以發生在台灣的公共安全事件作為本文啟發，其中不僅牽涉到官商勾結還可能因為官員收受賄賂使得監督放水，造成社會福利損失，使得無辜人民身害其中。
本文以賽局形式呈現政府官員和業者廠商之間的互動關係及貪腐行為，假設某些廠商為了合法營業，並透過賄賂政府官員取得安檢證照，其中因廠商的品質有所顧慮及存在瑕疵，並分為兩部分進行討論。第一部分，探討官員及廠商在什麼條件之下雙方願意達成私下協議；第二部分則是政府如何透過懲罰及獎勵機制遏止腐敗，改變子賽局完美Nash均衡，討論各個決策點之下的均衡及政策含義。

Inspired by some tragic incidents with regard to public security in Taiwan, this paper setups a model to involve collusions among officials and private firms, but also corruptible law enforcers whom might not fulfill his duty properly because of extortion. Both corruption and extortion will certainly result in the dead weight loss of social welfare.
This paper focuses on the interactions among the officials affiliated to various institutions and rent-seeking firms sought after a certificate for public security. In order to operate legally, a firm may bribe some officials to obtain security certificates, which might not perfectly qualified because of corruption and the firm’s concern for its own interest. The analysis will be carried out in two parts. The first part discusses the conditions under which officials and firms will reach a settlement. The second part discusses the issue how the government can curb corruption through punishment and reward mechanism. In conclusion, I draw more attention to the implication of policy remedies which may change the sub-games perfect Nash equilibrium in favor of public welfare.

論文審定書 i
致謝 ii
摘要 iii
Abstract iv
目錄 v
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 架構 3
第二章 文獻回顧 4
第三章 理論模型 7
第一節 模型假設 7
第二節 廠商及官員私下交易條件 9
第三節 懲罰、獎勵及政策含義 12
第四章 結論與建議 22
第一節 總結 22
第二節 未來研究建議 23
參考文獻 24

中文部分
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英文部分
Abram, William C., and Kadeem Noray. "Political corruption and public activism: an evolutionary game-theoretic analysis." Dynamic Games and Applications 8.1 (2018): 1-21.
Groenendijk, Nico. "A principal-agent model of corruption." Crime, Law and Social Change 27.3 (1997): 207-229.
Krueger, Anne O. "The political economy of the rent-seeking society." The American economic review 64.3 (1974): 291-303.
Lambsdorff, Johann Graf. "Corruption and rent-seeking." Public choice 113.1 (2002): 97-125.
Manion, Melanie. "Corruption by design: Bribery in Chinese enterprise licensing." The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 12.1 (1996): 167-195.
Melo Filho, Paulo, and Francisco Ramos. "A Game-Theoretic Approach to Corruption in the Allocation of Public Resources." PET 16-Rio. 2016. 
MIZOGUCHI, TETSURO, and N. G. U. Y. E. N. VAN QUYEN. "Corruption in Entry Licence Acquisition a Game-Theoretic Analysis with a Track of Bureaucrats." (2010).
Murphy, Kevin M., Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. "Why is rent-seeking so costly to growth?" The American Economic Review 83.2 (1993): 409-414.
Paul, Chris, and A. L. Wilhite. "Illegal markets and the social costs of rent-seeking." Public Choice 79.1-2 (1994): 105-115.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan. "The political economy of corruption." Corruption and the global economy 31.60 (1997): 54.
Tullock, Gordon. "Corruption theory and practice." Contemporary economic policy 14.3 (1996): 6-13.
網路資料
維基百科：台北林森錢櫃大火，網址：https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/台北林森錢櫃大火（最後瀏覽日期：2021/6/1）。
丁上程，2020/7/15，「林森錢櫃大火後　建管處科員遭爆索賄護航電梯安檢」，《今日新聞》，網址：https://www.nownews.com/news/5033096（最後瀏覽日期：2021/6/1）。
維基百科：2021年太魯閣號列車出軌事故，網址：https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021年太魯閣號列車出軌事故（最後瀏覽日期：2021/6/1）。
張祈，2021/4/16，「太魯閣號事故偵結 李義祥、移工阿好等7人依過失致死罪起訴」，《中央通訊社》，網址：https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/202104165006.aspx（最後瀏覽日期：2021/6/1）。