聯合國安全理事會是當代多邊安全治理的核心制度。當安理會針對某一國家的情勢通過決議，即代表國際社會對該國處境作出集體的政治認定。這種認定是否會影響國際援助資源的分配？既有的援助分配研究在處理多邊制度因素時，多以受援國是否擔任安理會成員作為核心解釋，較少直接以決議數量衡量國際制度對特定國家的關注程度，並檢驗其與援助配置之間的關聯。本研究不預設單一方向，而是將兩種對立的解釋並列檢驗。其一認為，安理會決議能向捐贈方傳遞訊息並施加規範性壓力，從而動員更多援助流入；另一派則認為，持續受到安理會關注的國家，容易被貼上政治風險高、治理失能的標籤，使主要已開發捐助國質疑援助能否發揮效果，反而減少投入。本研究以2022至2024年各受援國的資料進行分析，採用能處理部分國家完全未獲援助情形的迴歸模型估計，並另以涵蓋所有捐贈來源的援助總額進行穩健性檢驗。實證結果顯示，安理會決議數量與主要已開發捐助國提供的官方發展援助之間呈負向關聯，此一方向在各年度與各項設定中都一致；惟關聯的量值高度依賴少數極端觀測，將其排除後統計顯著性即不再成立。該關聯並未出現在援助總額的模型中，整體較支持汙名化機制的解釋。本研究將決議數量納入援助分配的分析，補充既有文獻較少討論的多邊制度可能伴隨的負向關聯。

The UN Security Council's adoption of a country-specific resolution constitutes a collective political judgment by the international community. Does that judgment shape aid allocation? Existing work focuses on whether recipients hold a Council seat, seldom using resolution counts to capture institutional attention. This study weighs two competing accounts: resolutions may signal need and exert normative pressure, mobilizing aid (legitimation); or they may mark a country as politically risky and poorly governed, leading major developed donors to doubt aid effectiveness and scale back (stigmatization). Using recipient-country data for 2022–2024 and a model that accommodates zero-aid observations, with total aid from all sources as a robustness check, the analysis finds a negative conditional association between resolution counts and DAC official development assistance. The direction holds across specifications, but the magnitude rests heavily on a few extreme observations, and statistical significance does not survive their exclusion. No such association appears in the total-aid model. The findings favor the stigmatization account and point to a rarely examined negative effect of multilateral institutions on aid allocation.

論文審定書 i
致謝 ii
摘要 iii
Abstract iv
目錄 v
圖次 vii
表次 vii
第一章　緒論 1
第一節　研究動機 1
第二節　研究目的 2
第三節　研究範圍與限制 3
第二章　文獻回顧 5
第一節　重力模型傳統下的雙邊援助決定因素 5
第二節　人道需求、援助回應性與援助效果 6
第三節　國際組織與援助分配的三條研究路徑 8
第四節　競爭性理論機制的辨析 10
第五節　計量方法的文獻慣例與研究空缺 12
第三章　研究假設與方法 17
第一節　假設架構及推導 17
第二節　汙名化機制假設 19
第三節　正當化機制假設 19
第四節　需求面基準假設 20
第五節　資料來源、變數與模型設定 21
第六節　假設檢定的核心統計判準 26
第七節　檢定模型的多層次穩健性設計 28
第四章　實證分析 33
第一節　樣本概況與描述統計 33
第二節　實證估計結果 36
第三節　跨年度綜合與假設驗證 41
第四節　主要實證發現綜整 47
第五節　蘇丹 2022–2024 期間援助配置的案例說明 51
第五章　結論 57
第一節　主要發現與文獻對話 58
第二節　政策意涵 62
第三節　後續研究方向 65
參考文獻 70

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