選人的政策選擇。本文研究發現，在兩個利益團體時，當選民全部為不知情選民時，即使利益團體位於極端兩邊，候選人還是會更靠近中位選民的立場，但是當候選人擁有更多基本盤時，候選人就可以更靠近自己固有意識形態以及利益團體的立場。本文還探討了現任者的影響，當現任者影響力越大時，不論是現任者還是挑戰者，都會更靠近自己的理想點。最後，本文討論了只有單一利益團體的情況，我們發現，在只有一個利益團體的時候，候選人不會靠近中位選民，而是偏向利益團體的理想點。

This paper mainly focuses on the uninformed voters, obtains the perfect Nash equilibrium of subgames through backward induction, and discusses how the interest groups will affect the candidates' policy choice when they provide political contributions to the candidates. This paper finds the policy positions of the candidates will be closer to the position of the median voters, even if the ideal points of interest groups locate at the opposite extremes in a unidimensional issue. However, when the candidates have their own base of voters, they can benefit from being closer to their own ideological positions or the ideal points of interest groups whom contribute to their election. This paper also discusses the influence of the incumbent. The greater the influence of the incumbent is, the closer to the ideal points that both the incumbent and the challenger will choose. Finally, this paper discusses the situation of a single interest group. In that case, the candidate may instead choose the ideal point of the interest group as his/her target.

目錄
論文審定書　i
誌謝　ii
中文摘要　iii
英文摘要　iv
目錄　v
圖次　vi
表次　vi
第一章　緒論　1
第一節　研究動機與背景　　1
第二節　研究目的　　3
第三節　研究方法　　3
第四節　本文架構　　4
第二章　文獻回顧　5
第一節　利益團體之遊說行為　　5
第二節　競選活動的廣告行為　　7
第三章　理論模型　8
第一節　模型基本假設　　8
第二節　利益團體的均衡捐款　　10
第三節　政黨均衡政策組合　　13
第四節　存在基本盤　　14
第五節　現任者影響效果　　16
第六節　單一利益團體　　18
第四章　結論與建議　23
第一節　本文結論　　23
第二節　未來延伸與建議　　24
參考文獻　25
附錄　27

中文文獻：
1. 張世熒（2000）。利益團體影響政府決策之研究。中國行政評論，9(3)， 23－52。
2. 郭俊偉（2010）。站在政治獻金背後「說話」 的利益團體－省思美國多元化社會的自由與平等。臺灣民主季刊，7(2)，77－123。
3. 曾淑芬（2007）。民進黨2000與2004總統大選競選廣告策略差異之研究－以自由時報、中國時報、聯合報為例。世新大學新聞學研究所(含碩專班)碩士論文，臺北市。

英文文獻：
1. Austen-Smith, D. (1987). Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting. Public Choice, 54(2), 123-139.
2. Austen-Smith, D., & Wright, J. R. (1992). Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote. Social Choice and Welfare, 9(3), 229-257.
3. Austen-Smith, D. (1993). Information and influence: Lobbying for agendas and votes. American Journal of Political Science, 799-833.
4. Baron, D. P. (1988). Regulation and legislative choice. The RAND Journal of Economics, 467-477.
5. Baron, D. P. (1994). Electoral competition with informed and uniformed voters. American Political Science Review, 33-47.
6. Felli, L., & Merlo, A. (2007). If you cannot get your friends elected, lobby your enemies. Journal of the European Economic Association, 5(2-3), 624-635.
7. Gersbach, H. (2014). Campaigns, political mobility, and communication. Public Choice, 161(1-2), 31-49.
8. Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1996). Electoral competition and special interest politics. The Review of Economic Studies, 63(2), 265-286.
9. Hall, R. L., & Deardorff, A. V. (2006). Lobbying as legislative subsidy. American Political Science Review, 69-84.
10. Klingelhöfer, J. (2019). Lobbying and Elections. Bulletin of Economic Research, 71(1), 1-17.
11. Le, T., & Yalcin, E. (2018). Lobbying, campaign contributions, and electoral competition. European Journal of Political Economy, 55, 559-572.
12. Prat, A. (2002). Campaign advertising and voter welfare. The Review of Economic Studies, 69(4), 999-1017.
13. Wittman, D. (2007). Candidate quality, pressure group endorsements and the nature of political advertising. European Journal of Political Economy, 23(2), 360-378.
14. Wittman, D. (2008). Targeted political advertising and strategic behavior by uninformed voters. Economics of Governance, 9(1), 87-100.