本研究探討授權與技術外溢下公司間差異化數量競爭之行為，以賽局模型分析異質寡占公司競爭下的產品品質變化，跨國公司為先行動者，影響跨國公司的三種決策(賣技術、合作或不合作)將會影響到公司利潤，影響利潤的關鍵是許可費(F)大小，且後續加入技術外溢去討論，以及討論兩間公司競爭下對社會福利所造成的影響。研究結果發現，在購買許可的情況下公司1和公司2的產品品質差異在沒有技術外溢時比有技術外溢時差距更大，說明了在技術外溢情況下，公司2產品質量大幅提升，因此兩家公司競爭會越大，本研究也發現在技術外溢程度不同時對社會福利的影響，得出合作的社會福利皆大於購買許可費的情況，由於受到技術外溢的影響，將反映到消費者的產品品質上，使消費者面臨更高的品質，進而提升了消費者剩餘與社會福利，此時政府可能會透過補貼等方式給公司1去選擇合作，以利社會福利極大化，最後討論政治人物的偏好參數對社會福利的影響，發現社會福利下降，也說明了政府偏袒某一方的時候，可能會做出非社會福利最大的決定。

This paper explores the behavior of quantity competition among companies under authorization and technology spillover, and uses the game model to analyze product quality changes under the competition of heterogeneous oligopoly companies. Multinational companies are the first movers, which affect the three types of decisions of multinational company (sell technology, cooperate or not cooperate). Cooperation will affect the company's profits. The key to affecting profits is the size of the license fee (F), and the technology spillover will be added to the discussion later, as well as the impact of the competition between the two companies on social welfare. The research results found that the product quality difference between Company 1 and Company 2 is larger when there is no technology spillover than when there is technology spillover under the condition of purchasing a license, which shows that the product quality of Company 2 has been greatly improved under the condition of technology spillover. Therefore, the competition between the two companies will be greater. This study also found that the impact on social welfare is different when the degree of technology spillover is different. It is concluded that the social welfare of cooperation is greater than the situation of purchasing license fees. Due to the impact of technology spillover, it will be reflected in consumption. In terms of product quality, consumers will face higher quality, thereby increasing consumer surplus and social welfare. At this time, the government may choose to cooperate with company 1 through subsidies and other means, so as to maximize social welfare. Finally, discuss the impact of the preference parameters of political figures on social welfare, and the decline in social welfare, also shows when the government favors a certain party, it may make decisions that maximize non-social welfare.

論文審定書 i
中文摘要 ii
英文摘要 iii
目錄 v
圖次 vi
表次 vii
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究方法 2
第三節 本文架構 2
第二章 文獻回顧 3
第三章 子賽局模型模型 7
第一節 模型基本假設 7
第二節 沒有簽訂任何許可 7
第三節 跨國公司賣技術 9
第四節 與跨國公司合作 13
第四章 社會福利分析 18
第一節 本國社會福利分析 18
第二節 政治人物的偏好參數對社會福利的影響 23
第五章 結論與建議 28
參考文獻 30

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