在這篇文章中，我們將境外資源加入衝突賽局模型，分別在自給自足與開放貿易的經濟體系下，探討資源衝突如何影響最終財貿易，以及貿易是否能夠促進和平。結果顯示：在衝突後貿易的情況下，該國的武裝投入會對該國社會福利產生三種影響，首先是貿易效果，因進行貿易可以享有貿易利得，使福利增加；其次是產出扭曲效果，由於將資源分配於武裝減少了消費財的生產，使福利減少；三是資源掠奪福利效果，當在衝突中獲勝時，可得到額外的資源用於生產，使福利提升。此外，貿易對於衝突的效果是模糊的，取決於貿易成本、兩國資源稟賦與可爭奪得資源大小。

In this paper, we combine resource predation with a game-theoretic model of conflict to analyze how resource conflict affects final goods trade and whether trade can promote peace or not? In the presence of trade, a country’s arming is shown to affect domestic social welfare in three different ways. The first is a trade effect, which can increase welfare as country can get gain of trade. The second is an output distortion effect of arming. It decreases welfare because allocating resource to arming reduces the final good production. The third is a plundering resources effect, which is welfare-improving since the winner can get more resource to produce more final goods. The effect of trade on conflicts is ambiguous, depending on the cost of trade, the resource endowments of the two countries, and the size of the resources that can be contested.

論文審定書…………………………………………………………………… i
中文摘要……………………………………………………………………… ii
英文摘要………………………………………………………………………. iii
目錄…………………………………………………………………………….iv
第 一 章 前言………………………………………………………………… 1
第 二 章 基礎模型…………………………………………………………… 6
2.1 資源爭奪與衝突技術…………………………………………………… 6
2.2 社會福利………………………………………………………………… 7
2.3 兩國衝突後不進行貿易………………………………………………… 8
2.4 兩國衝突後進行貿易……………………………………………………10
定理一……………………………………………………………………15
定理二……………………………………………………………………15
第 三 章 模型延伸…………………………………………………………… 17
3.1 資源爭奪與衝突技術……………………………………………………17
3.2 雙方衝突後不進行貿易…………………………………………………18
3.3 雙方衝突後進行貿易……………………………………………………21
第 四 章 結論………………………………………………………………… 23
參考文獻…………………………………………………………………………25

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