本文以2010至2019年台灣上市櫃公司發生總經理、財會主管與獨立董事離職之企業為研究主體，使用普通最小平方法(OLS)，探討經理人及獨立董事異動對銀行借款加碼利率之影響，並且進一步將離職原因分為自願性離職與非自願性離職，觀察不同離職型態是否對銀行借款加碼利率產生不同的影響。此外，本文延伸討論經理人的異動頻率以及專業背景是否亦對銀行借款加碼利率造成影響。主要實證結果如下：(1)相較於無人事異動公司，發生異動公司的借款加碼利率顯著較高，且人事異動與銀行借款加碼利率的正向關聯性主要來自於財會主管、獨立董事。(2)財會主管、獨立董事若發生自願性離職會使企業的借款加碼利率提升。推論原因為銀行將財會主管、獨立董事之自願性離職視為企業未來經營危機之警訊，故提高加碼利率以補償較高的風險。(3)若銀行發現公司總經理異動越頻繁，則給予企業之借款加碼利率越低，然而財會主管異動越頻繁，銀行給予借款加碼利率越高，顯示對銀行而言，總經理與財會主管的異動有不同的宣告效果。(4)若離職的經理人或獨立董事具有財會專業的背景時，則企業借款加碼利率顯著提升，顯示銀行認為具備財會專業的經理人或獨立董事辭職後可能會影響公司財務的穩定性，或是傳達公司財報出現問題的警訊，故提高借款加碼利率。

This study takes companies listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) and Taipei Exchange (TPEx) from 2010 to 2019 as research samples, and uses Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method to explore the impact of changes in managements and independent directors on corporate loan interest rate. After dividing types of changes into voluntary turnover and forced turnover, this study further investigates the effect of changes of types on corporate interest rate. In addition, this study extends the discussion on whether the manager’s change frequency and professional background also affect the corporate interest rate.
The main findings are as follows: First, following managements and independent directors departure, firms pay higher loan spreads, when compared to matched non- turnover firms. Further, the above positive relation exists mainly comes from Finance-Accounting supervisors and independent directors. Second, following voluntary turnovers of Finance-Accounting supervisors and independent directors, firms pay higher loan spreads. This result indicates that voluntary turnover of Finance-Accounting supervisors and independent directors may imply that the future performance of the company could deteriorate, which could cause creditors to require higher debt interest rates as protections of claims. Third, If the bank finds that the company’s general manager changes more frequently, the firms pay lower loan spreads. However, the more frequent the Finance-Accounting supervisor’s changes, the firms pay higher loan spreads. This shows that there is a different announcement effect between general manager and Finance-Accounting supervisor. Finally, If the resigned managements or independent directors has a background in finance and accounting, the firms have to pay higher loan spreads significantly, indicating that the bank believes that the resignation of managements or independent directors with finance-accounting expertise may affect the stability of the company's operations, or It is a warning signal that the company exists financial statements uncertainty.

目錄
論文審定書 i
致謝 ii
摘要 iii
Abstract iv
目錄 v
表次 vi
第一章 緒論 1
第二章 文獻回顧與假說建立 4
第一節 經理人異動 4
第二節 獨立董事異動 6
第三節 離職型態 6
第四節 經理人與獨立董事專業背景 8
第五節 企業債務資金成本 9
第六節 研究假說 11
第三章 研究方法 14
第一節 資料來源與樣本選擇 14
第二節 傾向性評分配對法(Propensity Score Matching) 17
第三節 變數定義 17
第四節 實證模型 24
第四章 實證結果與分析 26
第一節 敘述性統計與相關係數分析 26
第二節 單變量分析 31
第三節 回歸分析結果 33
第五章 結論與建議 46
第一節 研究結論 46
第二節 研究建議與限制 47
參考文獻 48
 

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