本研究旨在探討台灣上市上櫃公司宣告發放現金股利是否會對市場產生正異常報酬，並且進一步透過公司治理分析股利宣告效果的資訊內涵。首先，本研究發現台灣上市上櫃公司於現金股利宣告後會對股價產生顯著之正異常報酬，且於事發當日至事發後一天特別明顯。進一步透過單變量分析和Panel Data之多元迴歸模型
，本文發現企業之公司治理效能和現金股利宣告效果(即累積異常報酬)具顯著正相關，支持股利信號假說且於市場模型及市場指數調整模型皆證實此結果，隱含投資人會參考公司治理來判定公司現金股利發放之蘊含意義，以評估公司的長期發展前景和經營風險。透過延伸分析，本文亦發現不同樣本下，公司治理對現金股利宣告效果之影響程度也會不同。實證結果發現，上櫃公司高於上市公司、非電子業公司高於電子業公司、資訊透明度高之公司大於資訊透明度低之公司、券商追蹤分歧度高之公司大於券商追蹤分歧度低之公司、股票週轉率高之公司大於股票週轉率低之公司、景氣好之時期高於景氣壞之時期。綜合上述發現可知資訊透明度與雜訊程度
、交易流動性、總體經濟環境、產業和上市上櫃情況皆和公司治理與現金股利宣告效果之影響有關。

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the announcement of cash dividends by companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) and over-the-counter (OTC) companies in Taiwan leads to positive abnormal returns in the market. Additionally, the study aims to analyze the informational content of dividend announcements in relation to corporate governance. Initially, the study discovered that Taiwan TSE and OTC companies experience significantly positive abnormal returns on stock prices following the announcement of cash dividends, particularly on the day of the announcement and the subsequent day. Further analysis utilizing univariate analysis and panel data multiple regression models revealed a significant positive relationship between the effectiveness of corporate governance and the effects of cash dividend announcements, as indicated by cumulative abnormal returns. This finding supports the dividend signaling hypothesis. Both market models and market index adjustment models corroborated these results, suggesting that investors take corporate governance into consideration when assessing the implied implications of a company's cash dividend distribution in terms of long-term growth prospects and business risks. Through extended analysis, the study also observed that the impact of corporate governance on the effects of cash dividend announcements varies across different samples. Empirical evidence demonstrated that this impact was more pronounced for OTC companies than for TSE companies, non-electronic industry companies compared to electronic industry companies, companies with high information transparency relative to those with low information transparency, companies with high analyst tracking disagreement compared to those with low analyst tracking disagreement, companies with high stock turnover relative to those with low stock turnover, and during favorable economic periods as opposed to unfavorable economic periods. In summary, the findings suggest that the influence of corporate governance on the effects of cash dividend announcements is influenced by factors such as information transparency, noise level, trading liquidity, macroeconomic environment, industry, and listing status.

論文審定書………………………………………………………………………………………… i
中文摘要………………………………………………………………………………………… ii
英文摘要…………………………………………………………………………………………iii
第 一 章 緒論……………………………………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究背景與動機……………………………………………………………………1
第二節 研究目的……………………………………………………………………………2
第 二 章 文獻探討與假說建立………………………………………………………………3
第一節 現金股利、代理問題和股利宣告效果…………………………………………4
第二節 公司治理和股利政策……………………………………………………………5
第三節 公司治理相關文獻…………………………………………………………………6
第四節 公司治理與資訊透明度…………………………………………………………9
第 三 章 研究方法 ……………………………………………………………………………13
第一節 研究期間、樣本選取及資料來源……………………………………………13
第二節 現金股利宣告效果………………………………………………………………13
第三節 公司治理和全面性公司治理分數計算………………………………………18
第四節 公司治理分數與現金股利宣告效果單變量分析……………………………27
第五節 實證迴歸模型……………………………………………………………………28
第六節 不同情境分析……………………………………………………………………34
第 四 章 實證結果與分析 ……………………………………………………………………38
第一節 敘述性統計…………………………………………………………………………40
第二節 相關係數矩陣……………………………………………………………………… 40
第三節 股利宣告效果 …………………………………………………………………… 43
第四節 公司治理分數和累積異常報酬單變量分析…………………………………… 45
第五節 迴歸結果…………………………………………………………………………… 56
第 五 章 結論與建議 …………………………………………………………………………56
第一節 研究發現……………………………………………………………………………56
第二節 總結………………………………………………………………………………59
參考文獻………………………………………………………………………………………60
表次……………………………………………………………………………………………65
附錄……………………………………………………………………………………………110

參考文獻
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2009). Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 94(2), 291-309.
Agrawal, A., & Jayaraman, N. (1994). The dividend policies of all‐equity firms： A direct test of the free cash flow theory. Managerial and Decision Economics, 15(2), 139-148.
Agrawal, A., & Knoeber, C. R. (1996). Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31(3), 377-397.
Asquith, P., & Mullins Jr, D. W. (1983). The impact of initiating dividend payments on shareholders' wealth. Journal of Business, 77-96.
Adams, R. B., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010). The role of boards of directors in corporate governance： A conceptual framework and survey. Journal of Economic Literature, 48(1), 58-107.
Abdelsalam, O. H., Bryant, S. M., & Street, D. L. (2007). An examination of the comprehensiveness of corporate internet reporting provided by London‐listed companies. Journal of International Accounting Research, 6(2), 1-33.
Bhagat, S., & Black, B. (1999). The uncertain relationship between board composition and firm performance. Business Lawyer, 921-963.
Bhattacharya, S. (1979). Imperfect information, dividend policy, and the bird in the hand fallacy. Bell Journal of Economics, 259-270.
Black, F. (1976). The dividend puzzle. The journal of portfolio management, 2(2), 5-8.
Bertrand, M., & Schoar, A. (2003). Managing with style： The effect of managers on firm policies. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), 1169-1208.
Beasley, M. S. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. Accounting Review, 443-465.
Bhagat, S., & Bolton, B. (2013). Director ownership, governance, and performance. Journal of financial and Quantitative Analysis, 48(1), 105-135
Chae, J., Kim, S., & Lee, E. J. (2009). How corporate governance affects payout policy under agency problems and external financing constraints. Journal of Banking & Finance, 33(11), 2093-2101.
Chen, A., Kao, L., Tsao, M., & Wu, C. (2007). Building a corporate governance index from the perspectives of ownership and leadership for firms in Taiwan. Corporate Governance： An International Review, 15(2), 251-261.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P., & Lang, L. H. (2002). Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of Finance, 57(6), 2741-2771.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. (2000). The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1-2), 81-112.
Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2008). Boards： Does one size fit all? Journal of Financial Economics, 87(2), 329-356.
Corporate governance： stakeholder value versus shareholder value. Journal of Management and Governance, 5, 107-128.
Cahan, S. F., Emanuel, D., & Sun, J. (2009). The effect of earnings quality and country-level institutions on the value relevance of earnings. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 33, 371-391.
Yeh, Y. H., & T. S. Lee, T. W. Corporate Governance and Performance： the Case of Taiwan. 2(1), 21-48. Retrieved 2001-03 Daily, C. M., & Dalton, D. R. (1994). Bankruptcy and corporate governance： The impact of board composition and structure. Academy of Management journal, 37(6), 1603-1617.
Daily, C. M., & Dalton, D. R. (1994). Bankruptcy and corporate governance: The impact of board composition and structure. Academy of Management journal, 37(6), 1603-1617.
Demsetz, H., & Lehn, K. (1985). The structure of corporate ownership： Causes and consequences. Journal of political economy, 93(6), 1155-1177.
Dey, A. (2008). Corporate governance and agency conflicts. Journal of Accounting Research, 46(5), 1143-1181.
Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (1995). Detecting earnings management. Accounting review, 193-225.
Drobetz, W., Schillhofer, A., & Zimmermann, H. (2004). Corporate governance and expected stock returns: Evidence from Germany. European Financial Management, 10(2), 267-293.
Edwards, J., & Weichenrieder, A. J. (1999). Ownership concentration and share valuation： Evidence from Germany.
Easterbrook, F. H. (1984). Two agency-cost explanations of dividends. The American Economic Review, 74(4), 650-659.
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (2001). Disappearing dividends： changing firm characteristics or lower propensity to pay? Journal of Financial Economics, 60(1), 3-43.
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 301-325.
Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181.
Ferreira, M. A., & Laux, P. A. (2007). Corporate governance, idiosyncratic risk, and information flow. Journal of Finance, 62(2), 951-989.
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate governance and equity prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 107-156.
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1983). Implicit contracts under asymmetric information. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123-156.
Gillan, S., & Starks, L. T. (2003). Corporate governance, corporate ownership, and the role of institutional investors： A global perspective. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance Working Paper(2003-01).
Harford, J., Li, K., & Zhao, X. (2008). Corporate boards and the leverage and debt maturity choices. International Journal of Corporate Governance, 1(1), 3-27.
Harford, J., Mansi, S. A., & Maxwell, W. F. (2008). Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US. Journal of financial Economics, 87(3), 535-555.
Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (1988). Earnings information conveyed by dividend initiations and omissions. Journal of Financial Economics, 21(2), 149-175.
Himmelberg, C. P., Hubbard, R. G., & Palia, D. (1999). Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 53(3), 353-384.
Ho, S. S., & Wong, K. S. (2001). A study of the relationship between corporate governance structures and the extent of voluntary disclosure. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 10(2), 139-156.
Healy, P. M., Hutton, A. P., & Palepu, K. G. (1999). Stock performance and intermediation changes surrounding sustained increases in disclosure. Contemporary Accounting Research, 16(3), 485-520.
Imhoff, G. (2003). Accounting quality, auditing and corporate governance. Auditing and Corporate Governance (January 2003).
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American Economic Review, 76(2), 323-329.
Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831-880.
Jiraporn, P., & Ning, Y. (2006). Dividend policy, shareholder rights, and corporate governance. Shareholder Rights, and Corporate Governance (September 18, 2006).
Judge Jr, W. Q., & Zeithaml, C. P. (1992). Institutional and strategic choice perspectives on board involvement in the strategic decision process. Academy of Management Journal, 35(4), 766-794.
Jatiningrum, C., Abdul-Hamid, M., & Popoola, O. M. J. (2016). The impact of disclosure quality on corporate governance and earnings management： Evidence from companies in Indonesia. International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, 6.
Jiang, F., Kim, K. A., Nofsinger, J. R., & Zhu, B. (2017). A pecking order of shareholder structure. Journal of Corporate Finance, 44, 1-14.
Kao, L., Chiou, J. R., & Chen, A. (2004). The agency problems, firm performance and monitoring mechanisms： the evidence from collateralised shares in Taiwan. Corporate Governance： An International Review, 12(3), 389-402.
Kusnadi, Y., & Wei, K. J. (2011). The determinants of corporate cash management policies： Evidence from around the world. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(3), 725-740.
Klein, A. (1998). Firm performance and board committee structure. Journal of Law and Economics, 41(1), 275-304.
Kovacs, T., & Sharma, V. (2009). Do analyst recommendations reflect shareholder rights?. Journal of Banking & Finance, 33(2), 193-202.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000). Investor protection and corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1-2), 3-27.
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471-517.
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (2000). Agency problems and dividend policies around the world. Journal of Finance, 55(1), 1-33.
Lemmon, M. L., & Zender, J. F. (2010). Debt capacity and tests of capital structure theories. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 45(5), 1161-1187.
Lazear, E. P. (2000). Performance pay and productivity. American Economic Review, 90(5), 1346-1361.
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2002). Investor protection and corporate valuation. Journal of Finance, 57(3), 1147-1170.
Lambert, R. A., & Larcker, D. F. (1985). Golden parachutes, executive decision-making, and shareholder wealth. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1-3), 179-203.
Lang, M. H., & Lundholm, R. J. (1996). Corporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior. Accounting Review, 467-492.
McConnell, J. J., & Servaes, H. (1990). Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of Financial Economics, 27(2), 595-612.
McNichols, M., & Dravid, A. (1990). Stock dividends, stock splits, and signaling. Journal of Finance, 45(3), 857-879.
Miller, K. D., & Bromiley, P. (1990). Strategic risk and corporate performance： An analysis of alternative risk measures. Academy of Management Journal, 33(4), 756-779.
Miller, M. H., & Modigliani, F. (1961). Dividend policy, growth, and the valuation of shares. Journal of Business, 34(4), 411-433.
Miller, M. H., & Rock, K. (1985). Dividend policy under asymmetric information. Journal of Finance, 40(4), 1031-1051.
Mitton, T. (2004). Corporate governance and dividend policy in emerging markets. Emerging Markets Review, 5(4), 409-426.
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988). Management ownership and market valuation： An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 293-315.
Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2005). CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. Journal of Finance, 60(6), 2661-2700.
Murphy, K. J. (1985). Corporate performance and managerial remuneration： An empirical analysis. Journal of accounting and economics, 7(1-3), 11-42.
Merton, R. C. (1987). A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete Information. Journal of Finance, 42(3), 483-510.
Nissim, D., & Ziv, A. (2001). Dividend changes and future profitability. The Journal of Finance, 56(6), 2111-2133.
Pettit, R. R. (1972). Dividend announcements, security performance, and capital market efficiency. Journal of Finance, 27(5), 993-1007.
Prendergast, C. (1999). The provision of incentives in firms. Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1), 7-63.
Rozeff, M. S. (1982). Growth, beta and agency costs as determinants of dividend payout ratios. Journal of Financial Research, 5(3), 249-259.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737-783.
Salvioni, D. M., & Gennari, F. (2019). Stakeholder perspective of corporate governance and CSR committees. Salvioni, DM & Gennari F.(2019). Stakeholder Perspective of Corporate Governance and CSR Committees, Symphonya. Emerging Issues in Management, 1, 28-39.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986). Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy, 94(3), 461-488.
Shivdasani, A., & Yermack, D. (1999). CEO involvement in the selection of new board members： An empirical analysis. Journal of Finance, 54(5), 1829-1853.
Villalonga, B., & Amit, R. (2006). How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value? Journal of Financial Economics, 80(2), 385-417.
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185-211.
Zahra, S. A., & Pearce, J. A. (1989). Boards of directors and corporate financial performance： A review and integrative model. Journal of Management, 15(2), 291-334.
Zakaria, Z., Muhammad, J., & Zulkifli, A. H. (2012). The impact of dividend policy on the share price volatility： Malaysian construction and material companies. International Journal of Economics and Management Sciences, 2(5), 1-8.
李德冠. (2012). 公司治理改革下提升投資人保護的影響-來自現金股利的證據 (Publication Number 2012年) 國立臺灣大學]. AiritiLibrary.
洪士庭. (2006). 公司治理特性、經營策略與績效關係之研究 (Publication Number 2006年) 國立政治大學]. AiritiLibrary.
高蘭芬, 盧正壽, 黃冠智, & 陳安琳. (2012). 公司治理、公司績效與投資策略 [Corporate Governance, Firm Performance, and Investment Strategy]. 中山管理評論, 20(3), 851-880.
葉銀華, 蘇裕惠, 柯承恩, & 李德冠. (2003). 公司治理機制對於關係人交易的影響.
李德冠（2001）。公司監理機制對於關係人交易影響之研究。﹝碩士論文。輔仁大學﹞臺灣博碩士論文知識加值系統。
黃啟倫（2006）。股權構造、關係人交易與公司績效。﹝碩士論文。銘傳大學﹞臺灣博碩士論文知識加值系統。
邱垂昌，黃秀姿，2006，〈自願設立獨立董事、關係人交易與公司價值關聯性之研究：代理理論與訊號發射理論之比較〉。《管理及人文科學》1（3）：379-403。
陳麗娟，2004，《董事會組成、股權構造、關係人交易與企業績效關係之研究一以紡織業及電子業為實證》。臺南：國立成功大學高階管理碩士在職專班碩士論文。
葉銀華, 李存修, & 柯承恩. (2002). 公司治理與評等系統, 台北 商智文化.(Yeh, Yin-Hua, Li, Cun-Xiu, & Ko, Chen-En. 2002. Corporate governance and rating system. Taipei, TW： Sunbright.).
周賓凰、劉怡芬 (2000)。「台灣股市橫斷面報酬解釋因子：特徵、單因子、或多因子」，證券市場發展 季刊，第十二卷第一期， 1-32 頁。
葉銀華, 邱顯比, & 何憲章. (1997). 利益輸送代理問題和股權構造之理論與實證研究 [Wealth Exploitation and Ownership Structure-A Study of Agency Theory on Taiwan Stock Market]. 中國財務學刊, 4(4), 47-73. (4).3