這項研究探討威權政體在經濟衰退時啟動對外軍事衝突的關係，並以俄羅斯在普丁（Vladimir Putin）領導下的案例作為核心分析。傳統解釋多強調地緣政治目標與民族主義意識形態，但本研究主張，國內經濟壓力在推動俄羅斯於2008年（喬治亞）、2014年（克里米亞）及2022年（烏克蘭）發動戰爭的決策中扮演了關鍵角色。
本文結合轉移性戰爭理論（diversionary war theory）與個人化政體（personalist regimes）的概念，指出經濟衰退——包括GDP增長下滑、通貨膨脹上升以及失業率提高——會造成內部不穩定，進而激勵威權領導人發動軍事行動，以鞏固菁英忠誠並提升大眾支持率。透過過程追蹤（process tracing）與反事實分析（counterfactual analysis），研究顯示每一次戰爭皆與經濟困境時期相互重疊，且隨後帶來普丁支持度的顯著提升，以及菁英對國家庇蔭依賴的加深。
研究結果進一步修正並拓展了轉移性戰爭理論，結合Barbara Geddes關於領導人存續的洞見，強調威權政體的戰爭決策不僅受到民意影響，更深受菁英生存動態的制約。本研究提供一個更具細緻性的分析框架，以理解個人化政體如何將對外衝突作為回應內部危機的戰略手段，並對威權體制的延續性與國際穩定產生重要啟示。

This study investigates the relationship between economic decline and the initiation of external military conflicts by authoritarian regimes, with a particular focus on Russia under Vladimir Putin. While traditional explanations emphasize geopolitical objectives and nationalist ideologies, this research argues that domestic economic pressures played a critical role in driving Russia’s decisions to wage war in 2008 (Georgia), 2014 (Crimea), and 2022 (Ukraine). Drawing upon diversionary war theory and the concept of personalist regimes, this study posits that economic downturn, characterized by declining GDP growth, rising inflation, and increasing unemployment, creates internal instability that incentivizes authoritarian leaders to launch military actions to consolidate elite loyalty and boost public approval. Using process tracing and counterfactual analysis, the research demonstrates how each war coincided with periods of economic distress and triggered significant surges in Putin’s approval ratings, as well as increased elite dependence on state patronage. The findings contribute to the refinement of diversionary war theory by integrating Barbara Geddes’ insights on leadership survival, emphasizing that authoritarian war decisions are shaped not only by public opinion but also by elite survival dynamics. This study offers a nuanced framework for understanding how personalist regimes use external conflict as a strategic response to internal crises, with implications for both authoritarian durability and international stability.

Thesis Validation Letter ................................................................................................................................ i
Acknowledgment ........................................................................................................................................ ii
Chinese Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ iii
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................................... iv
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................................... v
List of Figures ........................................................................................................................................... vii
Chapter 1: Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 1
Chapter 2: Literature Review ..................................................................................................................... 4
2.1 Conventional perspective ............................................................................................................... 4
2.2 Diversionary Theory of War Perspective ...................................................................................... 7
2.3 My Perspective ............................................................................................................................ 12
Chapter 3: Theoretical Frameworks ....................................................................................................... 14
3.1 Highly Centralized Personal Authority ..................................................................................... 15
3.2 The Decisive Role of Personal Charisma ................................................................................... 17
3.3 Centralization of Loyalty Networks ........................................................................................... 18
Chapter 4: Research Design ..................................................................................................................... 22
4.1 Economic Background Analysis ................................................................................................. 23
4.2 The Political Environment and Leadership Decisions Before War .......................................... 25
4.3 Post-War Impacts and Outcomes ............................................................................................... 27
4.4 Counterfactual Analysis: Would War Occur Without Economic Decline? ............................. 29
Chapter 5 2008 Russo-Georgian War ..................................................................................................... 31
5.1 Background of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War .......................................................................... 31
5.2 2008 Russo-Georgian War’s Economic Background Analysis .................................................. 31
5.3 The Political Environment and Leadership Decisions Before 2008 ......................................... 40
5.4 Post-War Impacts and Outcomes After 2008 War .................................................................... 42
Chapter 6 2014 Crimea Annexation ........................................................................................................ 46
6.1 Background of the 2014 Crimea Annexation ............................................................................. 46
6.2 2014 Crimea Annexation’s Economic Background Analysis .................................................... 46
6.3 The Political Environment and Leadership Decisions Before 2014 ......................................... 54
6.4 Post-War Impacts and Outcomes After 2014 Crimea Annexation ........................................... 56
Chapter 7 2022 Russia-Ukraine War ...................................................................................................... 60
7.1 Background of the 2022 Russia-Ukraine War ........................................................................... 60
7.2 2022 Russia-Ukraine War’s Economic Background Analysis ................................................... 60
7.3 The Political Environment and Leadership Decisions Before 2022 ......................................... 65
7.4 Post-War Impacts and Outcomes After 2022 Russia-Ukraine War ......................................... 68
vi
Chapter 8: Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 72
References ................................................................................................................................................. 75

References

Associated Press. (2012, September 16). Russia: Tens of thousands turn out for anti-Putin rally. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/16/russia-anti-putin- protest-moscow
Baturo, A., & Elkink, J. A. (2016). Dynamics of regime personalization and patron–client networks in Russia, 1999–2014. Post-Soviet Affairs, 32(1), 75–98. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2015.1032532
Baum, M. A. (2002). The constituent foundations of the rally-round-the-flag phenomenon.
International Studies Quarterly, 46(1), 263–298. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-
2478.00232

BBC News. (2011, December 10). Russia election: Biggest protests since fall of USSR. BBC News.. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-16122524
BBC News. (2015, January 30). Ukraine conflict: Putin ally to build bridge to Crimea.

BBC News.. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31067977

Beliakova, P., Perlo-Freeman, S., & Freeman, S. (2018, May 11). Corruption in the Russian defense sector (WPF Report). World Peace Foundation, The Fletcher School, Tufts University. https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/files/2018/05/Russian-Defense-Corruption- Report-Beliakova-Perlo-Freeman-20180502-final.pdf
Bershidsky, L. (2018, October 11). Putin baits the West to bring Russian money home. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-10-11/putin-baits-the- west-to-bring-russian-money-home

Biersack, J., & O’Lear, S. (2014). The geopolitics of Russia's annexation of Crimea: Narratives, identity, silences, and energy. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 55(3), 247–269. https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2014.985241
Bigg, C. (2008, December 26). Financial crisis in Russia holds threat of social unrest. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/Financial_Crisis_In_Russia_Holds_Threat_Of_Social_Unrest/1 362714.html
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003). The Logic of Political Survival. MIT Press.
Bukhari, S. R. H. (2024). Ukraine and Russia: A historical analysis of geopolitical dynamics, national identity, and conflict escalation leading to the present-day crisis. Kurdish Studies, 12(2), 5803–5824. https://doi.org/10.58262/ks.v12i2.430
Camp, K. M., Mead, D., Reed, S. B., Sitter, C., & Wasilewski, D. (2020, October). From the barrel to the pump: The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on prices for petroleum products. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2020/article/from-the-barrel-to-the-pump.htm
Chow, E. C. (2018, February 22). Russia’s national oil champion goes global. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias- national-oil-champion-goes-global
DeRouen, K. R., Jr. (1995). The indirect link: Politics, the economy, and the use of force. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39(4), 671–695. https://www.jstor.org/stable/174382
Dreyfuss, B. (2014, March 19). Full text and analysis of Putin’s Crimea speech. The Nation. https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/full-text-and-analysis-putins-crimea-speech/

Düben, B. A. (2023). Revising history and ‘gathering the Russian lands’: Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian nationhood. LSE Public Policy Review, 3(1), Article 4, 1–12. https://doi.org/10.31389/lseppr.86
Ferguson, I. (2018). Between new spheres of influence: Ukraine’s geopolitical misfortune.

Geopolitics, 23(2), 285–306. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2017.1402299 ForumKuban. (n.d.). Kuban International Economic Forum. https://www.forumkuban.ru/
Geddes, B. (1999). What do we know about democratization after twenty years? Annual Review of Political Science, 2, 115–144. https://www.annualreviews.org/content/journals/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.115
Geddes, B., Wright, J., & Frantz, E. (2014). Autocratic regimes dataset [Data set].
University of California, Los Angeles. https://sites.google.com/site/authoritarianregimedataset
Gelpi, C. (1997). Democratic diversions: Governmental structure and the externalization of domestic conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(2), 255–282. https://www.jstor.org/stable/174373
Gorst, I. (2014, April 30). IMF cuts growth outlook for Russia, again. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/3ed2fac4-e85e-3384-93e1-86b20c8f9a3a
Götz, E. (2017). Russia, the West, and the Ukraine crisis: Three contending perspectives.

International Studies Review, 19(2), 228–253. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2016.1254162
Götz, E., & Merlen, C.-R. (2019). Russia and the question of world order. European Politics and Society, 20(2), 133–153. https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2018.1545181

Grey, S., Shiffman, J., & Smith, G. (2024, December 30). The Russian billionaires whose chemical factories fuel Russia’s war machine. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-billionaires-whose-chemical-factories- fuel-russias-war-machine-2024-12-30/
Harding, L. (2008, April 4). Putin: NATO expansion is a direct threat to Russia. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/04/nato.russia
Harding, L. (2010, February 2). Kremlin shocked as Kaliningrad stages huge anti- government protest. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/02/russia-anti-government-protest- kaliningrad
Kendall, B. (2014, March 19). Crimea crisis: Russian President Putin's speech annotated.

BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26652058

Kiselev, S. V., Seitov, S. K., Samsonov, V. A., & Filimonov, I. V. (2024). Employment in informal sector of Russia: Unemployment and other socio-economic factors.
Population and Economics, 8(3), 197–219. https://doi.org/10.3897/popecon.8.e114046

Kizilova, K., & Norris, P. (2024). “Rally around the flag” effects in the Russian–Ukrainian war. European Political Science, 23, 234–250. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-023- 00450-9
Lambert, F. (2015, June 9). Putin offers amnesty to Russians who repatriate offshore money.

United Press International. https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World- News/2015/06/09/Putin-offers-amnesty-to-Russians-who-repatriate-offshore- money/1211433879901/

Levada Center. (n.d.). Putin’s approval rating. Retrieved June 1, 2025, from https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/
Levy, J. S. (1989). The diversionary theory of war: A critique. In M. I. Midlarsky (Ed.), Handbook of war studies (pp. 259–288). Unwin Hyman.
Luhn, A. (2016, January 25). Russia’s GDP falls 3.7% as sanctions and low oil price take effect. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/25/russias-gdp- falls-37-as-sanctions-and-low-oil-price-take-effect
Luzin, P. (2025, January 22). Russia’s year of truth: The runaway military budget. Center for European Policy Analysis. https://cepa.org/article/russias-year-of-truth-the- runaway-military-budget/
Maglov, M., Badanin, R., & Titov, S. (2023, February 28). Vladimir Putin and the secretive network of Ermira. Proekt Media. https://www.proekt.media/en/guide-en/vladimir- putin-ermira-en/
Meduza. (2022, November 30). Russian defense purchasing set to increase by 50 percent in 2023. Meduza. https://meduza.io/en/news/2022/11/30/russian-defense-purchasing-set-to- increase-by-50-percent-in-2023
Miller, R. A., & Elgün, Ö. (2011). Diversion and political survival in Latin America. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 55(2), 192–219. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002710381064
Moukine, G. (2013, October 2). Putin confronts economy’s long-term flaws. The Moscow Times. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2013/10/02/putin-confronts-economys-long- term-flaws-a28247

Osnos, E., Remnick, D., & Yaffa, J. (2017, February 24). Trump, Putin, and the new Cold War. The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/06/trump-putin- and-the-new-cold-war
Parfitt, T. (2008, December 22). Protesters beaten as anger grows at Russian car import tax.

The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/dec/22/russia-global- economy-cars
Parfitt, T. (2012, February 4). Anti-Putin protesters march through Moscow. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/04/anti-putin-protests-moscow-russia
Petrov, N., Lipman, M., & Hale, H. E. (2014). Three dilemmas of hybrid regime governance: Russia from Putin to Putin. Post-Soviet Affairs, 30(1), 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2013.825140
Pertsev, A. (2016, May 17). Crossing a Kremlin red line: The attack on RBC. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2016/05/crossing-a-kremlin-red-line-the-attack- on-rbc
President of the Russian Federation. (2021, July 2). Decree No. 400: On the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation. Kremlin. http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/47046
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. (2008, August 6). Russia’s Medvedev warns of ‘horrible’ conflict if Georgia joins NATO. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-s-medvedev-warns-of- horrible-conflict-if-georgia-joins-nato/29417137.html
Reality Check team. (2023, February 22). Ukraine war: President Putin speech fact- checked. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/64718139

Reuters. (2015, January 17). Russia’s capital outflows reach record $151.5 bln in 2014 as sanctions, oil slump hit. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/business/russia-s- capital-outflows-reach-record-151-5-bln-in-2014-as-sanctions-oil-slump- idUSL6N0UV3S3/
Reuters. (2022, February 22). Extracts from Putin's speech on Ukraine. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/extracts-putins-speech-ukraine-2022-02-21/
Roache, M. (2021, January 22). ‘Putin is a thief.’ Thousands of pro-Navalny protesters detained as U.S. condemns crackdown. Time. https://time.com/5932550/russia- protests-navalny/
Romanovskiy, R. (2023, February 1). How Putin’s friends “bought out” occupied Crimea. iStories. https://istories.media/en/stories/2023/02/01/how-putins-friends-bought-out- occupied-crimea/?tztc=1
Security Council of the Russian Federation. (2000, January 10). National security concept of the Russian Federation. Federation of American Scientists. https://nuke.fas.org/guide/russia/doctrine/gazeta012400.htm
Stognei, A., Speed, M., Seddon, M., & Weaver, C. (2024, October 15). From hairspray to Heineken: The Kremlin ally snapping up western assets. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/52e5e588-76b7-4d29-b96e-a72aa87f72d7
Tempest, R. (2016). The charismatic body politics of President Putin. Journal of Political Marketing, 15(2–3), 101–119. https://doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2016.1151105
The Economist. (2012, December 1). Alone at the top. The Economist. https://www.economist.com/europe/2012/12/01/alone-at-the-top

The Moscow Times. (2016, May 11). Russia launches criminal case against independent RBC media. The Moscow Times. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2016/05/11/russia-launches-criminal-case-against- independent-rbc-media-a52833
U.S. Energy Information Administration. (n.d.). Cushing, OK WTI spot price FOB. U.S. Department of Energy. https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/RWTCD.htm
Volkov, D. (2016, March 23). Russian elite opinion after Crimea. Carnegie Moscow Center. https://carnegie.ru/2016/03/23/russian-elite-opinion-after-crimea-pub-63094
Walker, S. (2014, March 18). Putin condemns western hypocrisy as he confirms annexation of Crimea. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/18/crimea- putin-condemns-western-hypocrisy-annexation
Yaffa, J. (2017, May 22). Putin’s shadow cabinet and the bridge to Crimea. The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/29/putins-shadow-cabinet-and-the- bridge-to-crimea
Yaffa, J. (2017, May 29). Putin’s shadow cabinet and the bridge to Crimea. The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/29/putins-shadow-cabinet-and-the- bridge-to-crimea