本文延伸 Spence（1973）之就業市場訊號模型，探討當企業內部存在人力資本外部性與職位效果時，教育訊號與勞動市場均衡將如何改變。基於傳統模型將教育視為聘僱前區分勞工能力的主要訊號，
本文進一步考慮高生產力勞工若被配置於管理職位，是否能透過知識擴散、經驗傳承與工作互動，提高非管理職位中其他勞工的有效生產力。本文建立一個結合教育訊號、人力資本外部性與職位配置的理論
模型，分析職位效果對分離型均衡與混合型均衡的影響。研究發現，適度的人力資本外部性可提高低生產力勞工在低教育選擇下的效用，降低其模仿高教育訊號的誘因，進而使高生產力勞工維持分離所需承
擔的最低教育水準下降。然而，外部性並非越強越好；當外部性過強時，教育訊號的類型區分功能可能被削弱，使分離型均衡的可行區間縮小甚至消失，市場可能轉向含職位效果之混合型均衡。教育訊號與
人力資本外部性並非單純替代或互補關係，而是共同影響勞動市場均衡與企業內部配置效率。政策與企業管理的重點不應只是提高外部性強度，而應建立能夠觀察、歸因並獎酬外溢能力的制度，以同時降低
過度教育所造成的訊號成本，並維持對高生產力勞工的辨識與配置效率。

This study extends Spence's (1973) job market signaling model to examine how educational signals and labor market equilibria change when human capital externalities and
position effects exist within firms. Unlike the traditional model, which treats education as a pre-employment signal of worker ability, this study considers whether
high-productivity workers assigned to managerial positions can improve the effective productivity of other workers through knowledge diffusion, experience transmission, and
workplace interaction. The study develops a theoretical model combining educational signaling, human capital externalities, and job assignment. The results show that moderate
externalities can reduce low-productivity workers' incentive to mimic high education, thereby lowering the minimum education level required for high-productivity workers to
maintain a separating equilibrium. However, excessive externalities may weaken the type-distinguishing function of education and cause the separating equilibrium to shrink or
disappear, leading to a pooling equilibrium with position effects. Overall, educational signals and human capital externalities jointly shape labor market equilibria and firms'
internal allocation efficiency. Policy and firm management should therefore focus not only on increasing externalities, but also on building mechanisms to observe, attribute, and
reward spillover abilities.

論文審定書 i
誌謝 ii
摘要 iii
Abstract iv
目錄 v
圖目錄 vii
表目錄 viii
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景 1
第二節 研究動機 1
第三節 研究問題 2
第二章 文獻回顧 3
第一節 教育訊號理論的基本架構與後續發展 3
第二節 教育訊號與其他資訊機制的互動 4
第三節 職位配置、工作指派與組織內部訊號 5
第四節 人力資本外部性與本文定位 7
第三章 模型 9
第一節 基本模型：Spence 教育訊號模型 9
第二節 基本模型下的均衡分析 11
第三節 人力資本外部性與職位效果之模型設定 18
第四節 職位效果下的分離型均衡 20
第五節 外部性強度與分離均衡限制 26
第六節 職位效果下的混合型均衡 30
第四章 模型延伸與政策意涵 34
第一節 混合型均衡的來源差異 34
第二節 外部性對低生產力勞工教育選擇誘因 36
第三節 職位互動篩選機制與入職後類型再辨識 39
第五章 結論 41
參考文獻 43

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