本文延伸Delfgaauw and Dur (2010) 的模型, 藉由勞動者的公共服務動機探討其對於職業的自我選擇及投入的努力程度。若優秀且熱忱的勞動者選擇進入公部門工作, 可以增加公部門的效率, 進而提升公共服務品質。本文發現在公、私部門皆為完全競爭市場下,若勞動者擁有純粹利他動機, 則公部門的篩選制度及轉換部門就業的摩擦成本, 可有效緩和低能力勞動者反向選擇進入公部門的現象。然而, 如果勞動者擁有非純粹利他動機, 則低能力勞動者反向選擇進入公部門就業之情形將不存在。

We extend the model of Delfgaauw and Dur (2010) to analyze the occupation choice with the presence of the public service motivation. When the workers are purely altruistic, the lower is the acceptance rate of job application to the public sector, the higher is the possibility to have applicants with better managerial ability. In addition, when the friction cost of restarting job searching is higher, the applicants with less managerial ability tend to apply the private sector jobs from the beginning. On the other hand, when the workers are impurely altruistic, the applicants with less managerial ability will not self-select into the public sector. Finally, the highest social welfare level may not be reached if the acceptance rate in the public sector is not one hundred percent.

1 緒論 1
1.1 研究動機與目的 1
1.2 研究方法與本文架構 2
2 文獻回顧 4
3 基本模型 9
4 純粹利他動機 12
4.1 最適努力 12
4.2 職業選擇 13
4.3 公部門之進入門檻(μ) 及轉換部門就業之摩擦成本(d) 17
5 成本極小與社會福利極大 19
5.1 成本極小 19
5.1.1 模型設定 19
5.1.2 最適努力與最低公共服務動機水準 20
5.1.3 最低公共服務動機水準與管理能力的關係 22
5.2 社會福利極大 22
5.2.1 模型設定 23
5.2.2 最適努力與最低公共服務動機水準 24
5.2.3 最低公共服務動機水準與管理能力的關係 26
6 非純粹利他動機 28
6.1 模型設定 28
6.2 最適努力 28
6.3 職業選擇 30
7 結論 34
附表 36
參考文獻 37

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