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博碩士論文 etd-0521123-151251 詳細資訊
Title page for etd-0521123-151251
論文名稱
Title
授權與技術外溢下之異質寡占市場數量領導行為
Stackelberg Competition in the Heterogeneous Oligopoly Market under Licensing and Technology Spillover
系所名稱
Department
畢業學年期
Year, semester
語文別
Language
學位類別
Degree
頁數
Number of pages
38
研究生
Author
指導教授
Advisor
召集委員
Convenor
口試委員
Advisory Committee
口試日期
Date of Exam
2023-06-13
繳交日期
Date of Submission
2023-06-21
關鍵字
Keywords
許可權、合作賽局、技術外溢、數量領導、創新
Licensing, Cooperative Game, Technology Spillover, Quantity Leadership, Innovation
統計
Statistics
本論文已被瀏覽 79 次,被下載 1
The thesis/dissertation has been browsed 79 times, has been downloaded 1 times.
中文摘要
本文建立一個寡佔市場結構之下具產品差異化特徵的Stackelberg數量領導模型。其中兩家國內廠商承擔了質量開發的可變成本,他可以透過獨自開發、向外國廠商購買許可證或與外國廠商共同合作。另外,也考慮了技術外溢下的情況。探討消費者剩餘和社會福利。結果顯示,由於廠商一具有先行者優勢,所以會使廠商二的數量、價格和利潤受到擠壓。然而,隨著外溢效果越高,我們發現廠商二的技術提高,能夠瓜分掉部分廠商一的市場。最後,我們發現外溢效果越高,消費者剩餘和社會福利也會越大。
Abstract
This paper establishes a Stackelberg quantitative leadership model with product differentiation characteristics under the oligopoly market structure. Two of the domestic firms incur the variable cost of quality development, which can be developed independently, purchased licenses from foreign firms, or jointly cooperated with foreign firms. In addition, the situation under technology spillover is also considered. Discuss consumer surplus and social welfare. The results show that Firm 1 has the first-mover advantage, the quantity, price and profit of Firm 2 will be squeezed. However, as the spillover effect gets higher, we find that the technology improvement of Firm 2 can carve up part of the market of Firm 1. Finally, we find that the higher the spillover effect, the greater the consumer surplus and social welfare.
目次 Table of Contents
論文審定書 i
摘要 ii
abstract iii
目錄 iv
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與背景 1
第二節 研究目的 1
第三節 研究方法 1
第二章 文獻回顧 2
第三章 模型之比較分析 5
第一節 是否獲得外國廠商獨家許可 5
第二節 與外國廠商共同合作 10
第三節 技術外溢 13
第四節 例子 20
第四章 社會福利分析 22
第一節 消費者剩餘與社會福利 22
第二節 政府監管下的社會福利 25
第五章 結論與建議 28
參考資料 30

參考文獻 References
一、英文部分
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6. Li, C., Song, J., (2009) : “Technology licensing in a vertically differentiated duopoly”, Japan and the World Economy, Vol.21, No. 2, pp. 183–190.
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10. Nabin, M., Nguyen, X., Sgro, P., (2013) : “Technology transfer, quality standards and North–South trade”, Review of International Economics, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp.783–796.
11. Nguyen, X., Sgro, P., Nabin, M., (2014) : “Licensing Under Vertical Product Differentiation:Price vs. Quantity Competition”, Economic Modelling, Vol.36, pp.600-606.
12. Nguyen, X., (2015) : “On the Efficiency of Private and State-owned Enterprises in Mixed Markets”, Economic Modelling, Vol. 50, pp. 130-137.
13. Nie, P., Y., Wang, C., Wen, H., Z., (2022) : “Technology Spillover and Innovation”, Technology Analysis & Strategic Management , Vol. 34 , No. 2 , pp. 210-222.
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18. Sen, N., Kaul, S., Biswas, R., (2021) : “Technology Licensing under Product Differentiation”, Journal of Economics, Vol. 134, pp.219-260.
19. Toshimitsu, T., (2005) : “Tariffs, quality choice, and cost functions: a foreign monopoly case”, Review of International Economics, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 376-384.

20. Xianpei, H., Menghuan, Z., Yeming, G., (2021) : “Dilemma of Quality Information Disclosure in Technology Licensing”, European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 294, No. 2, pp. 543-557.
21. Zou, Y., Chen, T., L., (2020) : “Quality Differentiation and Product Innovation Licensing”, Economic Modelling, Vol. 87, pp. 372-382.
22. Zhang, H., Hong, X., Zhou, M., (2022) : “Optimal Technology Licensing Contract with Quality Improvement Innovation under Cournot Competition”, Journal of Management Analytics, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 496-513.

二、 中文部分
1.劉淑琪(2014),『以賽局理論探討已開發國與低度開發國的公司間技術合作之最適策略』,國立中山大學經濟學研究所碩士班碩士論文。
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