本研究主要將垂直產品差異化價格競爭的模型進行延伸，考慮當跨國公司的技術被採用到本國的公司時有不同的許可方式，且在技術移轉中可能會產生技術外溢，以賽局理論觀點探討在獨立研發、固定費用許可、權利金許可、合作許可下，跨國公司與本國公司的最適決策。研究結果發現，隨著外溢程度越高，沒有簽訂許可的生產方吸收到的技術越多，會提升他的學習能力並與自身現有技術結合，使質量提升的越快。另外，我們也發現在特定的外溢程度和固定費用範圍下，本國公司接受固定費用許可是最適選擇。最後，進行社會福利的探討，結果指出，無論何種許可方式下，隨著外溢程度的提高，會使消費者剩餘增加，本國社會福利也隨之增加。若政府對公司和消費者有不同偏好，則在大多數的許可下，忽視消費者權利，都對公眾利益造成不良的影響。

The focus of this study is to extend the model of vertical product differentiation pricing competition, considering different licensing methods when the technology of multinational companies is adopted by domestic firms. It also considers the possibility of technological spillovers during technology transfer and explores the optimal decision-making for both multinational and domestic companies from a game theory perspective under scenarios of independent innovation, fixed fee licensing, royalty licensing, and cooperative licensing. The research findings indicate that as the degree of spillovers increases, the non-licensing producer absorbs more technology, enhances its learning capabilities, and integrates it with its existing technology, leading to faster quality improvement. Additionally, it is observed that under certain degrees of spillovers and fixed fee ranges, accepting fixed fee licensing is the optimal choice for domestic companies. Finally, when considering social welfare, the results indicate that regardless of the licensing method, an increase in the degree of spillovers leads to increased consumer surplus and overall social welfare. However, if the government has different preferences for companies and consumers, neglecting consumer rights under most licensing scenarios can have adverse effects on public interest.

論文審定書 i
誌謝 ii
摘要 iii
ABSTRACT iv
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與背景 1
第二節 研究方法與目的 2
第三節 本文結構 3
第二章 文獻回顧 4
第三章 子賽局模型分析 6
第一節 沒有簽訂任何許可 6
第二節 跨國公司賣出技術 8
第三節 跨國公司進行合作 14
第四節 綜合結果 16
第四章 社會福利分析 20
第一節 消費者剩餘、本國社會福利 20
第二節 社會福利分析結果 22
第三節 政治人物的偏好參數對社會福利的影響 23
第五章 結論與建議 28
參考文獻 30

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