隨著各國政府近來逐漸強化環保原料比例的規範，大眾亟待了解這一環保措施帶來的福利效應。有鑑於此，本研究建構了一個包含上游環保原料供應商與下游最終財廠商之垂直相關市場模型，以分析政府在連續獨占（Successive Monopoly）與買方力量（Buyer Power）兩種原物料市場結構下，如何制定社會福利之最適環保投入比例，並對這兩種市場結構下的經濟效果進行差異性的比較。我們的研究結果發現，在這兩種市場結構下之最適環保投入比例均為介於0到1之間的內部解。此外，只要污染邊際損害的程度足夠小（大），那麼政府在買方力量市場下之最適環保原料比例就會高（低）於在連續獨占市場下的水準。我們的研究結果表明，上下游廠商在環保原料市場上的力量配置的確會影響政府環境政策的成效。因此，政府在制定環保原料使用規範時，應重視產業供應鏈中的市場結構，以提升政策之整體效率

In recent years, governments around the world have increasingly strengthened regulations requiring the use of environmentally friendly raw materials, creating an urgent need to understand the welfare effects of such environmental policies. To address this issue, this study develops a vertically related market model consisting of an upstream supplier of environmentally friendly raw materials and a downstream final-good producer. The model is used to examine how the government determines the welfare-maximizing proportion of environmentally friendly inputs under two alternative market structures: Successive Monopoly and Buyer Power. We further compare the economic outcomes under these two market structures. Our results show that the optimal proportion of environmentally friendly inputs is an interior solution between zero and one under both market structures. Furthermore, when the marginal environmental damage from pollution is sufficiently low (high), the welfare-maximizing proportion of environmentally friendly inputs under Buyer Power is higher (lower) than that under Successive Monopoly. These findings indicate that the distribution of market power between upstream and downstream firms in the environmentally friendly raw material market significantly affects the effectiveness of government environmental policies. Therefore, when formulating regulations on the use of environmentally friendly raw materials, governments should take the supply chain's market structure into account in order to improve overall policy efficiency.

目錄
論文審定書i
中文摘要ii
英文摘要iii
目錄iv
第一章：前言1
1.1 研究背景與動機1
1.2 文獻回顧2
第二章：模型設計4
2.1 基本架構5
2.2 連續獨佔模型6
2.3 買方力量模型10
2.4 比較靜態分析14
2.4.1 連續獨佔模型之比較靜態分析15
2.4.2 買方力量模型之比較靜態分析18
2.5 小結21
第三章：模型結果比較22
3.1 均衡產量之比較22
3.2 環保原料定價之比較23
3.3 最適環保投入比例之比較23
第四章：總結27
數學附錄 A31
參考文獻33

參考文獻
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