本研究針對2019年1月至2021年12月間，以總部設立於美國加州之上市公司為研究對象。透過普通最小平方法進行分析，檢定檢驗女性配額制度對公司現金持有決策的影響。此外，本研究亦進一步比較女性董事和企業現金持有率之間的關係，在受政策影響與不受影響地區之間是否存在顯著差異。同時，探討是否可以透過所屬產業來解釋女性董事和現金持有率之間的關聯性。
結果顯示，女性配額制度明顯提升了加州市場的企業董事會性別多樣性，並且政策推動和現金持有率之間是呈現正向關係，這意味著當企業被要求增加越多女性董事人數，其現金持有率也將相應提高。值得注意的是，研究發現受政策規範的加州公司在現金持有水平的增幅明顯超過其他不受規範的公司，這進一步證實了強制配額制對加州公司的財務決策產生了推動作用。最後，研究結果亦表明，強制性別配額制之推動使整體加州公司的現金持有率有所提升，但這種兩者的正向關係沒有在女性董事比例較低的高科技產業和其他產業別之間存在顯著差異，表示政策對現金持有率的影響不受公司所屬產業的影響。

This study takes listed companies headquartered in California from January 2019 to December 2021 as research samples and examine the impact of gender quota policies on corporate cash holdings decisions by using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis. Additionally, we also investigate whether there are significant differences between regions affected and unaffected by the policy, and to explore the potential role of industry affiliation in explaining the association between female directors and cash holdings.
The results demonstrate that in the California market, gender quota policies have significantly enhanced gender diversity within corporate boards. Moreover, we observe a positive relationship between policy implementation and cash holdings, indicating that an increase in the number of female directors corresponds to higher levels of corporate cash holdings. Importantly, we find that California firms subject to the policy exhibit a more pronounced increase in cash holdings compared to other companies, providing further evidence of the driving effect of mandatory quota regulations on financial decision-making. Furthermore, the findings indicate that the impact of increased female directors on cash holding rates is consistent across different industries. There is no significant difference in the magnitude of cash holding increases between high-tech industries with lower female board representation and other industry sectors. This suggests that the impact of increased female director representation on cash holdings is not influenced by the company's industry affiliation.
In conclusion, our study contributes to a understanding by examining the effects of gender quota policies on corporate cash holdings decisions.

論文審定書 I
摘要 II
ABSTRACT III
目錄 V
圖次 VIII
表次 IX
第 1 章 緒論 1
1.1 研究緣起 1
1.2 研究目的 2
1.3 論文架構 2
第 2 章 文獻回顧 4
2.1 美國加州參議院第 826 號法案介紹 4
2.2 各國在董事會性別配額方面的立法現狀 5
2.3 董事會性別多樣性對公司價值之影響 7
2.3.1 正向影響 7
2.3.2 負向影響 8
2.3.3 無明顯之影響 9
2.3.4 具有非線性影響 9
2.4 現金持有量之議題 10
2.5 《SB 826》政策與公司現金持有的關係研究 12
第 3 章 研究方法 14
3.1 研究樣本 14
3.2 變數定義 15
3.2.1 應變數 15
3.2.2 解釋變數：政策強制性程度之代理變數 15
3.2.3 控制變數 16
3.3 實證模型設定 20
3.3.1 女性配額制和現金持有的關係 20
3.3.2 總部設立於加州與否 21
3.3.2總部設立於加州與否_差異中的差異法 22
第 4 章 實證結果討論 24
4.1 研究樣本分析 24
4.1.1 敘述統計及相關係數分配 24
4.1.2 單變數分析 27
4.1.3 小結 29
4.2 迴歸檢定分析 30
4.2.1 迴歸檢定結果 30
4.2.2 迴歸檢定小結 31
4.3 納入控制組的迴歸分析及差異中的差異檢定結果 33
4.3.1 納入控制組的迴歸檢定結果 33
4.3.2 納入控制組的差異中的差異檢定結果 36
4.4 檢視財務策略變化由政策差異或COVID-19風險驅動 38
4.5 檢驗高科技與其他產業間的差異 39
第 5 章 結論與建議 42
5.1 結論 42
5.2 建議 43
參考文獻 44
附錄 49

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