2016 年樂陞案爆發後，可轉債的相關規範是否可以使企業有效地籌資以及能否保護投資人已成為投資人以及金管會關注的重點之一。另外，過去的文獻指出薄弱的公司治理結構可能會導致公司管理層缺乏監督與制度，從而存在違法或不道德行為。因此本研究以台灣可轉債在2017年的制度改善，先探討公司治理品質之優劣是否影響公司發行可轉債的傾向，再探討制度改善是否改變其影響。研究結果發現，在制度改善前，公司治理較差的公司傾向發行可轉債；制度改善後，該負向影響顯著減弱，並且宣告效果也顯著優於 2017 年前。透過進一步的分析，可以發現可轉債的訂價效率與次級市場流動性都在金管會的對可轉債的各項改革後顯著變佳，轉換溢價率也顯著提升，減少了藉由炒作股價使可轉債轉換來進行套利的機會，綜上所述，金管會在 2017 年對可轉債的監理及制度改革，確實改善了台灣可轉債市場，同時也對投資人更加友善。

After the Lesheng case broke out in 2016, whether the relevant regulations of convertible bonds can effectively raise capital for enterprises and protect investors has become one of the key issue for investors and the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC). In addition, past literature has indicated that weak corporate governance structures may lead to a lack of supervision and regulation by the company's management, leading to illegal or unethical behavior. Therefore, this study combines regulation improvements about Taiwan's convertible bond to first explore whether the quality of corporate governance affects a company's tendency to issue convertible bonds, and then examine whether the reforms have changed this impact. The study found that before the reform, companies with weaker corporate governance tended to issue convertible bonds. After the reform, this negative impact was significantly reduced and the announcement effect was also significantly better than before 2017. Through further analysis, it was found that the pricing efficiency and secondary market liquidity of convertible bonds both significantly improved after the Financial Supervisory Commission's various reforms on convertible bonds, and the conversion premium rate also significantly increased, reducing the opportunity for arbitrage through speculation of stock prices for conversion of convertible bonds. In conclusion, the Financial Supervisory Commission's supervision and system reforms for convertible bonds in 2017 did improve Taiwan's convertible bond market and were also more investor-friendly.

論文審定書 i
誌謝 ii
中文摘要 iii
英文摘要 iv
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景及動機 1
第三節 主要發現 2
第四節 研究流程 3
第二章 文獻回顧 4
第一節 發行可轉換公司債的相關研究 4
第二節 公司治理相關研究 8
第三節 建立假說 8
第三章 研究方法 11
第一節 研究架構 11
第二節 資料來源與樣本選取 12
第三節 變數定義 13
第四節 實證模型 18
第四章 實證分析 21
第一節 敘述性統計 21
第二節 相關性分析 22
第三節 事件研究法 23
第四節 多元羅吉斯迴歸分析 24
第五節 額外分析 25
第五章 結論與建議 27
第一節 結論 27
第二節 建議 28
參考文獻 29
附錄 33

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