本文探討對於智慧財產權類型的商品，廠商在直接面對消費者進行銷售時，所會選擇的揭露及訂價策略。在揭露策略的選擇上，無論是獨占或者是雙占的兩間廠商，都僅基於消費者對於揭露的態度選擇其揭露程度，當消費者在揭露後的剩餘價值愈低，廠商便會選擇較低的揭露比例。而在雙占市場下，根據條件的不同可能存在兩種均衡市場樣貌，若消費者對於商品的事前價值評估較高，擁有較高臨界揭露比例消費者會選擇購買高品質產品，而事前價值評估較低時則反之。並且越高的事前價值會使廠商選擇更高的訂價。

This paper discusses the pricing and disclosing strategy of firms that are selling intellectual property directly toward consumers. When it comes to the choice of disclosing strategy, both monopoly and duopoly firms make the decisions based only on their target consumers’ attitude toward revealing. A lower evaluation of the remaining quality causes the firms to reveal less. Under duopoly, there are two possible equilibria. Consumers with higher critical revealing proportion would buy the high-quality product when the consumer prior valuation is relatively high, and vice versa. Moreover, higher consumer prior valuation would increase raise the price of both firms.

論文審定書 i
摘要 ii
Abstract iii
目錄 iv
圖目錄 v
表目錄 v
第一章 緒論 1
第二章 文獻回顧 3
第三章 模型分析 6
第一節 獨占市場 6
第二節 雙占市場 9
第三節 兩廠商的均衡行為 17
第四節 討論 21
第四章 結論 23
參考文獻 25
附錄 26

Anton, J., and Yao, D., 2002, The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting, The Review of Economic Studies, 69, 513–531.
Anton, J., and Yao, D., 2004, Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing Intellectual Property, The RAND Journal of Economics, 35, 1–22.
Bhattacharya, S., and Guriev, S., 2006, Patents vs. Trade Secrets: Knowledge Licensing and Spillover, Journal of the European Economic Association, 4, 1112–1147.
Chen, Y., Li, S., Lin, K. and Yu, J., 2021, Consumer search with blind buying, Games and Economic Behavior, 126, 402-427.
Gill, D., 2008, Strategic disclosure of intermediate research results, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 17, 733-758
Hong, X., Zhou, M. and Gong, Y., 2021,Dilemma of quality information disclosure in technology licensing, European Journal of Operational Research, 294, 543-557.