本文創建一項代表台灣公司治理的指標來驗證公司治理與公司績效之關聯性。從現有台灣經濟新報資料庫中的113個關於公司治理的變數中，本研究挑選出18個最具代表性的變數形成公司治理指標，指標含蓋三大構面：董監事會席次、股權結構以及人事穩定度。考慮到2003年以前公司治理尚未廣泛推廣且2020年COVID-19疫情影響，故本研究資料期間為2003~2019年，並扣除掉金融機構及部分有遺失值之資料，最終樣本為16,128筆觀察值。研究結果顯示，公司治理能有效解釋公司績效，呈現正向且顯著的關係。除此之外，每個構面的指標也都能解釋公司績效，雖然個別解釋力相較於整合性公司治理指標較弱，但此三種構面的公司治理指標皆會影響公司績效。最後，考慮到不同年份及事件對公司治理可能的影響，本研究使用金融危機及台灣公司治理政策執行時間來區分為不同子期間，結果顯示公司治理指標在不同期間皆能解釋公司績效，證明本研究所建構之公司治理指標之有效性。

This paper creates an index representing corporate governance in Taiwan, and examines the relationship between corporate governance and performance. To make index, the most representative variables were selected from 113 variables related to corporate governance in the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database, and this study selects 18 most representative variables, which include three dimensions: the performance of the broad of directors, ownership structure, and employee stability. Considering that corporate governance has not been promoted before 2003 and the impact of COVID-19 in 2020, the data period is from 2003 to 2019. Finally, after deducting the number of financial institutions and some data with missing values, the number of data is 16,128. The results show that corporate governance index can effectively explain corporate performance, showing a positive and significant relationship. In addition, the index of each dimension can also explain corporate performance. Furthermore, considering the impact of different years and events on corporate governance, this study uses the financial crisis and the implementation time of Taiwan's corporate governance policies to distinguish different sub-periods. The results show that corporate governance index is still effective in different time periods, which once again proves the effectiveness of the index.

論文審定書 i
摘要 ii
Abstract iii
壹、 研究背景 1
貳、 文獻回顧 5
一、 股權結構影響力 5
二、 董監事會席次影響力 6
三、 人事穩定度影響力 6
四、 公司治理指標 7
參、 樣本資料來源及變數定義 8
一、 樣本資料來源及樣本期間 8
二、 變數定義 8
(一) 董監事會席次影響力 8
(二) 股權結構影響力 10
(三) 人事穩定度影響力 11
(四) 經營績效衡量指標 12
(五) 控制變數 13
三、 公司治理指標 14
肆、 敘述統計分析 15
伍、 研究方法及基本實證模型 17
陸、 公司治理指標與經營績效 19
一、 公司治理指標與經營績效實證結果 19
二、 內生性檢驗及樣本選擇偏差檢驗 21
三、 不同經營績效下公司治理指標之有效性 22
四、 不同時間段下公司治理指標與經營績效實證結果 23
(一) 不同時間段下台灣的公司治理 23
(二) 公司治理指標實證結果 24
(三) 不同構面下公司治理指標實證結果 26
(四) 不同時間段下指標差異 28
(五) 不同時間段下內生性檢驗及樣本選擇偏差檢驗 29
柒、 主成分改變分數權重 30
一、 重新定義構面分數組成 30
二、 重新定義公司治理指標 30
捌、 結論 32
參考文獻 34

圖次
圖一 台灣公司治理發展時間線 38
圖二 台灣公司治理時間段區分簡易示意圖 39


表次
表一 製作公司治理指標變數 40
表二 公司治理構面分數敘述統計量 41
表三 公司治理評等與經營績效 42
表四 公司治理與ROA 43
表五 公司治理與ROE 44
表六 公司治理與 Tobin's Q 45
表七 兩階段最小平方法(2SLS)―內生性檢驗 46
表八 Heckman兩階段模型―樣本選擇偏差 47
表九 不同經營績效下公司治理與ROA 48
表十 不同時間段下公司治理與ROA 49
表十一 不同時間段下公司治理與ROE 50
表十二 不同時間段下公司治理與Tobin's Q 51
表十三 不同時間段下公司治理構面指標與ROA 52
表十四 不同時間段下公司治理構面指標與ROE 53
表十五 不同時間段下公司治理構面指標與Tobin's Q 54
表十六 不同時間段之間公司治理指標影響 55
表十七 不同時間段之間董監事會席次指標影響 56
表十八 不同時間段之間股權結構指標影響 57
表十九 不同時間段之間人事穩定度指標影響 58
表二十 不同時間段之間兩階段最小平方法(2SLS)―內生性檢驗 59
表二十一 不同時間段之間Heckman兩階段模型―樣本選擇偏差 60
表二十二 改變構面內變數權重後之公司治理與ROA 61
表二十三 改變公司治理指標權重後之公司治理與ROA 62

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