本文透過賽局理論研究獨佔下雙邊市場廠商在產品具有垂直差異時的最適定價並探討其商業策略。經研究發現，廠商在獨佔市場下的定價會大於雙方合作互相上架對方商品後的定價，而廠商在獨佔市場下的顧客數量會小於雙方合作後的顧客數量。由此可知，兩競爭廠商合作後會有負面的價格競爭效果與正面的市場擴張效果。當雙方合作後向對方收取一筆費用可以減緩負面的價格競爭效果，而當雙方品質差距越大時，市場擴張效果則會越強烈。研究發現在此條件下兩競爭廠商彼此合作可以提升各自與產業總利潤，創造雙贏。

The thesis is to study optimal pricing of Two-sided Market monopoly firm when their products have vertical differences based on the game theory, and discusses their business strategies. The research found that when a firm becomes momopoly, the fixed price will be higher than two cooperating firms; yet the number of customers will decrease. The result showed that when the two competing firms cooperate, there will be have negative price competition effects and positive market expansion effects. When the two parties cooperate, charging each other a fee can reduce the negative price competition effects.When the quality gap between the two parties is larger, the market expansion effect will be stronger. The study found that if the two competing firms cooperate with each other under this condition, they not only increased total profit but create a win-win situation.

論文審定書 i
謝辭 ii
摘要 iii
Abstract iv
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 文獻回顧 3
第二章 數學模型 6
第一節 基本模型假設 6
第二節 兩平台各自販售 7
第三節 兩雙邊平台互相合作採固定上架費 8
第四節 兩雙邊平台互相合作採抽成制度 15
第三章 以數位內容產業案例探討 18
第一節 兩平台各自販售 18
第二節 兩雙邊平台互相合作採抽成制度 19
第四章 結論 22
參考文獻 24
附錄 26

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