在現行法規嚇阻力不足的框架下，企業常將環境違規罰款視為可接受的營運成本。本研究旨在探討具備風險尋求 (Risk-seeking) 特質的飛行員執行長 (Pilot CEOs) ，是否更傾向大膽承擔風險，進而推升企業環境違規之機率。

本研究以 2000 年至 2024 年美國上市企業為樣本，結合 Violation Tracker 違規資料庫與聯邦航空總署 (FAA) 資料，採用卜瓦松偽最大概似估計法 (PPML) 與傾向分數配對法 (PSM) 進行實證分析。研究結果表明，由 Pilot CEO 領導的企業，其發生環境污染與重大違規的預期次數顯著較高，但總裁罰金額未顯著增加，印證其將罰款視為法規套利代價之假說。

進一步的子樣本分析證實，當企業缺乏外部監督 （低機構持股） 、資源寬裕（不受財務限制、低股利支付率），以及年長 CEO 面臨退休前短視效應時，Pilot CEO 推升違規的效應最為顯著。本研究結論指出，防範企業環境危機不僅需強化罰款嚇阻力，更應針對資源充沛且由高風險偏好管理者領導之企業，實施更嚴密的合規稽核機制。

Under the current framework of insufficient regulatory deterrence, firms often treat environmental violation fines as an acceptable "cost of doing business." This study aims to examine whether pilot CEOs, characterized by risk-seeking traits, are more inclined to boldly assume risks, thereby increasing the probability of corporate environmental violations.
Utilizing a sample of U.S. publicly listed firms from 2000 to 2024, this study integrates the Violation Tracker database with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, employing Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimation and Propensity Score Matching (PSM) for empirical analysis. The results show that firms led by pilot CEOs exhibit a significantly higher expected frequency of both general and serious environmental violations, whereas the total penalty amounts do not increase significantly. This substantiates the hypothesis that these managers view fines as the price of regulatory arbitrage.
Further subsample analyses verify that the effect of pilot CEOs on driving up violations is most pronounced when firms lack external monitoring (low institutional ownership) , possess financial slack (financially unconstrained and low dividend payout ratios), and when older CEOs face pre-retirement horizon problems. This study concludes that preventing corporate environmental crises requires not only strengthening the deterrent effect of fines but also implementing more rigorous compliance auditing mechanisms for resource-abundant firms led by managers with high risk preferences.

論文審訂書 i
誌謝 ii
中文摘要 iii
ABSTRACT iv
目錄 v
表目錄 vii
第一章 緒論 1
1-1研究動機 1
1-1-1為何環境保護重要？ 1
1-1-2為何擁有飛行員執照的執行長（CEO）可能會影響企業違規發生？ 1
第二章 文獻回顧與假說建立 3
2-1 風險尋求 3
2-2 行為一致性與違規決策 3
2-3 假說建立 4
第三章 資料收集與變數構建 5
3-1 資料來源與樣本篩選 5
3-1-1飛行員執行長（Pilot CEO）資料搜集 6
3-1-2 企業違規資料 (Violation Tracker) 與資料合併 6
3-2 變數定義 8
3-2-1被解釋變數：企業違規行為 8
3-2-2解釋變數：飛行員執行長 8
3-3 模型建立 8
3-4 內生性問題 9
第四章 實證結果與分析 11
4-1 敘述性統計分析 11
4-2 相關係數分析 11
4-3 主迴歸結果分析 13
第五章 穩健性檢定 15
5-1 替代性被解釋變數與嚴重程度 15
第六章 子樣本檢定 18
6-1 年齡子樣本分析 18
6-2 機構投資人持之股子樣本分析 20
6-3 財務限制之子樣本分析 21
6-4 股利支付率之子樣本分析 22
第七章 結論 24
參考文獻 26
附錄 36

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