本文主要目的為探討下游廠商合併行為對於生產多要素上游廠商之流程創新的影響。此外，我們也將分析不同要素之間進行流程創新對彼此的外溢效果，對於下游廠商合併意願會有什麼樣的影響。模型建構一垂直相關市場。存在一家生產多要素上游廠商分別對兩家下游廠商提供兩種特定要素，下游兩廠商則生產差異化產品。主要結果指出，當流程創新的外溢效果增加時，上游廠商會提高流程創新，要素價格下降，兩家下游廠商產量皆增加，上下游廠商利潤皆提升。相反的，當產品替代性上升時，上游廠商減少流程創新，要素價格上升，下游廠商產量減少，上下游廠商利潤皆會下降。此外，與未合併相比，下游廠商合併後，上游廠商會減少流程創新，下游廠商產量會下降，最終產品價格上升，上游廠商要素價格也上升。我們發現只有當外溢效果夠小且下游產品替代性夠大時，兩家下游廠商才會進行合併。

The purpose of this paper is to explore how the merger of downstream firms impact the process innovation of upstream firms, when the spillover effect of process innovation is involved. We further investigate its impact on the incentives of merger for downstream firms. We build a vertically related model, where a multi-factor upstream firm respectively provides two specific factors to two downstream firms which producing differentiated goods in the final-good market. The main results indicate that an increase in the spillover effect leads to more process innovation and lower factor prices in the upstream market, more output in the downstream market, and increased profits for both downstream and upstream firms, regardless of whether the downstream firms are merged or not. On the contrary, an increase in product substitutability leads to less process innovation and higher factor prices in the upstream market, less output in the downstream market, and increased profits for both downstream and upstream firms. Downstream firm mergers lead to reduced process innovation by upstream firms and decreased output of downstream firms, while raising prices in both upstream and downstream markets. We further reveal that downstream firm mergers only occur when the spillover effect is sufficiently weak and downstream products are close substitutes.

論文審定書……………………………………………………………….i
中文摘要…………………………………………………………………ii
英文摘要…………………………………………………...……………iii
目錄…………………………………………………………………...…iv
第一章 前言…………………………..………………………………....1
第二章 文獻回顧………………………………………………………..4
第三章 模型設定………………………………………………………..7
3.1 下游廠商未合併之均衡分析………………………………….…9
3.2 下游廠商合併之均衡分析……………………………………...13
第四章 結論…………………………………………………………....18
參考文獻………………………………………………………………..19
附錄A…………………………………………………………………..20
附錄B…………………………………………………………………..21
附錄C…………………………………………………………………..22
附錄D…………………………………………………………………..23
附錄E…………………………………………………………………...24

Caprice, S. (2005), “Incentive to encourage downstream competition under bilateral oligopoly,” Economics Bulletin, 12, 1−5.
FaulÍ-Oller, R. and B. Lluis (2008), “Horizontal mergers for buyer power,” Economics Bulletin, 12, 1-7.
FaulÍ-Oller, R., Sandonis, J. and J. Santamaria (2011), “Downstream mergers and upstream investment,” The Manchester School, 79, 884-898.
Lommeruda, K. E., Straumea, O. R. and L. Sørgard (2005), “Downstream merger with upstream market power,” European Economic Review, 49, 717-743.
Milliou, C. and A. Pavlou (2013), “Upstream Mergers, Downstream Competition, and R&D Investments,” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 22, 787-809.
Symeonidis, G. (2010), “Downstream merger and welfare in a bilateral oligopoly,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 28, 230-243.
Ziss, S. (2001), “Horizontal mergers and delegation,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 19, 471-492.