聯合國於2005年將ESG納入企業經營的評量標準，而ESG是由環境（Environmental）、社會（Social）和公司治理（Governance）這三大議題組成，藉由改善三大層面去促使企業邁向永續經營，永續經營為近年來國內外各公司備受關注的議題，提高公司的ESG表現為公司長期穩健發展的重要因素之一，本研究宗旨在探討董監事股權質押是否會影響ESG的表現，並探討質押後產生的代理問題以及如何降低代理問題對ESG所帶來的負面影響，本研究以2015年至2022年台灣1336間上市櫃公司為樣本，實證結果指出董監事進行股權質押會產生代理問題對ESG有不利之影響，表示董監事進行股權質押，導致股權分散，並加劇代理問題，將不利於公司的永續發展。另外，本研究也發現在高質押比率的公司，扣除質押比率後的董監事實際持股比率較能有效衡量董監事的監督能力；最後發現在機構持股人與股利政策監督下，將減少董監事股權質押衍生的代理問題，並有利於ESG的表現。綜合上述，由於董監事質押對ESG具有一定的影響力，企業應該對董監事股權質押進行控管，以利後續企業ESG的發展，亦可作為投資人之投資參考依據。

In 2005, the United Nations announced that ESG will be included in the evaluation criteria of corporate operations. ESG has become a key concern for companies worldwide in recent years. Enhancing a company's ESG performance is crucial for long-term stability and development. This research aims to investigate the impact of directors/supervisors' pledge equity on ESG performance and discuss the agency problems and strategies to reduce their adverse effects on ESG.
This study applied 1,336 companies in Taiwan from 2015 to 2022 to investigate the relationship between directors/supervisors' pledge and ESG. The empirical results demonstrate that the pledge of equity by directors/supervisors leads to agency problems, which adversely affect ESG performance. This suggests that when directors/supervisors pledge their equity, it creates equity dispersion and exacerbates agency problems, which could harm the company's sustainable development. Additionally, this study reveals that in companies with a high pledge ratio, the supervisory ability becomes more effective by considering the actual shareholding ratio. Furthermore, the institutional shareholders and dividend policies help reduce the agency problems.
Consequently, the directors/supervisors' equity pledge has a significant effect on ESG. Thus companies must control and regulate such pledges. This will facilitate the future development of ESG within enterprises and serve as a valuable investment reference for investors.

論文審定書i
誌謝ii
中文摘要iii
英文摘要iv
目錄v
圖目錄vii
表目錄vii
第一章 緒論1
第一節 研究背景與動機1
第二節 研究目的5
第三節 研究流程6
第二章 文獻回顧與建立假說7
第一節 相關文獻7
第二節 建立研究假說10
第三章 研究方法13
第一節 資料來源13
第二節 變數解釋15
第三節 迴歸模型19
第四章 敘述統計與實證結果24
第一節 敘述統計與相關係數24
第二節 董監事股權質押對ESG之影響28
第三節董監事名目與實際持股對ESG的影響30
第四節 公司治理外部監督機制減少董監事股權質押的代理問題33
第五節 假說與實證結論分析36
第五章 研究結論與建議39
第一節 研究結果39
第二節 研究限制未來研究方向40
參考文獻41
一、中文文獻41
二、英文文獻41

圖目錄
圖 1-1 2007-2022年董監事質押比例趨勢圖3
圖 1-2各產業董監事質押比率趨勢圖4
圖 1-3研究流程圖6
圖 3-1 ESG永續發展指標架構圖13
圖 3-2 樣本之產業分布長條圖15

表目錄
表 1-1各年度董監事股權質押比率之平均2
表 1-2各產業董監事股權質押比率之平均3
表 3-1 樣本公司之產業分佈表14
表 3-2 變數、資料來源及預期符號23
表 4-1 樣本敘述統計表26
表 4-2 相關係數表27
表 4-3 董監事股權質押與ESG之估計結果29
表 4-4 不同質押比率下，董監事名目持股與實質持股之公司家數30
表 4-5 不同質押比率下，董監事名目與實際持股之關係32
表 4-6 公司治理外部監督機制降低董監事股權質押的代理衝突，對ESG的影響………………………………………………………………………………35
表 4-7 是否支持假說彙整表38

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