在過去的研究下，學者對於跨國移工的買工費用有許多分析，然而其皆是利用整體環境來分析高額費用的產生，而較少提到個體行為的分析。因此我們無法從中得知仲介機構在這個環境中，為何相對勞工們可以擁有優勢來取得對費用的掌控權，甚至是將成本轉嫁給移工們的能力以及即便勞工因為費用的問題導致利益受到損害，移工們仍然願意前往他國工作。

本研究試圖將分析角度拉回個人層次，企圖從個體的主動動機出發，而非被制度完全限縮的被動角色。利用代理人理論，將分析的過程專注在移工和仲介兩角色身上，觀察他們動機和目標，以及在媒合工作中互動的過程如何使得移工需要負擔了大量的成本。並且了解在這過去以結構性角度下分析的配套措施：去仲介化的政策是否對於現在的移工處境能有改善。

在研究結果中我們發現，這個跨國產業的體制內部仲介和移工們有著高度資訊不對稱的情形，仲介們在產業內的資訊掌握度比移工們來得高，其掌握著對雇主以及工作環境的了解、語言及辦理文件時的專業知識。透過這樣的優勢，仲介會透過產生不道德行為以及投機主義，且代理人和委託人的目標產生矛盾的關係而使仲介產生趨利避害的行為進而增加更多的費用來轉嫁給移工。再者，移工們也因爲缺乏監督代理人行為的手段，使其只能以付出費用來得到工作機會。

In the past studies, scholars have made many analyses on the purchasing costs of transnational migrant workers. However, they all analyze the generation of high costs based on the overall environment, and seldom mention the analysis of individual behaviors. We don't know why agencies in this environment have an advantage over workers in terms of controlling costs, even in terms of their ability to pass on costs to migrant workers, and the willingness of migrant workers to work in other countries even if they are harmed by costs.

This study tries to pull the analysis back to the individual level, focusing on the two roles of migrant workers and intermediary workers including their motivation and goals. Through the agent theory to observe how their interaction in the work of matchmaking makes migrant workers bear a lot of costs. In this result, we find that there is a high degree of information asymmetry between brokers and migrant workers within the system of the multinational industry. Brokers have a higher degree of information mastery than migrant workers in the industry, and they have a better understanding of the employer and the working environment, language and professional knowledge of document processing.

Through such advantages, the agency will produce unethical behavior and opportunism, and the agent and the client's goals conflict, so that the agency will produce the behavior of seeking benefits and avoiding harm, and then increase more costs to the migrant workers. Moreover, migrant workers lack the means to monitor the behavior of agents, so they have to pay to get a job.

目錄
論文審定書 i
摘要 ii
Abstract iii
目錄 iv
圖目錄 v
表目錄 vi
第一章 導論 1
第二章 文獻探討 4
第一節 代理人理論的角色與關係 4
第二節 代理人問題 5
第三節 交易成本 7
第四節 跨國人力市場的費用 8
第三章 研究方法和受訪者資料 12
第四章 研究分析 16
第一節 動機和目標衝突 17
第二節 資訊不對稱 23
第三節 交易成本 31
第五章 結論及建議 35
參考文獻
一、中文參考文獻 38
二、英文參考文獻 39
附件 41
附錄一 訪談大綱 41

一、 中文參考文獻 王宏仁、白朗潔(2007)。移工、跨國仲介與制度設計:誰從台越國際勞動
力流動獲利?。台灣社會研究季刊， (65)，35–66。
孫煒(2004)。非營利管理的責任問題:政治經濟研究途徑。政治科學論叢， (20)，141–166。
柯于璋(2013)。政府委託研究案代理問題之探討:一個結合賽局理論與代 理人理論的研究取向。行政暨政策學報，(57)，1–35。
蔡明璋、陳嘉慧(1997)。國家、外勞政策與市場實踐:經濟社會學的分析。 台灣社會研究季刊，(27)，69–95。
吳嘉苓(2015)。社會及行為科學研究法，33 - 62。

二、 英文參考文獻
Arnold, M. A. (1992). The Principle-Agent Relationship in Real Estate Brokerage Services. Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, 20(1), 89–106.
Baldo, C., Valle-Cabrera, R., & Olivas-Lujan, M. (n.d.). Executive Recruitment Triads from an Agency Theory Perspective. Administrative Issues Journal: Connecting Education, Practice, and Research, 9(1), 1-18.
Bidwell, M., & Fernandez-Mateo, I. (2010). Relationship Duration and Returns to Brokerage in the Staffing Sector. Organization Science, 21(6), 1141–1158.
Bonet, R., Cappelli, P., & Hamori, M. (2013). Labor Market Intermediaries and the New Paradigm for Human Resources. The Academy of Management Annals, 7(1), 341–392.
Cranford, C. J. (2005). Networks of Exploitation: Immigrant Labor and the Restructuring of the Los Angeles Janitorial Industry. Social Problems, 52(3), 379– 397.
Grossmana, W., & Schoenfeldtb, L. F. (2001). Resolving Ethical Dilemma through International Human Resource Management : A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective. Human Resource Management Review, 11(1–2), 55–72.
Kang, Q., & Liu, Q. (2010). Information-Based Stock Trading, Executive Incentives, and the Principal-Agent Problem. Management Science, 56(4), 682– 698.
39
Kern, A., Müller-B ̈oker, U. (2015). The middle space of migration: A case study on brokerage and recruitment agencies in Nepal. Geoforum, 158–169.
Luo, X., & Donthu, N. (2007). The Role of Cyber-Intermediaries: A Framework Based on Transaction Cost, Analysis, Agency, Relationship Marketing and Social Exchange Theories. Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 22(7), 452–458.
Mills, P. K. (1990). On the Quality of Services in Encounters: An Agency Perspective. Journal of Business Research, 20(1), 31–41.
Panda, B., & Leepsa, N. M. (2017). Agency Theory: Review of Theory and Evidence on Problems and Perspectives.Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, 10(1), 74–95.
Rutherford, R. C., Springer, T. M., & Yavas, A. (2005). Conflicts between Principals and Agents: Evidence from Residential Brokerage. Journal of Financial Economics, 76(3), 627–665.
Samaluk, B. (2016). Migrant Workers’ Engagement with Labour Market Intermediaries in Europe: Symbolic Power Guiding Transnational Exchange. Work, Employment and Society, 30(3), 455–471.
Trond Petersen. (1993). The Economics of Organization : The Principal-Agent Relationship . Acta Sociologica, 36(3), 277–293.
Ward, D., & Filatotchev, I. (2010). Principal–Principal–Agency Relationships and the Role of External Governance. Managerial and Decision Economics, 31(4), 249–261.