隨著大數據 行銷的發展，廣告商更能精準地投放觀眾需要的廣告 ，使得觀眾
對於廣告的厭惡程度降低。 本文建構一個獨占的雙邊媒體平台模型， 分別 探討 單
一版本與免費加值 兩種定價 模式 下 平台策略如何受到影響。主要結果顯示 單
一版本定價下，若觀眾 對廣告厭惡程度低，平台會提供 免費版本 不 向觀眾收取
訂閱費，僅 向廣告商收取費用 ；若觀眾對廣告厭惡程度高，平台則會同時向觀眾
與廣告商收 費。此外，在 免費版本下，當觀眾對廣告厭惡降低時，平台會 降低 廣
告費率， 增加 廣告數量 與 觀眾 人數 ，平台品質先上升後下降 。單一版本雙邊收費
下 平台 同樣 會 降低廣告費率， 增加廣告量與觀眾人數； 然而 平台會降低 訂閱
費 ，並降低提供的 品質 。 再者， 免費加值模式下 ，隨 觀眾 對 廣告厭惡程度下降
選擇免費版本的 觀眾 增加，選擇加值版本的 觀眾 減少，訂閱費先上升 後下降 此
外， 隨著 觀眾 對廣告厭惡程度的降低， 平台提供的免費版本 品質上升，加值版本
的品質下降。

The development of big data marketing has effectively reduced the disutility of advertisements (ads) for the platform's users. This paper aims to study how this affects a monopoly platform's quality provision and pricing strategy under the single version and freemium pricing models, respectively. The main results show that, in the single version pricing model, if ads' disutility is low, the platform provides a free version that does not charge users subscription fees; if ads' disutility is high, the platform charges both users and advertisers. Moreover, when the platform provides a free version, a reduction in ads' disutility lowers the advertising rate, increases both the number of ads and the number of users, and the platform's quality first rises and then declines. On the other hand, when the platform charges both users and advertisers, such a reduction also decreases the advertising rate, and increases both the number of ads and the number of users; however, the platform charges a lower subscription fee and provides lower quality for users. Furthermore, under the freemium model, the reduction in ads' disutility has similar effects on the advertising rate and the number of ads. Meanwhile, in response to the decrease of ads' disutility, the number of the free version's users increases, and the number of the premium version's users decreases, and the subscription fee first increases and then decreases. In addition, the quality of the free version increases, and the quality of the premium version decreases.

審定書..........................................i
摘要.....................................................ii
Abstract...............................................iii
目錄.....................................................iv
圖次......................................................v
表次.....................................................vi
第一章 前言.........................................1
第二章 文獻回顧.................................4
第三章 單一定價模式.........................6
3.1平台品質給定下的最適解.............7
3.2內生品質下的最適解.....................9
第四章 Freemium模型.......................11
4.1平台品質給定下的最適解............12
4.2內生品質下的最適解....................14
第五章 結論........................................18
參考文獻.............................................20
附錄.....................................................21

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